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amplitude is equal to that of the world?”
(Paul Ricoeur)
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EDITORIAL METHOD
The layout of this thesis follows the guidelines offered by Kate L, Turabian’s Manual 
fo r  Writers o f  Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations}  Where Turabian gives a 
choice of two methods, such as is the case for the presentation of footnotes and 
bibliographical references, for instance, I have chosen one and used it consistently 
throughout the thesis.
Where I have quoted from the work of another, the punctuation depends on whether 
the quotation is a full sentence in its original form. Question marks, exclamation 
points, commas, etc. are placed outside quotation marks unless the question, 
exclamation, or subordinate clause is part of the quotation. This rule applies equally 
to quotations within quotations.
In other sections of this thesis I have used block quotations to emphasis a text of 
particular importance. When the material in a block quotation begins with a 
paragraph in the original, it is given a paragraph indentation of four spaces and the 
first letter is capitalised. The punctuation used in quotations of this kind follows that 
of the author in question. If in a quotation of several paragraphs a full paragraph or 
more is omitted, the omission is indicated by a period and three ellipsis points at the 
end of the preceding paragraph, and followed by a period. These four dots at the end 
of a paragraph are followed by three dots at the beginning of the next paragraph. This 
paragraph is also indented.
Regular quotations within the body of the text appear within single quotation marks. 
Double quotations marks are used for quotations “within” quotations. Where for 
syntactical reasons it is necessary to change a letter of the original text from higher to 
lower case it is indicated by placing square brackets around the first letter of the first 
word of the quotation. If the quotation is set off syntactically from the text by a 
comma, period or colon, the first word is capitalised, even though it is lowercase in 
the original. Ellipsis points enclosed in square brackets are used to indicate the 
omission of a word or a sentence from the original text. The punctuation used in 
quotations of this nature depends on whether the end of the sentence is the one used 
by the cited author or whether it is mine. The period is placed inside the quotation 
marks to indicate that the end of the sentence as it appears in this text is also the end 
of the sentence as it appears in its original form. The period is placed outside the final 
quotation mark when the end of the sentence as it is presented here is not that of the 
original author.
Titles of foreign works are italicised, but every word of the title is not capitalised. I 
have only capitalised what would be capitalised in a normal sentence. The first word 
of a subtitle is also capitalised. As with works in English, a colon separates the title 
from the subtitle. I have done this at the beginning of every chapter, where the work 
of an author is being cited for the first time. Thereafter, the title will usually appear in 
abbreviated form. Titles of journals and periodicals are italicised and abbreviated in 
the footnotes used in this thesis, and a list of abbreviations may be found at the
1 K a te  L .  T u ra b ia n ,  A M anual fo r  Writers o f  Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 6 th e d n ., re v is e d  
b y  J o h n  G ro s s m a n  a nd  A l ic e  B e n n e tt ,  C h ic a g o  a nd  L o n d o n : T h e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  C h ic a g o  P re ss , 1 9 9 6 .
beginning of this thesis. Note also that italics are sometimes used in the body of the 
text for emphasis.
Ricoeur’s writings on language present the translator/reader with several problems, 
especially when distinctions which seem to make perfect sense in French do not carry 
the same degree of clarity when translated into English. Where this is the case, I have 
enclosed the French term in brackets beside its English translation. In addition, a 
glossary is appended.
ABSTRACT
This thesis will attempt to show how the work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur 
can help to move discussions about the specificity of Christian morality beyond the 
search for specifically Christian norms and principles to emphasise the importance of 
the biblical narrative in answering the ‘Who?’ of personal identity. It will also show 
how Ricoeur’s work is useful in determining how the Bible can help to deepen our 
understanding of the virtues by providing us with paradigmatic examples of what 
virtuous behaviour looks like.
It will be argued that the similarities between a Ricoeurian interpretation of the 
Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate and currents trends in virtue ethics and spirituality 
make it an attractive alternative to the search for specifically Christian norms and 
values. The key to understanding Christian morality is not to be found in a search for 
norms and principles but in the particular way the Christian community understands 
itself. Stories and practices supplement ethics with the kind of personalism that was 
lacking in traditional moral theology.
The study will further demonstrate that Ricoeur’s understanding of history and 
tradition can provide a way of answering to the respective concerns of the Autonomy 
and Glaubensethik schools vis-à-vis tradition without showing a bias towards one or 
the other. Later sections will show how Ricoeur’s work can provide us with a model 
for understanding how Christians can dialogue with the rest of world without being 
forced to abandon the narrative that continues to shape their lives.
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INTRODUCTION
Moral theology is at a crossroads. As it looks forward it seems also to be looking 
back. Recent interest in the merit of an ethics of virtue over an ethics of rules and 
principles now seems to be marked by a desire to recapture some of the certainty of 
the past, of scholasticism and of casuistry. The legacy of moral theology from 
Augustine and Aquinas today is often expressed not so much in rules and principles of 
conduct but in the more supple form of the virtues. Yet there appears to be 
differences between theologians as to whether virtue ethics can supply the missing 
piece of the jigsaw puzzle of the moral task, which up until Vatican II was largely 
defined in terms of duty and obligation. Some theologians are now attempting to 
furnish virtue ethics with a deontological base so that Christian ethics does not move 
too far away from its traditional foundations, or fall into a sectarian or self-interested 
posture vis-à-vis other religious traditions and the universal ethical task to seek the 
truth.
Hitherto there have been rare moments of combining both casuistry (or a form 
thereof) and the virtues in a heuristic relationship. James Keenan and Thomas 
Shannon are among those who are currently seeking to move away from the negative 
connotations associated with casuistry and its various forms. In so doing, they 
propose that, if rules and principles are to play a part in contemporary moral theology,
1
casuistry needs to be expressed in the teleological anthropology that virtue ethics 
promotes.1 Their work is marked by a desire to transcend the tensions and, perhaps, 
the myths surrounding casuistry and any attempt to explain moral theology in terms 
merely of norms and principles. Thus Keenan and Shannon are among those who are 
seeking to combine an ethics of virtue with an ethics of rule. They do this by arguing 
that the only way one can explain virtue or vice is by recounting stories and cases 
which show how a particular rule works.
It is clear that contemporary moral theology has come a long way since the renewal 
period, when theologians were in search of an alternative approach to that of the 
manuals of moral theology. The development of moral theology, however, seems 
rather circular; from the manuals to biblical ethics; from biblical ethics to autonomous 
ethics or faith-ethics; and from virtue ethics to casuistry, albeit in a different form to 
that of its historical beginnings. While this circular movement may be interpreted by 
some as a sure sign of the uncertainty of the future of Christian ethics, it may also be 
seen as a sign that contemporary moral theology is evolving at quite a pace, and that it 
is in search of new approaches to old questions and alternative ways of interpreting 
the dichotomies of the past. This clearly suggests that as a discipline moral theology 
is not averse to change, and that it is continually striving to answer to the needs of 
Christians living in a world that is marked by individualism and secularism.
Nevertheless, anyone familiar with the development of moral theology since the
Second Vatican Council will agree that the many changes which have occurred in
moral theology have been the result of lively debates and arguments about practically
1 C f .  Jam es K e e n a n , S .J . a n d  T h o m a s  A .  S h a n n o n , “ C o n te x ts  o f  C a s u is tr y :  H is t o r ic a l  and  
C o n te m p o ra ry ,”  in  Jam es  K e e n a n , S .J . a nd  T h o m a s  A .  S h a n n o n , The Context o f  Casuistry, W a s h in g to n  
D .C . :  G e o rg e to w n  U n iv e r s i t y  P re s s , 1 9 9 5 , 2 2 1 -2 3 1 .
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every aspect within its domain. Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor explains that what began 
as a mere dissatisfaction with some aspects of the method used by most scholars 
before the Council has turned into a long and sometimes acrimonious debate over 
every aspect of the discipline.
The debate on the specificity of Christian ethics may be so described. Beginning in 
the 40s and 50s, this debate gave rise to a considerable amount of discussion in the 
area of moral theology, which now seems to have come to a halt. The result, 
however, is that scholars of moral theology are to be divided into two distinct but, as 
we shall see, not unrelated schools: the ‘ Glaubensethik’ and ‘Autonomy’ schools. 
The notion of the autonomy of morality vis-à-vis religion is a difficult one, and 
proponents of this view have not found it easy to state their position. There are two 
strands of the autonomy thesis, which correspond to two different but related 
concerns. One seeks to emphasise that we should not expect to receive our moral 
norms from an external authority or from revelation. Instead, we must acknowledge 
that we are meant by God to discover the content of morality ourselves, The other 
maintains that the content of Christian morality is identical to that of the humanist 
because it is discovered using natural law and reason.
Proponents of the Glaubensethik school, however, contested these views. Their
position may be summarised by saying that they wish to preserve the idea that
Christian morality has a specific content that is derived from faith and revelation.
Similarly to the Autonomy school, there are two main strands of thought, called
respectively the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’. Those authors who believe that there are
2 P a u lin u s  Ik e c h u k w u  O d o z o r ,  Moral Theology in an Age o f  Renewal: A Study o f  the Catholic 
Tradition Since Vatican II, N o t r e  D a m e , In d ia n a : U n iv e r s i t y  o f  N o t r e  D a m e  P re s s , 2 0 0 3 , 6.
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specific norms available through revelation and known in faith are considered to be 
proponents of the former view. The weaker form, put briefly, includes those who 
maintain that, even if there are no specifically Christian norms or values, Christians 
sometimes find themselves ‘going the extra mile’ or beyond the merely reasonable 
because they believe it is part of being a true disciple.
That there are tensions between the so-called Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools is 
obvious. But the questions raised by writers of both positions have had a positive 
effect on the discipline of moral theology in so far as its primary focus is no longer 
merely rules and principles of conduct. It is on these grounds that Enda McDonagh 
can say that moral theology in the classical sense is dead, given that the interests, 
language and presuppositions of moral theology since the Council have undergone 
dramatic changes which make much of the discipline almost unrecognisable from its 
manualist past.3 But as moral theology continues to live in its renewed form, there 
seems to be little or no sign of a consensus being reached concerning the nature and 
uniqueness of Christian morality. Indeed, many scholars have moved away from the 
debate, convinced that it has run its course. James Walter, for instance, advocates that 
moral theologians should concentrate on the more general task of determining how 
the Scriptures can inform and direct us morally.4
3 E n d a  M c D o n a g h , The Making o f  Disciples: Tasks o f  Moral Theology, D u b l in :  G i l l  a nd  M c M i l la n ,  1
4 Jam es  J. W a l te r ,  “ T h e  Q u e s t io n  o f  th e  U n iq u e n e s s  o f  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y :  A n  H is t o r ic a l  a n d  C r i t ic a l  
A n a ly s is  o f  th e  D e b a te  in  R o m a n  C a th o l ic  E th ic s ,”  in  T o d d  A .  S a lz m a n  (e d .) , M ethod and Catholic 
M oral Theology: The Ongoing Reconstruction, O m a h a , N e b ra s k a : C re ig h to n  U n iv e r s i t y  P re s s , 19 9 9 , 
1 7 0 .
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Indeed, following the publication of the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, some 
theologians seem to have adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards moral theology,5 
while others, most notably Joseph Selling, express disappointment about the 
encyclical’s view of contemporary moral theology. It seems quite clear that Veritatis 
Splendor gives much of postconcilar moral theology and the moralists of the period 
less than a pass-mark. One of the encyclical’s central concerns is to underline the 
point that the work of some theologians of the postconcilar period denies some 
important Christian truths.6 Referring to moral autonomy, John Paul II speaks of 
certain trends in theological thinking, of philosophical affirmations which are 
incompatible with ‘revealed truths’ (VS, 29). Moreover, he speaks of a remarkable 
lack of harmony between ‘the traditional response encountered in seminaries and 
faculties of theology, with regard to questions of the greatest importance for the 
Church and for the life of faith of Christians, as well as for the laity’ (VS, 29).
Some of the disharmonies to which the Pope refers in Veritatis Splendor are evident, 
in his view, from the way in which certain theologians of the postconiliar era answer 
the recurrent questions of context versus principle, faith versus reason, autonomous 
ethics versus faith-ethics, conscience versus authority, and the existence of moral 
absolutes. Although the aim of the encyclical is to redefine the nature of Catholic 
moral theology, it seems to have caused further divisions, not to mention 
disappointment, among scholars. Some writers feel that although their theology does 
not seek to undermine the Magisterium, or the Christian faith, or imply that freedom 
should be absolute, the encyclical suggests otherwise. In an extensive commentary on
5 C f.  J o s e p h  S e l l in g  a nd  J a n  Jans (e d s .), The Splendor o f  Accuracy: An Examination o f  the Assertions 
Made by Veritatis Splendor, K a m p e n , T h e  N e th e r la n d s : K o k  P h a ro s  P u b lis h in g  H o u s e , 1 9 9 4 , 7 .
6 J o h n  P a u l I I ,  Veritatis Splendor, L o n d o n : C a th o lic  T r u t h  S o c ie ty ,  1 9 9 3 , p a ra g . 2 9 .
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Veritatis Splendor, Joseph Selling remarks that ‘[o]ne of the more general trends that 
[he] found frequently repeated was with respect to theories, trends, or currents that 
“exalt freedom to such an extent that it becomes absolute” (VS, 32-53).’7 
Nevertheless, Selling points out that he has not yet met anyone who believes the 
encyclical is addressed to them, for no Catholic theologian agrees that human beings 
possess absolute freedom. This is one of the reasons why he is disappointed with the 
encyclical: the revisionist view of moral theology is misrepresented and
o
misunderstood.
Those who hold a more traditional view of moral theology are also disappointed with 
postconciliar moral theology. Servais Pinckaers, for instance, believes that post 
Vatican II moral theology is little more than a wasteland of relativism. Pinckaers 
expresses a concern about the place of orthodoxy in a pluralistic society which claims 
to be open theoretically to all opinions but, in fact, excludes orthodoxy.9 His 
allegations are perhaps stronger than the Pope’s, and show a general dissatisfaction 
with the kind of moral theology which is being promoted by those who seek to 
encourage dialogue with the secular world, and ensure that Christian ethics do not 
become insular and incompetent in the face of secularism or ecumenism.
Although, of course, their reasons are different, the dissatisfaction expressed by 
Pinckaers and Selling is a factor which unites them. The same may be said of the
7 S e ll in g  a n d  J a n  Jans (e d s .), The Splendor o f  Accuracy, 3 5 ; c f. Jo s e p h  S e ll in g ,  "Veritatis Splendor  a nd  
th e  S o u rc e s  o f  M o r a l i t y , ”  LS  19 (1 9 9 4 ) ,  3 -1 7 .
8 T h e  ‘ r e v is io n is ts ’ a re  th o s e  w h o  a ccep ted  th a t  th e  m o r a l  th e o lo g y  o f  th e  m a n u a ls  w a s  fa r  f r o m  
ad e q u a te  and  b e g a n  th e  ta s k  re c o n s tru c t in g  m o r a l  th e o lo g y  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  S c r ip tu re  and  t r a d it io n ,  
ra th e r  th a n  o n  n a tu r a l a n d  c a n o n  la w s .
9 S e rv a is  P in c k a e rs , The Sources o f  Christian Ethics, E d in b u rg h :  T & T  C la rk ,  1 9 9 5 , 3 0 5 f f .
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writers of the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools: each school is dissatisfied with 
the approach taken by the other in respect of the uniqueness of Christian ethics. 
While one could interpret this division in a negative way, and conclude the divisions 
will never be resolved, one could also look at the divisions between the two schools as 
a sign that both wish to protect the Christian tradition, albeit from different 
perspectives. Both schools of thought wish to ensure that the Christian tradition does 
not become obsolete in the contemporary world. As Jeffery Stout tells us, pluralism 
need not be viewed in negative terms: it is a sign that many theologians agree that 
there is a common good and a central telos of the Church which needs to be 
protected.10
It is from this perspective, then, that this study of the Christian proprium  debate will 
begin. Instead of attempting to show which scholar or school of thought has it right 
(so to speak), the aim will be to find an intermediary position, in which the concerns 
of both schools are represented. In chapter one, the historical matrices that gave rise 
to the debate, as well as the emergence of the so-called Autonomy and Glaubensethik 
schools, will be discussed. This will allow us to see that in spite of the weaknesses in 
both schools’ presentation of the specificity of Christian ethics, both share a desire to 
protect a specifically Christian identity, however this is to be conceived.
The second chapter seeks to redefine the role of the biblical texts in Christian ethics 
using Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical theory of interpretation. It will be shown that 
Ricoeur’s work can perhaps mediate between the Autonomy and Glaubensethik 
schools, for it asserts that the role of narrative is to provide Christian believers with a
10 J e f f r e y  S to u t ,  Ethics After Babel: The Languages o f  Morals and Their Discontents, B o s to n : B e a c o n  
P re ss , 1 9 8 8 , 2 1 0 .
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unique identity, rather than specific rules of conduct. His writings demonstrate that 
narrative performs a more fundamental role than that of a ‘law-maker’. When applied 
to the biblical texts, Ricoeur’s work suggests that the Bible is significant for Christian 
ethics since it tells Christians who they are, and connects them with their specifically 
Christian identity.
Moreover, chapter two will argue that the ethical stories contained in the Bible are 
significant because they provide believers with an imaginary space in which they may 
try out various proposals for living. Similarly to Ricoeur’s interpretation of texts, it 
will be suggested that, rather than telling Christians what they should do, the biblical 
texts speak of that which is humanly ‘possible’.
Chapter three is dedicated to virtue ethics. Since self-knowledge is central to 
Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation, rules and principles are no longer given priority. 
This is similar to what virtue ethicists such as Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair 
MacIntyre are trying to achieve. The emphasis is placed upon the importance of 
knowing oneself rather than knowing simply what one should do. While Hauerwas, 
MacIntyre and Ricoeur interpret the role of narrative in the acquisition of virtue in 
different ways, they are united in the belief that good behaviour is not simply a matter 
of obedience but of developing good character traits and engaging in the practices of 
one’s community that help to sustain and shape the virtues. Highlighting the 
similarities between a Ricoeurian interpretation of the Glaubensethik/Autonomy 
debate and current trends in virtue ethics will serve to strengthen the argument that the 
specificity of Christian morality pertains to a specific story or identity.
8
Chapter three will further argue that there are certain aspects of Ricoeur’s writing that 
hint at the kind of practices necessary to sustain a morality of virtue rather than rule. 
Reading the specific narrative of the Christian community, for instance, serves as a 
way of reminding the faithful of who they are as they pursue the virtues. Indeed, 
reading ethical narratives is also important for Ricoeur because it provides believers 
with paradigmatic instances of virtuous behaviour, which they may analogously 
transfer into the moral arena when necessary. This is another way of saying that 
reading ethical narrative helps to make us ethical.
The practice of forgiveness is also significant in a Ricoeurian interpretation of 
Christian morality, since it can help us to move on from the sins of the past, whether 
they have been carried out by us or done to us. For Ricoeur, forgiveness is absolutely 
necessary in all forms of society and community, because it helps us to learn a new 
story about ourselves and about those around us. However, he makes an important 
distinction between forgiveness and amnesty. Forgiveness, he argues, is not a matter 
of forgetting the sins of the past, or erasing the debt. It is not amnesia. A certain 
amount of remembrance of past offences is necessary so that the re-enactment of 
those offences might be avoided in the future.
Of course, moving the central focus of the Christian proprium  debate from acts, 
norms and principles to emphasise character, story, practices and identity means that 
Christian ethics is offered a broader horizon of meaning. This broader horizon of 
meaning can account for the fact that there are dimensions of morality that we do not 
see. This will be the focus of chapter four.
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It will be argued that since Ricoeur interprets revelation in such a way that we are not 
looking to it merely for norms, he opens up the possibility of responding to the 
contemporary call to put morality and spirituality back together. Similarly to current 
trends in spirituality, Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation invites us to consider 
revelation as an invitation to enter into a spiritual relationship with God, where 
obedience to rule is not a cardinal concern. Instead, believers are invited to look at 
creation as God does. This means that the significance of revelation resides not so 
much in its content but in the kind of moral sensibilities it awakens in the hearts of the 
faithful.
The link that a Ricoeurian approach to the specificity of Christian morality debate 
establishes between spirituality and morality makes it an attractive alternative to the 
search for specifically Christian norms and principles. The general thrust of chapter 
four, then, is to show that although Ricoeur’s rejects the idea that revelation yields 
new norms or principles, his work can account for the fact that, for Christians, love of 
God means love of neighbour. This means that even though Christians are expected 
to provide rational reasons to justify their moral actions, they will interpret these 
actions as the outpouring of God’s love. For this is what Christians believe they 
should do because of who they are.
The final chapters raise some objection to the validity of Ricoeur’s contribution to the 
Christian proprium  debate. Chapter five raises questions about the role of the 
Magisterial teaching authority in a Ricoeurian approach to Christian ethics. It asks 
whether Ricoeur’s work affirms or undermines the place of tradition in moral 
discernment. If the Christian tradition does not provide believers with any new or
10
‘extra’ material norms or rules of conduct, one wonders whether such a view could be 
deemed unorthodox. Outlining Ricoeur’s understanding of tradition and subsequently 
applying it to the Christian proprium  debate will help us to see that tradition may be 
interpreted as a healthy dialectic between the orthodoxy and the received wisdom of 
the past and the forward looking praxis of the present. In this way, it is hoped that 
Ricoeur’s work will provide proponents of the Glaubensethik and Autonomy 
positions with a more inclusive understanding of tradition, where the legitimate 
concerns of both parties are respected,
The sixth chapter constitutes a more general critical appraisal of a Ricoeurian 
approach to the Christian proprium  debate. It seeks to identify some of the possible 
objections to, and possible criticisms of, introducing the work of Paul Ricoeur into the 
area of Christian ethics at all. Some of the issues raised include the limitations of 
narrative as means of explaining identity, tradition and ‘being’. The need to include 
women in the quest for self-understanding through the texts o f tradition will also be 
explored. Other questions which will be raised include the role of obligation in 
Ricoeurian virtue theory, and whether it promotes a strictly Aristotelian account of the 
virtues. Subsequently, it will be asked whether a Ricoeurian approach to Christian 
ethics, with its emphasis on symbolism and the imagination, undermines the truth of 
the biblical story. Investigating how Ricoeur combines history and fiction in a 
dialectic relation will indicate how both are necessary for the communication of 
God’s message in a Kingdom that is at the same time revealed but yet to come.
Another question that will be raised in chapter seven relates to the place of moral 
rules in a Ricoeurian approach to the specificity of Christian morality debate. Since
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the general thrust of Ricoeur’s work is similar to the contemporary retrieval of virtue 
ethics and spirituality, one might wonder whether obligation plays any part in his 
interpretive theory. Nonetheless, it will be argued that his treatment of the universal 
Golden Rule (Lk. 6:31) indicates that Ricoeur does not present us with an account of 
morality that is purely subjective or narcissistic. For Ricoeur, morality is not simply 
about desires and their fulfilment; it involves also the need to respect the ‘other’ at all 
costs. Being obedient, then, means finding ways of living out the call to love one’s 
neighbour as oneself.
Chapter six will conclude by considering what is perhaps one of the most 
controversial questions asked of the work of Stanley Hauerwas and other scholars, 
who assert that Christian moral behaviour camiot be understood apart from the 
narrative that shapes it. That is, does a Ricoeurian account of Christian morality 
promote a sectarian view of the Christian community and its role in society? In 
response to such criticisms, it will be argued that Ricoeur’s writings about the ethos of 
the European community can provide us with a useful model for interpreting the role 
of Christians in a pluralist and secular world, where ‘identity’ and ‘alterity’ are given 
sufficient attention.
In short, the view taken in this thesis is that Paul Ricoeur’s work can assist in showing 
that the specificity of Christian morality pertains to a unique identity or story. It is not 
incompatible with either the Glaubensethik or Autonomy school’s view, since it 
asserts that the Bible is an indispensable resource for the formation of the ethical and 
communal identity of the Christian community. The difference between a Ricoeurian 
approach to the issues arising out the specificity of Christian morality debate and that
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of the so-called Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools is that the former invites us to 
consider the Bible as an archive for self-understanding and for the development of 
ethical understanding. Thus the texts of the Christian tradition are placed in the most 
fundamental role of all. They are the means through which the Christian community 
answers the most basic, and perhaps most important, human question: ‘Who am I?’ 
For if we do not know ourselves, how can we know what we should do?
Moreover, since Ricoeurian theory considers the Bible as the primary archive of self- 
understanding, rather than of ethical doing, it will be suggested that Ricoeur succeeds 
in placing the Bible at the heart of the Christian life without limiting the complexities 
of moral decision making to a mere obedient following of historical texts. In this 
way, it will be shown that, in spite of their unique story of election and salvation, 
Christians are called to share in the common search for universal truth and dialogue 
with ‘the world of women and men, the entire human family seen in its total 
environment. ...[i.e.,] the world as the theatre of human history, bearing the marks of 
its travail, its triumphs and failures.’11
Of course, one might wonder why or, indeed, how the work of a philosopher is suited 
to discussion of the nature of faith, and what or whether it contributes to human 
reason. Moreover, given that some philosophers believe that reason is the only means 
through which truth can be attained, one might be sceptical of analysing the debate on 
the Christian proprium  through the eyes of a philosopher.
11 Gaudium et Spes, in  A u s t in  F la n n e r y  O .P . ,  Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, 
D u b l in :  D o m in ic a n  P u b lic a t io n s ,  1 9 9 6 , 1 6 4 , p a rag . 2.
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The encyclical letter Fides et Ratio, however, suggests that faith and philosophy can 
assist each other in the search for truth. According to John Paul II, faith in divine 
revelation can stimulate natural reason to new and deeper ways of thinking about the 
meaning of being and of persons through a reflection on the Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity. He argues that faith reminds philosophy that there are higher truths beyond 
the capacity of unaided reason to attain. Faith keeps philosophy humble and aware of 
its own limits, and protects it from the tendency to arrogance or to the presumption 
that reason is limitless.12
That the Pope is calling for a philosophy that acknowledges its limits and avoids the
■ 1Ttemptation to consider itself self-sufficient or separate from community is certain.
Philosophy, he notes, needs a community of persons, especially the experience of
trust in persons, since so much of what we know and take for understanding must
come from trust in what others tell us. The Pope’s understanding of the relationship
between faith and philosophy is best construed as a circle. Since theology is an
understanding of faith in the light of the twofold methodological principle, the auditus
fidei and the intellectus fidei, faith and reason and theology and philosophy must
coexist. Theology ensures that philosophy does not lose sight of the existence of a
higher being and of a higher source of meaning and truth, while philosophy can help
theology to attain a deeper understanding of revelation. Thus the Pope writes:
Theology’s source and starting-point must always be the word of God 
revealed in history, while its final goal will be an understanding of that word 
which increases with each passing generation. Yet, since God’s word is Truth 
(cf. Jn. 17:17), the human search for truth—philosophy, pursued in keeping 
with its own rules—can only help to understand God’s word better. It is not
12 W .  N o r r is  C la rk e ,  “ J o h n  P a u l I I :  T h e  C o m p le m e n ta r i ty  o f  F a i th  a n d  P h i lo s o p h y , ”  Communio 2 6 /1  
(1 9 9 9 ) ,  5 6 2 .
13 J o h n  P a u l I I ,  Fides et Ratio, 1 9 9 8 , pa rag . 73 .
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just a question of theological discourse using this or that concept or element of 
a philosophical construct; what matters most is that the believer’s reason use 
its power of reflection in the search for truth which moves from the word of 
God towards a better understanding of it.14
There can be no doubt, then, that the Pope sees value in using philosophy to arrive at
a deeper understanding of faith. The truth of revelation to which Christians commit
must be understood by human reason in order to be personally possessed by them, to
become truth for them. As the Austrian Theological Commission puts it, theology
needs philosophy so that the faith community can continue to answer some of the
most fundamental human questions: Who am I? Where did I come from and where
am I headed? Why does evil exist? How should I live? 15 And the principal
instrument given to us by God to work out in detail this intelligibility of revealed truth
is natural reason, especially in its most fully reflective form—philosophy.16
Of course, a philosophy that denies the existence of God or the limitations of human 
reason will undoubtedly hinder the kind of mutual enrichment the Pope believes is 
possible between theology and philosophy. The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 
however, does no such thing. At no point in his writings does he leave his readers in 
any doubt about the limitations of human reason or about the need to be a part of a 
community that strives to understand life and to draw closer to the Sacred. Ricoeur’s 
agenda is to protect philosophy from degenerating into an over-rationalistic and 
mechanical search for truth, where transcendental meaning has no place. As we shall 
see, he is constantly calling philosophers to acknowledge that there is ‘something
14 Ib id .
15 Ö s te rre ic h is c h e  T h e o lo g is c h e  K o m m is s io n ,  “ F id e s  e t R a t io :  In h a lt  u n d  W ü r d ig u n g ,”  Zeitschrift fü r  
Katholische Theologie 1 2 2 /3 -4  ( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  2 6 6 .
16 C la rk e ,  “ J o h n  P a u l I I , ”  5 6 3 .
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other’, something more, which prevents human reason from becoming absolute, and 
ensures that the mystery of God’s creation is not forgotten.
Thus Ricoeur’s philosophy is suitable for discussions concerning the nature of 
Christian morality, revelation, tradition and truth. In fact, it seems to answer to— at 
least in style—the call of Fides et Ratio, and places philosophy in service o f a 
community which is formed by faith, not solely by reason. Ricoeur’s writings leave 
us in no doubt that, although he is not a proclaimer of the Christian religion, his 
philosophy is an attempt to move away from the idea that humans are self-made, 
autonomous beings. For Ricoeur, we are dependent upon something greater than 
ourselves. Reason, therefore, must be understood as existing in relation to the human 
search for the Sacred, for meaning and belonging. That Ricoeur’s philosophy is 
congenial to theological discussions is clear. For, as we will see shortly, it is with 
Ricoeur that ‘faith may sit in thought’.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN P R O P R I U M  DEBATE
The Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate is not new to anyone who has studied moral 
theology since the renewal. The issues involved are complex and have left moralists 
divided over the precise nature of Christian morality. While some writers are 
concerned that if  faith has no bearing on ethics, Catholic moral theology will 
degenerate into secularism, others are anxious to show that faith is the foundation 
stone upon which Christian truth is based. The questions asked include: Does 
Christian faith add any ‘new’ material content to Christian morality that cannot be 
discovered by reason alone? What is the precise role of the Bible in moral theology, 
and can it be taken as the proximate source of Christian morality? And if  morality is 
a matter of human experience, what role is played by revelation?
The task of answering these questions is complicated, however, by the statement often 
found in encyclicals that faith informs or contributes to Christian morality. Humanae 
Vitae (1968), for example, says that faith illuminates and enriches human reason.1 
This ultimately means that, in the search for moral truth, reason may be unreliable and 
must be informed by faith. Published in 1967, Populorum Progressio suggests that
1 P a u l I V ,  Humanae Vitae, 1 9 6 8 , p a rag . 4 .
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earthly goods are for the benefit of all persons,2 and relies on biblical passages to 
justify this claim.3 Moreover, the Declaration on Procured Abortion (1974) asserts 
that its moral principles are derived in the light of faith, and again biblical references 
are used to support this view.4
It is not difficult to see why these encyclicals have been debated over and over again, 
among other reasons, because their statements suggest that faith should make a 
difference to the way in which believers make moral decisions. Furthermore, they 
imply that the Christian story illuminates the moral quest and that faith completes or 
improves moral reason. The issues at stake here have crystallised around the debate 
on the specificity of Christian morality. Although it is still a bone of contention in 
academic circles, and most students of theology are aware of the issues dividing the 
Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools, it is important to remember that the issues are 
the result of their respective efforts to move away from former attempts to describe 
Christian ethics that scarcely referred to Christ or to Christian sources. This kind of 
theology was typical of the neo-Scholastic period.
But what was this period and how did it give rise to the debate on the specificity of 
Christian morality? It is from this question that we will begin. Examining the 
background to the Christian proprium  debate, and subsequently highlighting the 
contrasting stances of the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools, will not only provide 
us with a sound basis from which to begin our analysis, but it will also suggest a need
2 C f.  Populorum Progressio , 1 9 6 7 , esp. p a rag s . 3 , 17, 3 2 .
3 V in c e n t  M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics: Recent Roman Catholicism, D u b l in :  G i l l  a n d  M a c m il la n ,
1 9 8 5 , 2. S o m e  o f  th e  te x ts  u s e d  in  Populorum Progressio  in c lu d e : L k .  2 2 , 2  T h e s . 3 .1 0 , M t .  5 .3 ; 1 6 .2 6 ; 
19. 6 , G n . 1. 2 8 , 1 Jn. 3 .1 7 , E p h . 4.
4 Is . 4 9 :1 -5 ;  4 6 :3 ;  P s . 2 2 :1 0 ;  7 1 :6 ; L k .  1 :4 4 .
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for a new approach to an old but unresolved question: What is specific about Christian 
morality?
The aim of this chapter will be to show how the limitations of approaching the 
Christian proprium  debate from the perspective of ‘content’, norms or principles may 
be overcome by beginning from what is common to both sides. That is, that there 
exists a specifically Christian identity, narrated in the texts of the Bible, upon which 
Christians are invited to reflect on what it means to be a person, including a moral 
person.
1.1 A Call for Renewal
Neo-Scholasticism is the name given to a late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
period in Roman Catholic theology.5 During this period moral theology was 
identified with the manuals and with their method for determining sinfulness and 
degrees of sinfulness. Often described as a legal model, with law as the objective 
norm of morality, the manuals scarcely mentioned scriptural teaching, and while they 
recognised the role of human reason and natural law, they were marked by a 
predominant emphasis on authoritative hierarchical teaching.6 Being moral was a 
matter of following the rules offered by the manuals, and little attention was given to 
the role of freedom or individual conscience in moral decision-making.
The manuals provided clear guidelines on moral and immoral conduct. Their most 
significant role during the neo-Scholastic period was their use in the formation of
5 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 9.
6 C h a r le s  E . C u r ra n , M oral Theology at the End o f  the Century, T h e  P è re  M a rq u e tte  L e c tu re  in  
T h e o lo g y ,  M i lw a u k e e ,  W is c o n s in :  M a rq u e tte  U n iv e r s i t y  P re s s , 1 9 9 9 , 14.
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priests, and the certainty with which they were written facilitated a clear, if 
minimalist, understanding of morality.7 Despite the fact that from about 1918 
onwards other disciplines, such as spirituality, dogmatic theology and patristic 
studies, were attempting to integrate notions of ‘kerygma’ and ‘personalism’ into their 
theological reflection, moral theology seemed to remain focused on sin, obligation
and the human act. ‘Moral theology [notes Raphael Gallagher] was, in general
• 8 opinion, in an almost perfect state’. The tone of the neo-Scholastic manuals was due
in part to a struggle against modernism, especially the Enlightenment. In the same
way as other scientific disciplines sought to emphasise the importance of objectivity
and rationality, moral theology placed a great deal of emphasis upon the objectivity of
moral knowledge and action, without of course denying the role of faith.9 As a result,
it became formal in its approach, focusing on rules and principles of conduct.
But this is not to suggest that neo-Scholastic moral theology should only be associated 
with a rigid and ahistorical system of natural law, since this type of theology did 
include reference to the Thomistic virtues. Although the influence of the
7 I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  n o te  th a t  s o m e  a u th o rs  c o m p a re  th e  m a n u a ls  o f  m o r a l  th e o lo g y  w i t h  th e  C e lt ic  
p e n ite n t ia l b o o k s , w h ic h  m a y  h a v e  o r ig in a te d  in  W e ls h  s y n o d s  h e ld  u n d e r  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  S t. D a v id  in  
th e  s ix th  c e n tu ry . M o s t ly  w r i t te n  in  L a t in  b u t  s o m e  in  O ld  I r is h ,  th e  p e n ite n t ia ls  w e re  s im i la r  to  th e  
m a n u a ls  in  th e  sense  th a t  th e y  w e re  u se d  b y  c o n fe s s o rs  in  th e  c o n fe s s io n a l,  a n d  fo c u s e d  to  a la rg e  
e x te n t o n  p e n a n c e . T h e  absence o f  d io c e s a n  o rg a n is a t io n s  a n d  E p is c o p a l ju r is d ic t io n  in  W a le s  a nd  
I r e la n d  e x p la in  w h y  th e  p e n ite n t ia ls  w e re  n o t  d e c re e d  b y  S y n o d s  b u t  w e re  th e  w o r k  o f  in d iv id u a ls —  
a b b o ts  o f  m o n a s te r ie s . T h e s e  a b b o ts  h a d  th e  ta s k  o f  is s u in g  p e n a n c e  b a se d  o n  th e  te a c h in g  o f  th e  
S c r ip tu re s , c a n o n ic a l a n d  m o n a s t ic  t r a d it io n ,  a n d  o n  th e i r  o w n  ju d g e m e n t.  C f .  J o h n  M a h o n e y ,  The 
Making o f  Moral Theology: A Study o f  the Roman Catholic Tradition, O x fo r d :  C la re n d o n  P re s s , 1 9 8 7 , 
5 -1 7 ; f o r  a f u l l  s tu d y  o f  th e  I r is h  P e n ite n t ia ls ,  see H u g h  C o n n o l ly ,  The Irish Penitentials and Their 
Significance fo r  the Sacrament o f  Penance Today, D u b l in :  F o u r  C o u r ts  P re s s , 1 9 9 5 .
8 R a p h a e l G a lla g h e r ,  “ T h e  M a n u a l S y s te m  o f  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y  S in c e  th e  D e a th  o f  A lp h o n s u s ,”  ITQ  51 
( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  9.
9 K la u s  D e m m e r ,  Shaping the Moral Life: An Approach to Moral Theology, tra n s . R o b e r to  D e lT O r o ,  
Jam es  K e e n a n  S .J . (e d .) , w i t h  a fo r e w o r d  b y  T h o m a s  K o p fe n s te in e r ,  W a s h in g to n  D .C . :  G e o rg e to w n  
U n iv e r s i t y  P re ss , 2 0 0 0 , 1 2 f f .  F o r  a n  e x a m p le  o f  h o w  th e  D e c a lo g u e  c o u ld  b e  d e s c r ib e d  as ‘ c a s u is tic  
la w ’ , see K a r l  H .  P e s c h k e , S .V .D . ,  Christian Ethics: M oral Theology in the Light o f  Vatican II, 
A lc e s te r ,  W a r w ic k s h ir e :  C . G o o d l i f f e  N e a le  L td . ,  1 9 8 6 , 1 6 ff .
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Enlightenment on moral theology cannot be denied, we must not over-generalise and
presume that the moral theology of neo-Scholasticism was purely rule-based. Nor
must we forget that moral theology became less focused on Thomistic virtues and
more engaged with rule and principles, especially after the renewal of the sacrament
of confession at the Council of Trent. Instead, we must consider why moral theology
became more formal and less speculative in its approach. It is also important to note
that some themes that originally were integral to moral theological reflection
(e.g.fkerygma’ and ‘personalism’) fell under the category of dogmatic theology. This
meant that, when confronted with the scientific rigor of dominant culture, moral
theology was lacking because it became preoccupied with acts, principles and
argumentative consistency10 to the detriment of virtue. This is clear when we look at
how morality was defined by the neo-Scholastics.
Morality arises from the precept laid on us by God to reach our last end. 
Morality strictly has to do with what is necessary to reach the end. The last 
end is given by God to us as a reward for good living. The content of morality 
is discovered by reason, unaided by revelation, reflecting on the nature of the 
rational animal. But the divine positive law confirms it. Moral obligation 
arises not from the inherent rightness of an action but from the command of 
God.11
Although this legalistic approach to moral theology continued throughout the 40s and 
50s, at the same time there emerged a group of theologians who were dissatisfied with 
the style of morality presented by the manuals, and emphasised the need for renewal. 
The dissatisfaction was such that the Second Vatican Council had some terse 
comments which any schoolteacher would recognise as of the ‘could do better 
variety’.12 In discussing the educational and vocational formation of men for the
10 D e m m e r ,  Shaping the Moral Life: An Approach to Moral Theology, 1 3 -1 4 .
11 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 14.
12 M a h o n e y ,  The Making o f  Moral Theology, 3 0 3 .
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priesthood, the bishops had to examine the nature of the various branches of theology 
which they had studied and to which they referred when formulating a 
pronouncement. It was in this context that they made certain recommendations 
concerning moral theology.
Among these recommendations was the need to pay special attention to the role of the 
Scriptures in moral theology and to the figure of Christ as the basis for moral living.13 
But perhaps the most interesting changes were already taking place within the 
discipline of moral theology itself, and it is worth investigating the views of some of 
the moralists who instigated the call for renewal in the first place.
1.2 Scholars of the Renewal
The scholars of the renewal expressed dissatisfaction with the formal, philosophical 
style of morality that featured in the manuals.14 They believed that the sources of 
moral theology ought to include the Bible and the figure of Christ. In fact, it appeared 
that the driving force behind the renewal, at least in part, was the belief that Christian 
morality had a specific content, and that this content is derived from revelation. The 
central tenet of the renewal was the belief that Christian ethics is not simply about 
philosophical enquiry into the nature of moral goodness; it also involves a recognition 
that a transcendental order exists,15 and that through grace, faith in Christ and
13 C f.  Optatam totius. T h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n  m e n t io n e d  h e re  ra n  as f o l lo w s :  ‘ S p e c ia lis  c u ra  im p e n d a tu r  
T h e o lo g ia e  m o r a l i  p e r f ic ie n d a e , c u iu s  s c ie n t if ic a  e x p o s it io n ,  d o c tr in a  S . S c r ip tu ra e  m a g is  n u tr i ta ,  
c e ls itu d in e m  v o c a t io n is  f id e l iu m  in  C h r is to  i l lu s t r e t  e o ru m q u e  o b lig a t io n e m  in  c a r ita te  p ro  m u n d i v i ta  
f fu c tu m  fe r e n d i ’ , n o . 16 , AAS  5 8  ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  7 2 4 .
14 C f.  B e rn a rd  H ä r in g ,  C .S s .R . ,  The Law o f  Christ: Moral Theology fo r  Priest and Laity, 3 v o ls . ,  tra n s . 
E d w in  G . K a is e r ,  W e s tm in s te r :  T h e  N e w m a n  P re ss , 1 9 6 3 -1 9 6 6 ; J o s e f  F u c h s , “ G ib t  es e in e  s p e z if is c h e  
c h r is t l ic h e  M o r a l? ”  Stimmen derZeit 185  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  9 9 -1 1 2 .
15 P h i l ip p e  D e lh a y e , “ L a  m is e  e n  cause  de la  s p é c if ic ité  de la  m o ra le  c h ré t ie n n e ,”  RTL 4  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  3 3 9 .
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consideration of the sacred Scriptures, the path of goodness will be revealed. As 
Häring puts it, ‘To come to Christ, the “light” of eternal truth, also means to arrive at 
a profound understanding of the good.’16
Although the authors of the renewal were united about the importance of situating 
Christian morality within the biblical tradition, they differed somewhat in their 
individual presentations of what this new approach should look like. Some stressed 
the importance of the new life in grace,17 and sought to concretise the principle of 
Agape. Others maintained that Christian morality should be based on the principle of 
charity,18 and that the moral task of the Christian was the imitation of Christ.
Bernard Häring, for example, maintains that the Good News is not actually a new law, 
but the sovereign majesty of God intervening in the person of Christ and the grace and 
love of God manifesting itself in him.19 For him, Christian morality is deepened by 
the figure o f Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit. The law of the old Covenant in 
the Decalogue is thought to establish minimum requirements in the form of 
prohibitions, and Christ is considered to be the sole teacher of the new Covenant 
founded in his sacrifice on Calvary. Law is life in Jesus; it is the following of his 
footsteps; it is loving service, humility and love of enemies. ‘The Gospel preaching 
of the Saviour [notes Häring] is the announcement of the divine message of salvation
16 H ä r in g ,  The Law o f  Christ, v o l .  1, 1 3 4 -1 3 5 .
17 C f .  D e lh a y e ,  “ L a  m is e  e n  cause  de la  s p é c if ic ité  de la  m o ra le  c h ré t ie n n e ,”  3 0 8 -3 3 9 .
18 E n d a  M c D o n a g h , “ T h e  P r im a c y  o f  C h a r i t y , ”  i n  E n d a  M c D o n a g h  (e d .) , Moral Theology Renewed , 
D u b l in :  T h e  F u r r o w  T r u s t ,  1 9 6 5 , 1 3 0 -1 5 0 .
19 H ä r in g ,  The Law o f  Christ, v o l .  1 ,3 .
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and the summons in an actual concrete situation presented with unique dramatic 
vividness.’20
There can be no doubt that Häring is advocating a move from the style of moral 
theology found in the manuals to a Scripture-based one. His position typifies what 
the renewal sought to achieve: it emphasises the need to place the Bible at the heart of 
Christian ethics. Of course some scholars understood this to mean that Scripture not
only provides a general moral orientation for believers, but that it also gives principles
• " 2 1and concrete rules which may be applied to specific situations.
Josef Fuchs is also among those authors who in the early stages of the renewal sought 
to move away from the moral theology of the manuals towards a more Christocentric 
morality. In his earlier writings, Fuchs advocates that Christ is the prototype to whom 
Christian life must conform, and that the newness in Christian morality has to do with 
the activity of grace, which transcends the ordinary category of rational human 
behaviour.22 Thus he counsels: ‘We are not meant to live merely as man, but as man 
baptized into Christ, into his death and into his resurrection, man who, through 
baptism, has died to sin and awakened to “walk in the newness of life.’”23
Fuchs uses St Paul’s letter to the Romans to support the view that, through baptism, 
Christians are influenced by divine grace—an active presence in Christians that
20 H ä r in g ,  The Law o f  Christ, v o l .  1, 4 .
21 C f .  J o s e f  F u c h s , Human Values and Christian Morality, tra n s . M . H .  H e e la n , M a e v e  M c R e d m o n d , 
E r ik a  Y o u n g  a n d  G e ra rd  W a ts o n ,  D u b l in :  G i l l  a n d  M a c m il la n ,  1 9 7 0 , 2 8 -2 9 .
22 F u c h s , Human Values and Christian Morality, 5 ; c f. H e le n  O p p e n h e im e r, The Character o f  
Christian Morality, 2 nd e d n ., L e ig h to n  B u z z a rd : T h e  F a i t h  P re ss  L td . ,  1 9 7 4 , 2 5 .
23 F u c h s , Human Values and Christian Morality, 5 ; f o r  a d is c u s s io n  o f  b ib l ic a l  e th ic s  as th e  im i t a t io n  o f  
C h r is t ,  see P e s c h k e , Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light o f  Vatican II, 5 8 f f .
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encourages them to live a virtuous life. Similarly to Häring, Fuchs believes that the 
norm of Christian morality is sacramental, and that Christian morality is derived from 
a supernatural ‘being-in-Christ’.24 Thus he contends that Christians have access to the 
supernatural order, which transcends the natural order discerned by reason. As such, 
they are called not only to live in accordance with the requirements of natural law, but 
also in accordance with the requirements of the supernatural order.
,..[I]n accordance with the principle that human behaviour derives 
from man’s ‘being’, it follows that not only must all of us be brought to see 
that the person of Christ is a pattern for every one of us, but all of us 
collectively must regard ourselves as forming a brotherly community and 
make the brotherhood a reality by active participation. Whoever is 
concerned to lead a truly Christian life, when he participates in this way, 
reveals the reality, the life, of Christ, who is the first-born of all.
Another strand of thought which came out of the renewal emphasised the need to
acknowledge the primacy of charity in Christian morality. Underlying this view is the
belief that sanctifying grace is the communication of charity.26 Gérard Gilleman’s
name is associated with this approach.
As MacNamara explains, ‘What was exciting about Gilleman’s work was that it 
combined the gospel spirit, which the renewal sought, with a philosophical grounding 
which was dependent especially on Aquinas.’27 Taking Aquinas’ understanding of 
the end as his starting point, Gilleman explains that moral acts must be understood in 
relation to their ultimate end, that is, God. Gilleman also stresses that no single act of 
goodness can reach the supernatural goal (God) unless it takes the form of Christian
24 F u c h s , Human Values and Christian Morality, 5.
25 Ib id . ,  6 .
26 G é ra rd  G il le m a n ,  “ T h é o lo g ie  m o ra le  e t C h a r ité ,”  NRT1A  ( 1 9 5 2 ) ,  8 0 6 -8 2 0 .
27 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 2 4 -2 5 .
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charity.28 ‘[T]he moral act only makes sense if  it points towards our ultimate end.’29 
Christian charity, in other words, illuminates the moral act and gives it meaning. In 
the same way as a body has no significance without the soul, for Gilleman, Christian 
morality only makes sense when understood as charity.30 Christian moral actions, 
therefore, are more than mere human expressions of love; they are considered to be 
manifestations of the most profound love conceivable—Agapè.
A third group of theologians writing during the renewal period emphasised the 
importance of following the person of Christ in the search for Christian moral truth. 
This involved showing the ways in which the figure of Christ could be considered as 
the cardinal principle of Christian moral discernment. Fritz Tillman, Rudolf 
Hofmann, Bernard Häring, Joseph Fuchs and Enda McDonagh are associated with 
this line of thought: each stresses the importance of following Christ in the quest for 
truth. McDonagh, for example, explains that Christ taught man ‘how he must die to 
self to reach the other and so love in a fully personal way.’31 He also contends that 
the sacraments of the Christian community must be translated into the everyday 
activity of Christian believers through Christian acts of charity. Similarly, Fuchs 
maintains that Christ is the pattern and law of Christian morality, and thereby the 
measure of every Christian believer’s life.
Both McDonagh and Fuchs sought to locate Christian morality in its Christological 
context, which involved relying heavily on Christological doctrine and the biblical
28 G il le m a n ,  “ T h é o lo g ie  m o ra le  e t C h a r ité ,”  8 1 8 .
29 Ib id . ,  tra n s . m in e .
30 Ib id . ,  8 1 9 .
31 M c D o n a g h , “ T h e  P r im a c y  o f  C h a r i t y , ”  1 4 1 .
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texts, without indicating how the figure of Christ concretely contributed to Christian 
moral conduct. Although these two scholars insist that the axiom Agere sequitur esse 
is central to the Christian understanding of morality, it is still uncertain as to what the 
content of a ‘Christ-centered’ morality would look like. If Christians participate in 
the life of Christ, how does this contribute to their daily living and to the way in 
which they make moral decisions? Does it mean that Christ should be seen as an 
inspirational figure? Or does it mean that moral living is a sharing in the discipleship 
of Christ? And if it does (either), what does it mean?
It is clear that, in spite of being united in the quest to locate the Bible and the life of 
Christ at the heart of Christian discernment, theologians of the renewal differed on 
what this ‘new’ kind of Christian morality should look like. Moreover, their 
individual presentations of the proposed Bible-centered moral theology raised a 
number of issues, which continued to be propounded by some writers, 
notwithstanding the work of Congar, Rahner and Schillebeeckx. The idea that the 
unbaptised individual could not reach the supernatural goals of morality in the same 
way as the Christian believer, for instance, raised the question of whether the 
requirements of Christian morality go beyond human morality. This was the case 
because divine grace was thought to confer a supernatural quality upon the actions of 
believers.32 Nonetheless, theologians of the renewal failed to indicate the ways in
32 T h e  th e o lo g ia n s  o f  th e  r e n e w a l r e l ie d  m a in ly  o n  th e  K a r l  R a h n e r ’ s u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  g ra ce  as a 
s u p e rn a tu ra l r e a l i t y ,  i.e . ,  th a t  w h ic h  is  h ig h e r  th a n  m e r e ly  h u m a n  e x p e r ie n c e . G ra c e  w a s  th o u g h t  to  
ra is e  th e  n a tu ra l a c tio n s  an d  h a b its  o f  b e lie v e rs  to  a s u p e rn a tu ra l s ta tu s , b e cause  C h r is t ia n  a c t io n  is  
e s s e n t ia lly  d ire c te d  to w a rd s  G o d . C f .  K a r l  R a h n e r , Nature and Grace, tra n s . D in a h  W h a r to n ,  L o n d o n : 
S h e e d  a n d  W a rd ,  1 9 6 3 , 4 -7 .
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which grace contributed to the content of moral actions, or how it served as the 
mediator between the ontological and psychological orders.
MacNamara raises other problems. Most scholars, he says, suggest (in various ways) 
that Christian morality involves a ‘following’ or a ‘sharing’ in the life of Christ, but 
none of them states clearly just how the Christian is to live. ‘“Following” or imitation 
may also mean that one is to take the content of one’s moral life from what is known 
of the life of Christ, i.e., from the Bible.’34 These assertions raise questions about the 
range of interpretations of the figure of Christ presented in the Bible. It must be noted 
that one of the main aims of the renewal was to integrate the Bible and moral 
theology, but how this was to be done became problematic. On some occasions 
Scripture was used to support certain moral truths said to have been arrived at by 
reason, on others it was used as itself the source of moral norms or principles, or as a 
source of moral obligation—the idea being that if a rule was written in the Scriptures, 
then it must be God’s will. Yet little attention was paid to the rules and principles of 
scriptural exegesis; scholars simply gathered together all the scriptural references to 
the topic which they were discussing and, often enough, texts that had only the most 
oblique relation to their topic.35
33 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 2 8 .
34 Ib id . ,  32 .
35 F o r  a n  in te re s t in g  d is c u s s io n  o n  th e  u se  o f  th e  b ib l ic a l  te x ts  b y  m o r a l th e o lo g ia n s , see R ic h a rd  B .  
H a y s , The Moral Vision o f  the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics, 
N e w  Y o r k :  H a rp e r  C o l l in s  P u b lis h e rs , 1 9 9 6 , esp. 2 2 0 f f .  H a y s  m a in ta in s  th a t  o n  th e  w h o le  m o ra lis ts  
a re  o n ly  in te re s te d  in  th e  b ig  th e o lo g ic a l th e m e s  o f  th e  N e w  T e s ta m e n t,  n o t  in  c lo s e  e x p o s it io n  o f  
b ib l ic a l  te x ts . R e fe r r in g  to  th e  w o r k  o f  R e in h o ld  N ie b u h r ,  f o r  e x a m p le , H a y s  e x p la in s  th a t  N ie b u h r ’ s 
u se  o f  th e  b ib l ic a l te x ts  is  ty p ic a l o f  a m o r a l is t ,  f o r  i t  is  h ig h ly  s e le c t iv e  an d  s u its  h is  p u rp o s e s . T h u s  
H a y s  e x p la in s : ‘ I n  th e  G o s p e ls  [ N ie b u h r ]  fo c u s e s  o n  “ th e  e th ic  o f  Jesus”  as e x p re s s e d  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  
th e  S e rm o n  o n  th e  M o u n t ;  in  o th e r  w o rd s , h e  c o n c e n tra te s  o n  J e s u s ’ s a y in g s  to  th e  v i r t u a l  e x c lu s io n  o f  
th e  n a r ra t iv e  f r a m e w o rk .  H is  re a d in g  o f  P a u l is  h ig h ly  s e le c t iv e , fo c u s in g  o n  R o m a n s  7 as a c la ss ic  
e v o c a t io n  o f  th e  “ im p o te n c e  a n d  c o r r u p t io n  o f  h u m a n  n a tu re ”  b u t  g iv in g  s c a n t w e ig h t  to  R o m a n s  8, 
w i t h  its  d e p ic t io n  o f  t r a n s fo rm e d  l i f e  in  th e  S p i r i t . . . .W h a t  a b o u t O ld  T e s ta m e n t t e x ts ? . . . . A l l  in  a l l ,  th is  
n a r r o w ly  c irc u m s c r ib e d  u se  o f  b ib l ic a l  s ou rces  is  a w e a k n e s s  in  N ie b u h r ’ s m e th o d . ’ (p . 2 2 0 ) .
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It is interesting to note that the recourse to the Bible in the search for moral truth was 
something that had always been a feature of the Protestant churches.36 But this is not 
say that these concepts were completely foreign to the Roman Catholic tradition; we 
have seen that the manuals used biblical statements to justify various moral stances 
and provide support for pre-existing philosophical positions. The main difference 
between the manual tradition and the proposed style of moral theology of the renewal 
was the way in which the role of the Bible was understood.
The Roman Catholic manuals did not take the Bible or revelation as their prim ary  
source. Instead, they used the Bible as ‘corroborative proof for positions already 
arrived at philosophically.’37 The newness of the renewal in Catholic moral theology 
was due to the fact that it promised a biblical morality, not unlike that of some of the 
Protestant traditions. Some models based morality on the New Testament principle of 
Agape, while others explored the motifs of discipleship and imitation of Christ.
But the way in which scholars went about explaining what this kind of morality 
should look like caused much division, as those who had formerly welcomed the 
proposal to base the renewal on the Bible had second thoughts, in view of what they 
saw as a naive approach to the moral content of the Bible. Some authors claimed that 
the figure of the historical Jesus could not be taken as the norm of Christian morality 
because, as Mackey puts it, ‘Precise details of the words and actual deeds of the 
historical Jesus are difficult to establish.’38 Moreover, the moral utterances of Jesus
36 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 16.
37 Ib id . ,  16.
38 Jam es M a c k e y ,  The Problems o f  Religious Faith, D u b l in :  H e l ic o n  L td . ,  1 9 7 2 , 2 6 8 ,
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contained in the Bible are a product of their time and cannot be taken as a definite 
guide illustrating how Christians of all ages should behave. Those who shared this 
view believed that the content of Christian morality was not any different to that of 
the non-believer, and that Christians had to use natural law in the search for moral 
truth.
Not all who had formerly welcomed the renewal’s proposal of a biblical morality 
shared this view, however. Josef Ratzinger and Heinz Schurmann, for instance, were 
of the opinion that, although we must attend to their literary character,39 the words of 
Jesus ‘may be held to be the ultimate ethical norm’.40 In fact, Schurmann argued that 
many of the moral utterances of Christ recorded in the Bible should be understood as 
paradigms of human ethical action that are morally binding for Christian believers: 
‘The central demand of the New Testament, in whatever garb it is presented, is the 
demand for total self-giving that follows from the love of Christ or of God. This is 
the ultimate commandment and is absolutely binding.’41 Furthermore, in this view the 
role of the magisterial teaching office is indispensable to the moral life of the Church 
because it is responsible for expounding the truths of faith, and ‘faith involves 
fundamental decisions (with definite content) in moral matters.’42
39 E x a m in in g  th e  l i t e r a r y  c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  w o rd s  o f  Jesus re v e a ls  th a t  m u c h  o f  w h a t  h e  says  is  in te n d e d  
to  m o t iv a te  b e lie v e rs  b y  w a y  o f  e x a m p le  ra th e r  th a n  g iv e  to  th e m  a s p e c if ic  c od e  fo r  l iv in g .
40 H e in z  S c h t irm a n n , “ H o w  N o r m a t iv e  a re  th e  V a lu e s  a n d  P re c e p ts  o f  th e  N e w  T e s ta m e n t? ”  in  J o s e f  
R a tz in g e r ,  H e in z  S c h ü rm a n n  &  H a n s  U rs  v o n  B a lth a s a r ,  Principles o f  Christian Morality, tra n s . 
G ra h a m  H a r r is o n ,  S a n  F ra n c is c o : Ig n a t iu s  P re s s , 1 9 8 6 , 2 4 .
41 S c h ü rm a n n , “ H o w  N o r m a t iv e  a re  th e  V a lu e s  an d  P re c e p ts  o f  th e  N e w  T e s ta m e n t? ”  3 3 .
42 J o s e f R a tz in g e r ,  “ T h e  C h u r c h ’ s T e a c h in g  A u t h o r i t y — F a i th — M o r a ls , ”  in  R a tz in g e r  e t a l. ,  Principles 
o f  Christian Morality , 1 9 8 6 , 7 2 .
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It is clear that the proposals of the renewal did much to replace the legalism of the 
manuals of moral theology and the much too impersonal, ontological and sometimes 
almost physical categories in which subjects such as divine grace were explained. But 
the move from the formalism of the past presented Catholic moralists with a new set 
of questions and problems about which there was little or no agreement. The 
following questions were asked: Is Jesus the norm for Christian morality? If so, how 
do his words and deeds give content to human morality? Are the texts of the Bible 
not historically conditioned and therefore limited in terms of what they can teach the 
faithful of today’s world? In fact, such were the disagreements between scholars of 
the renewal about the precise role and function of the Bible in Christian morality that 
in the early 70s a split emerged among Roman Catholic theologians as they separated 
into two schools of thought: the ‘ Glaubensethik’ and ‘Autonomy’ schools.
The former school gets its name from the German word for faith, and the name 
implies a view of Christian morality which connects its intimately with Christian 
belief. Some supporters of this school of thought believe that revelation contributes to 
the content of Christian morality. The latter school are so called because of the 
apparent autonomy which they attribute to morality vis-à-vis religion. But, as we 
shall see, they do not suggest that faith has nothing to say to Christian morality. A 
closer look at the central arguments of both schools of thought will make their 
distinguishing lines of response clearer.
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1.3 The Emergence of the Glaubensethik and Autonomy Schools
1.3.1 The Movement for an Autonomous Ethic
The early 70s saw a critical period for moral theology, as scholars who had initially
welcomed the renewal’s appeal to Scripture as the source of Christian morality began
to qualify their positions, insisting that
[w]hen we speak of the law of Christ, we must first of all pay attention to the 
fact that he himself, the person of Christ, is our law, the pattern of our life, 
its basis; secondly we must consider in which way and precisely in which 
sense Christ can truly be and is our law; and thirdly we must specially [sic] 
take note of the relation between the law of Christ and the moral natural 
law.43
Those who supported this view became known as the Autonomy school. Writers of 
this school of thought agreed with Alfons Auer’s assertion that the moral demands by 
which Christians are expected to live are identical in content to the demands of natural 
law.44 Such statements appeared to run contrary to the renewal’s proposal that 
Christian morality should be based on the Scriptures and on the figure of Christ. Josef 
Fuchs, Richard McCormick and Bruno Schuller, to name but three prominent authors, 
were among those who could not conceive of a biblically-centered morality which did 
not correspond in content to the demands made on moral subjects by natural law. In 
their opinion, neither the figure of Christ nor the biblical texts which deal with ethical 
matters can be used to justify moral positions: the texts of the Bible are the product of 
their time, and the moral demands of Christians must also meet the rational demands 
of the natural law.
43 F u c h s , Human Values and Christian Morality, 7 8 .
44 C f.  A l fo n s  A u e r ,  Autonome Moral und Christlicher Glaube, D ü s s e ld o r f :  P a tm o s , 1 9 7 1 , 2 7 f f .
An important factor contributing to the emergence of the Autonomy school was the 
fear that if morality were derived from Christian faith and revelation, it might give the 
impression that Christianity was a ‘ghetto’— a view which went counter to the mood 
of the time in Europe where there was a move towards inter-religious dialogue and 
discussion.45 According to MacNamara, the desire to communicate with members of 
other religious traditions and with all sensitively moral individuals in the search for 
moral goodness was a cardinal concern of the Autonomy school46 In addition to this 
move towards a shared morality, the Autonomy school sought to show that Christian 
morality was not simply a matter of following the commands of the Bible. In its 
view, Christian morality, like human morality, is something which can be found in the 
immanent structures of the world.
Around the same time as the emergence of the Autonomy school, ‘The Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modem World’, a document of Vatican II, made a 
significant statement which helped to advance its central argument. The mood of the 
document is set in paragraph two, as it addresses not only Christians but all those who 
seek truth and moral understanding. It reads as follows: ‘Now that the Second Vatican 
Council has studied the mystery of the church more deeply, it addresses not only the 
daughters and sons of the church and all who call upon the name of Christ, but the 
whole of humanity as well, and it wishes to set down how it understands the presence 
and function of the church in the world of today.’47
45 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 3 8 .
46 Ib id .
47 Gaudium et Spes, p a rag . 2 , in  A u s t in  F la n n e r y  (e d .) , O .P . ,  Vatican Council II: Constitutions, 
Decrees, Declarations, r e v is e d  e d n ., D u b l in :  D o m in ic a n  P u b lic a t io n s ,  1 9 9 2 .
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The document also stressed the autonomy of the natural order. It asserted that the 
natural order is rooted in the divine order, and encouraged the whole of humanity to 
use the methods of the sciences and arts in the search for human moral truth—a view 
that, if extended to the field of morality, seemed to support the stance taken by 
proponents of the Autonomy position.48 Similarly to Pacem in Terris, an encyclical 
of Pope John XXIII, the methodology employed in Gaudium et Spes was one which 
did not exclusively rely on the Scriptures or on faith statements. Instead, it appealed to 
reason as its primary source, keeping with its opening address to all men and women 
of good will.
But this is not to suggest that the aim of Gaudium et Spes was to promote a purely 
autonomist view of Christian morality. As Curran points out, ‘[T]here are some 
startling individual statements about the identity of the fully human and the 
Christian’.49 Generally speaking, however, one could say that Gaudium et Spes and 
Pacem in Terris  ‘create the milieu in which theologians raise the question about a 
distinctive and specific Roman Catholic ethics.’50
And raise questions they did. Although the scholars of the Autonomy school were 
united in the recognition that the content of morality is substantially the same for
48 T h e  d o c u m e n t re a d s  as fo l lo w s :  ‘ M a n y  o f  o u r  c o n te m p o ra r ie s  s e e m  to  fe a r  th a t  a c lo s e  a s s o c ia tio n  
b e tw e e n  h u m a n  a c t iv i t y  a n d  r e l ig io n  w i l l  e n d a n g e r th e  a u to n o m y  of h u m a n ity ,  o f  o rg a n iz a t io n s  an d  o f  
s c ience . I f  b y  th e  a u to n o m y  o f  e a r th ly  a f fa ir s  is  m e a n t th e  g ra d u a l d is c o v e ry , u t i l i z a t i o n  a n d  o rd e r in g  
o f  th e  la w s  a nd  v a lu e s  o f  m a tte r  a nd  s o c ie ty , th e n  th e  d e m a n d  f o r  a u to n o m y  is  p e r fe c t ly  in  o rd e r : i t  is  a t 
o n c e  th e  c la im  o f  h u m a n k in d  to d a y  a n d  th e  d e s ire  o f  th e  c re a to r. B y  th e  v e r y  n a tu re  o f  c re a t io n , 
m a te r ia l b e in g  is  e n d o w e d  w i t h  its  o w n  s ta b il i t y ,  t r u th ,  a nd  e x c e lle n c e , its  o w n  o rd e r  a n d  la w s . T h e s e , 
as th e  m e th o d s  p ro p e r  to  e v e ry  s c ie n c e  a n d  te c h n iq u e , m u s t b e  re s p e c te d .’ Gaudium et Spes, p a rag . 36 .
49 C h a r le s  C u r ra n , “ Is  th e re  a C a th o lic  a n d /o r  C h r is t ia n  E th ic ? ”  in  C h a r le s  E . C u r r a n  a n d  R ic h a rd  
M c C o rm ic k ,  S .J ., (e d s .), Readings in Moral Theology No.2: The Distinctiveness o f  Christian Ethics, 
N e w  Y o r k :  P a u l is t  P re s s , 1 9 8 0 , 6 4 -6 5 .
50 Ib id . ,  6 5 .
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Christians and non-Christians, their presentations of this human morality are quite 
different. Indeed, it is not unusual to find authors of the Autonomy school (as well as 
those of the Faith-Ethic school) criticising one another for misunderstanding the 
specificity of Christian morality.51 Charles Curran, for example, has reservations 
about Josef Fuchs’s understanding of the natural law and human reason. Curran 
cannot accept that the sensitively moral person, by reason, can come to understand 
that the love commandment requires self-sacrifice, even unto death on a cross. Thus 
Curran writes:
I have grave doubts that suffering, sacrifice and the cross are historically 
verifiable as rational. Such an approach does not seem to give enough 
importance to the reality of sin and what effect it has on man and reality. 
There is such a thing as the mystery of evil and the mystery of iniquity 
which is so strong that in the midst of it rationality does not shine through. 
In the midst of suffering and unrequited love one could very easily conclude 
to the irrationality of the whole human enterprise. I do not want to say that 
sin totally does away with some aspects of the rational, but I do think sin has 
more effect than the proponents of this position are willing to admit. This 
approach to the question seems too abstract, ahistorical and overly rational 
to be fully satisfying.
51 N o r b e r t  R ig a l i ,  f o r  in s ta n c e , c la im s  th a t  m a n y  c o n tr ib u to rs  to  th e  d e b a te  o n  th e  s p e c if ic i ty  o f  
C h r is t ia n  e th ic s  h a v e  m is u n d e rs to o d  th e  c e n tra l is su e . ‘ I n  s h o r t ,  th e n  [n o te s  R ig a l i ]  th e  d eb a te  is  n o t 
a b o u t C h r is t ia n  e th ic s ; n o t  a b o u t th e  d is t in c t iv e n e s s  o f  C h r is t ia n  m o r a l i t y ;  n o t  a b o u t B ib l ic a l  
fu n d a m e n ta l is m  n o r  e v e n  a b o u t B ib l ic a l  m o r a l i t y  o r  e th ic s ; n o t  a b o u t e c c le s ia s t ic a l a u th o r ita r ia n is m  
n o r  e v e n  a b o u t e c c le s ia s tic a l a u th o r ity ;  n o t  a b o u t w h e th e r  m o r a l i t y  s h o u ld  b e  th e o n o m o u s  ra th e r  th a n  
a u to n o m o u s ; n o t  a b o u t w h e th e r  m o r a l i t y  s h o u ld  b e  ro o te d  in  re a s o n  o r  in  C h r is t ia n  fa i th ;  n o t  a b o u t 
w h e th e r  re a s o n  is  to o  w e a k  to  a c h ie v e  c e r ta in ty  w i t h  re g a rd  to  m o r a l  n o rm s ; a n d  n o t  a b o u t p re s e rv in g , 
in  c ru s a d e - l ik e  o r  o th e r  fa s h io n ,  a C h r is t ia n  c h a ra c te r  o f  m o r a l i t y .  T h e  d e b a te  is  a b o u t w h e th e r  
C h r is t ia n  f a i t h  m a k e s  a n y  d if fe re n c e  w i t h  re g a rd  to  th e  m a te r ia l c o n te n t o f  m o r a l  l i f e . ’ N o r b e r t  R ig a l i ,  
“ T h e  U n iq u e n e s s  a n d  th e  D is t in c t iv e n e s s  o f  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y  a n d  E th ic s ,”  in  C h a r le s  E . C u r r a n  (e d .) , 
Moral Theology: Challenges fo r  the Future, N e w  Y o r k :  P a u lis t  P re s s , 1 9 9 0 , 8 0 . O th e r  w r ite r s  h a ve  
h ig h l ig h te d  th e  n e e d  f o r  c o n c e p tu a l c la r i f ic a t io n  c o n c e rn in g  th e  te r m in o lo g y  u se d  in  th e  C h r is t ia n  
proprium  d eb a te , e s p e c ia lly  in  re s p e c t o f  th e  te rm s  m o r a l i t y  a nd  e th ic s , d is t in c t iv e n e s s  and  s p e c if ic ity .  
C f .  J am es  J. W a l te r ,  “ T h e  Q u e s t io n  o f  th e  U n iq u e n e s s  o f  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y :  A n  H is to r ic a l  a n d  C r i t ic a l  
A n a ly s is  o f  th e  D e b a te  in  R o m a n  C a th o l ic  E th ic s ,”  in  T o d d  A .  S a lz m a n  (e d .) ,  Method and Catholic 
Moral Theology: The Ongoing Reconstruction, O m a h a , N e b ra s k a : C re ig h to n  U n iv e r s i t y  P re s s , 1 9 9 9 , 
163 .
52 C u r ra n , “ Is  th e re  a C a th o l ic  a n d /o r  C h r is t ia n  E th ic ? ”  7 6 .
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Curran is also dissatisfied with Fuchs’ use of the terms motivation and 
intentionality.53 Fuchs writes of a specifically Christian intentionality and motivation 
which affects the formal but not material cause of morality. Curran, however, asks 
whether the formal motivational or intentional element, which is present for 
Christians when making moral decisions, can be understood as existing apart from the 
material content of moral actions. His concern may be put in the form of a question: 
Is there not a reciprocal causality between the formal cause of morality and its 
material element? We thus find Curran arguing that Fuchs’ approach does not seem 
to prove conclusively that human morality understood in the metaphysical sense has 
the same content as Christian morality.54
This explains why Curran prefers to argue for the existence of an explicitly Christian 
consciousness, rather than intentionality or motivation, which affects moral 
judgement.55 This means that what is specific about Christian morality is the 
explicitly Christian way in which morality is known and manifested. Christian ethics 
is thematically and explicitly Christian, but what the Christian knows with an explicit 
Christian dimension is and can be known by all others.
Other proponents of the Autonomy view highlighted the uniqueness of Christian 
ethics by distinguishing between exhortation and normative ethics, and between the
53 F u c h s  m a in ta in s  th a t th e  s p e c if ic i ty  o f  C h r is t ia n  m o r a l i t y  has  to  d o  w i t h  th e  p a r t ic u la r  in te n t io n ,  o r  
th ru s t ,  o r  m o t iv a t io n  o f  C h r is t ia n  m o r a l i t y ,  i.e . ,  C h r is t ia n  m o r a l i t y  is  g o in g  s o m e w h e re , i t  has  a g o a l 
a nd  a s p e c if ic  in te n t io n a l i t y .  C f .  J o s e f  F u c h s , “ Is  th e re  a C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y ? ”  in  C u r r a n  e t a l. ,  Readings 
in Moral Theology No.2, 1 9 8 0 , 15 ; id e m , “ G ib t  es e in e  s p e z if is c h  c h r is t l ic h e  M o r a l? ”  Stimmen der Zeit 
1 85  (1 9 7 0 ) ,  11 I f f .
54 C u rra n , “ Is  th e re  a C a th o l ic  a n d /o r  C h r is t ia n  E th ic ? ”  7 6 .
55 C h a r le s  E .  C u r ra n , Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue, N o t r e  D a m e : F id e s  P u b lis h e rs  In c ., 1 9 7 2 , 
20.
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genesis and truth-value of moral or morally significant insights.56 In Bruno Schüller’s 
view, gospel and law yield different kinds of ethical propositions, and because the law 
has yet to be fulfilled, the gospels can only serve as a reminder to the faithful to 
constantly seek to do good and avoid evil. The gospels deal with ethical goodness in 
a real way but, according to Schüller, do not give Christians any new or extra material 
norms to which the non-religious or sensitively moral individual does not have access. 
‘The normative character of the gospel as the message of God’s action and Christ’s 
action for the salvation of the human race is thus the normative character of a 
model.’57
Indeed, Schüller takes this a step further by saying that if  the ‘ought’ of ethical action 
were to come from Christ, or from the ethical pronouncements found in the biblical 
texts, then to act morally would simply be a matter of acting like Christ, and morality 
would degenerate in a Christonomous moral positivism. In order to avoid such 
misrepresentation of the moral life, Schüller counsels that we must be clear about the 
origins of moral goodness: ‘The exemplarity of God and the exemplarity of Christ are 
not the standard for the meaning of “to be morally good” but for the exercise of moral 
goodness.’58
Though at one with Schüller and Curran in the view that the content of morality is the 
same for the believer and the non-believer, Richard McCormick and Vincent 
MacNamara approach the question of the specificity of Christian morality in yet
56 B r u n o  S c h ü lle r ,  “ T h e  S p e c if ic  C h a ra c te r  o f  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,”  in  C u r r a n  e t a l. ,  Readings in Moral 
Theology No.2, 1 9 8 0 , 2 0 8 .
57 Ib id . ,  2 1 2 .
58 Ib id . ,  2 1 3 .
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another way. McCormick believes that one’s motivation for doing good can be 
profoundly affected by one’s belief in revelation and prayer, and that Christianity 
provides believers with a new dynamism or view of persons and their meaning, a new 
style of life inspired by the figure of Christ,59 and a special context which facilitates 
moral reflection.60
The suggestion here is that the Christian tradition should be understood as a ‘value- 
raiser’ rather than an ‘answer-giver’, and it was supported by many theologians of the 
Autonomy stance. John Macquarrie, for instance, says that ‘[t]he distinctive element 
[in Christian morality] is the special context within which the moral life is perceived. 
This special context includes the normative place assigned to Jesus Christ and his 
teaching -  not, indeed, as a paradigm for external imitation, but rather as the criterion 
and inspiration for a style of life.’61 MacNamara also espoused the view that 
Christianity can sensitise us to what it means to be a human person. Christianity, he 
notes, provides the faith-community with a wealth of stories about human beings, 
God, and the cosmos. It facilitates a moral sensitivity in the pursuit of norms, even if
* f\0these are p er  se available outside the community.
59 R ic h a rd  A .  M c C o r m ic k ,  “ D o e s  F a i t h  A d d  to  E th ic a l  P e rc e p t io n ? ”  in  C u r r a n  e t a l. ,  Readings in Moral 
Theology No.2, 1 9 8 0 , 170 .
60 C f.  M a c k e y ,  The Problems o f  Religious Faith, 2 7 8 f f .  H e re  M a c k e y  p o in ts  o u t  th a t  ‘ [ h ]o w e  vet- 
p a ra d o x ic a l i t  m ig h t  s ee m , r e l ig io u s  f a i t h  fa c il i ta te s  a nd  e v e n  c a lls  f o r  m o r a l  c o m m itm e n t  w h ic h  ta k e s  
th e  fo r m  o f  th e  m o s t d e d ic a te d  in v o lv e m e n t  in  m a n ’ s w o r ld  a n d  in  m a n ’ s h is t o r y . . . .T h e  t r u th  is  th a t  
r e l ig io u s  f a i t h  saves  m a n  f r o m  b e in g  f re n e t ic  a n d  in h u m a n e , e n a b le s  h im  to  g iv e  o f  h is  b e s t in  h is to r y ,  
a n d  c a lls  f o r  h is  b e s t in  s u c h  a w a y  th a t  h e  m u s t  ta k e  th o u g h t  as to  h o w  b e s t h e  c a n  g iv e  it .  ’ (M a c k e y ,  
2 7 8 ) .
61 J o h n  M a c q u a rr ie ,  Three Issues in Ethics, N e w  Y o r k :  H a rp e r  a n d  R o w ,  1 9 7 0 , 89 .
62 V in c e n t  M a c N a m a ra , “ T h e  D is t in c t iv e n e s s  o f  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y , ”  in  B e r n a rd  H o o s e  (e d .) , Christian 
Ethics: An Introduction, L o n d o n : C a s s e ll,  1 9 9 8 , 159 .
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In spite of the various ways in which authors of the Autonomy school sought to 
explain the special nature of Christian morality, they were united in the view that 
revelation did not contribute any new norms or values to human morality. Their 
central stance may be summed up in three main points: a) the content of morality is 
discoverable by reason and the natural law; b) one does not need Christian faith in 
order to know what morality requires; c) revelation and faith give a context to moral 
striving; a vision o f life which informs our perceptions and choices; a motivation for 
right action, and a model and inspiration for moral endeavour in the person of Jesus 
Christ. In short, scholars of the movement for an autonomous ethic sought to show 
that there is nothing required of the Christian that is not also perceivable by, and 
required of, the non-Christian.
This view did not gain the support of all Roman Catholic theologians, however, and it 
was contested in particular by a school of thought which became known as the 
Glaubensethik school. As the theologians of the Glaubensethik school saw it, the 
movement for an autonomous ethic had reversed the central aims of the renewal, and 
the whole fate (Schicksal) of Christian morality was brought into question.63 But 
what was the Glaubensethik  school,64 and why did it emerge in opposition to the 
movement for an autonomous ethic?
63 C f.  B e rn a rd  S tö c k le , “ F lu c h t  in  das H u m a n e ?  E rw ä g u n g e n  ü b e r  d ie  F ra g e  n a c h  d e m  P r o p r iu m  
c h r is t l ic h e r  E t h ik , ”  IK Z  4  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  3 1 2 .
64 S o m e  c o m m e n ta to rs  p re fe r  to  c o n s id e r  th is  m o v e m e n t  as a m o re  a d v a n c e d  s tag e  o f  th e  re n e w a l.  C f.  
M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 5 6 .
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Proponents of the Faith-Ethic view could not accept the Autonomy school’s insistence 
that the content of Christian morality is the same for the believer and non-believer. 
They expressed concern about the suggestion that reason is sufficient in the search for 
moral truth. While they agree with the autonomists concerning vision and context, 
supporters of Glaubensethik further believe that there are things asked of Christians, 
which are recognised only in faith, with the help of divine grace. It is for this reason 
that Philippe Delhaye could not accept Fuchs’ autonomy thesis: in his view it did not 
account for the action of divine grace on human conduct.65 For Delhaye, Christian 
moral action is specific in the sense that it is influenced and perfected by the grace of 
God.
Other supporters of the Glaubensethik school rejected the autonomy stance because it 
was too secular in its approach. In his article “Flucht in das Humane?” Bernard 
Stöckle criticises Fuchs, Auer and Blank, claiming that they are affected by the 
general trend towards secularism—a movement which was gaining considerable 
momentum and support from various scholars during the renewal period. 
Furthermore, Stöckle believes that the Autonomy school’s presentation of Christian 
morality was far too abstract and philosophical.66 The autonomists’ insistence on 
natural law and reason seems to be at the root of Stöckle’s concerns. For Stöckle, as
1.3.2 The Glaubensethik Stance.
65 D e lh a y e , “ L a  m is e  e n  cause  de la  s p é c if ic ité  de la  m o ra le  c h ré t ie n n e ,”  3 3 9 .
66 S tö c k le , “ F lu c h t  in  das H u m a n e ? ”  321 f f .
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for most proponents of the Faith-Ethic view, Christian ethics cannot be based on 
reason alone: God, not man, is the source of moral obligation.
More recent scholarship seems to show that some authors of the Glaubensethik 
persuasion have not changed their views. Writing in the early 80s, Konrad Hilpert, 
for example, takes the criticisms against the movement for an autonomous ethic a step 
further. In particular Hilpert focuses on the work of Alfons Auer, saying that Auer 
has adopted the concept of autonomy from philosophical ethics solely for the 
purposes of communicating with the secular world.68 In Hilpert’s estimation, the 
autonomy position denies all transcendence, and the concept of autonomy should not 
be used to overcome the weaknesses of the casuistic approach to moral theology.69 
Further concerns raised by Hilpert and others have to do with the kind of freedom 
associated with the term ‘autonomy’. For the idea of being autonomous seems to 
suggest that the individual’s freedom and self-fulfilment comes first, while the idea of 
being persons living together in a community comes second.
In addition to the concern that the views of the Autonomy school seemed to make 
reason absolute and to promote a secular morality, the Faith-Ethic school also feared 
that the autonomy position encouraged a denial of a place for the magisterial teaching 
office.70 Josef Ratzinger states that the movement for an autonomous ethic ‘has no 
room for an ecclesiastical Magisterium in the moral field. For norms essentially
61 I t  is  im p o r ta n t  to  n o te  th a t  p ro p o n e n ts  o f  th e  A u to n o m y  v ie w  w e re  n o t  s u g g e s tin g  th a t G o d  w a s  n o t  
th e  sou rc e  o f  e th ic a l o b l ig a t io n ;  th e y  w e re  s im p ly  t r y in g  to  s h o w  th a t  b e l ie f  in  G o d  d id  n o t  a lte r  th e  
c o n te n t o f  m o r a l i t y  o r  g iv e  n e w  m a te r ia l n o rm s  o r  v a lu e s  th a t  w e n t  b e y o n d  th e  scop e  o f  h u m a n  re a s o n .
68 K o n ra d  H i lp e r t ,  “ T h e  T h e o lo g ic a l C r it iq u e  o f  ‘ A u t o n o m y ’ , ”  Concilium  1 7 1 -1 7 6  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  11.
69 T h is  c r i t ic is m  is  m a d e  a g a in s t A u e r ’ s u se  o f  th e  te r m  a u to n o m y  as a w a y  o f  o v e rc o m in g  th e  p ro b le m s  
a ss o c ia te d  w i t h  th e  m o r a l  th e o lo g y  o f  th e  m a n u a ls .
70 C f.  R a tz in g e r ,  “ T h e  C h u r c h ’ s T e a c h in g  A u t h o r i t y — F a i th — M o r a ls , ”  4 8 f f .
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based on the tradition of faith would, according to... [the autonomy thesis], spring 
from the misunderstanding that the teachings of the Bible are absolute and perennial 
indications while they are only a reference to the positions reached at different
• 71moments by the knowledge attained by reason.’
Of course the Autonomy school did not intend to undermine the role of the 
Magisterium in the teaching of morals; it simply sought to show that the Christian 
tradition did not add any new material norms to morality, i.e., that the content of 
morality is discoverable by all. Nevertheless, the criticisms against the Autonomy 
school continued. Josef Ratzinger, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Philippe Delhaye, James 
Gustafson and Gustav Ermecke are among those who rejected the autonomy stance, 
preferring instead to support the view that the ethics of Christians must be Christian.
There are two main points of orientation to be considered here. The first is that 
authors of the Faith-Ethic school believe that Christians have a particular vocation to 
follow Christ in obedience. The second is more complex: the assertion that the 
Christian community has a significant grounding in an historical event, and its history
79 • •and conduct are to be determined by that historical revelation. According to writers 
of this line of thought, it is a mistake to equate the content of Christian morality with 
the content of philosophical ethics, because the content of the former is and should be 
determined by revelation. In other words, Christ is the prototype for Christian 
morality, and this means that there are things expected of Christians which are
71 J o s e f R a tz in g e r ,  “ M a g is te r iu m  o f  th e  C h u rc h , F a i th ,  M o r a l i t y , ”  in  C u r ra n  e t a l. ,  Readings in Moral 
Theology No.2 , 1 9 8 0 , 176 .
72 Jam es M .  G u s ta fs o n , Can Ethics be Christian? C h ic a g o  a n d  L o n d o n : T h e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  C h ic a g o  
P re ss , 1 9 7 5 , 171 .
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n ' t
recognised only in faith. Similarly to the autonomists, however, there are 
differences in the ways in which individual supporters of the Glaubensethik explained 
their views. Though united with colleagues in the view that faith gives a specific 
content to Christian morality, each scholar makes his own argument.
Highlighting the fundamental problem with ‘orthopraxy’, Josef Ratzinger, for 
example, emphasises that the truth of reality (or of being) is inextricably linked with 
faith, even if people are not aware of it.74 Ratzinger contends that that the question of 
the distinctiveness of Christian morality seems to revolve around the historical origin 
of certain biblical statements, the problem of how faith communicates with reason, 
and the limitations of reason in matters of faith.75 In response to the Autonomy view, 
that various biblical statements may be traced back to other sources and therefore 
cannot be considered as elements of a specifically Christian morality, Ratzinger 
asserts that it is wrong to say that texts inherited from elsewhere can never attain a 
specific character when imported into a different context.
Ratzinger also points out that it is futile to sift through the biblical moral utterances 
and precepts in an attempt to find out if similar statements existed in other traditions. 
‘Christianity’s originality [he says] consists rather in the new total form into which
73 S o m e  s c h o la rs  re fe r re d  to  C h r is t  as th e  n o m i par excellence  o f  C h r is t ia n  m o r a l i t y .  S ee  esp. H a n s  U rs  
v o n  B a lth a s a r ,  “ N in e  T h e s e s  in  C h r is t  E th ic s ,”  in  C u r r a n  e t a l, Readings in Moral Theology No.2, 1 9 8 0 , 
1 9 0 -2 0 7 ; id e m , ‘N in e  p ro p o s it io n s  o n  C h r is t ia n  e th ic s ,”  R a tz in g e r  e t a l. ,  Principles o f  Christian Morality, 
19 8 6 , 7 7 -1 0 2 ; f o r  a u s e fu l e n tr y  in to  U rs  v o n  B a lth a s a r ’ s th e s is , see M a r c  O u e lle t ,  “ T h e  F o u n d a t io n s  o f  
C h r is t ia n  E th ic s  a c c o rd in g  to  H a n s  U rs  v o n  B a lth a s a r ,”  Communio  ( F a l l  1 9 9 0 ), 3 7 5 -4 3 8 .  F o r  a 
d is c u s s io n  o f  e th ic s  as d iv in e  d ra m a  a n d  p ra x is ,  see E d w a rd  T .  O a k e s , “ E th ic s  a n d  th e  S e a rc h  f o r  G o d ’ s 
w i l l  in  th e  th o u g h t o f  H a n s  U r s  v o n  B a lth a s a r ,”  Communio  17  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  4 0 9 -4 3 1 .
74 R a tz in g e r ,  “ T h e  C h u r c h ’ s T e a c h in g  A u t h o r i t y — F a i th — M o r a ls , ”  5 1 .
75 Ib id ;  a nd  fo r  a n  in te re s t in g  s tu d y  o f  th e  J e w is h  a n d  H e l le n is t ic  c u ltu re s  o u t  o f  w h ic h  th e  b ib l ic a l  te x ts  
d e v e lo p e d , see L is a  S o w le  C a h i l l ,  “ T h e  B ib le  a n d  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l  P ra c t ic e s ,”  in  L is a  S o w le  C a h i l l  and  
Jam es C h ild re s s  (e d s .) , Christian Ethics, C le v e la n d , O h io :  T h e  P i lg r im  P re s s , 1 9 9 6 , 3 -1 7 .
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human searching and striving have been forged under the guidance of faith in the God 
of Abraham, the God of Jesus Christ.’76
Indeed, Ratzinger was not the only scholar who maintained that the words of Jesus 
have normative significance because they are clothed in the authority of God as
77  • •revealed in the Scriptures. Heinz Schurmann also took the view that there are 
binding demands which remain valid for Christians in spite of the fact that they may 
be conditioned by time and culture. Although it is true that we must attend to the 
literary character of his words, Schurmann believes that the following of Christ must 
remain the basis of the Christian moral life.
Nevertheless, Schurmann’s approach to the biblical texts and their use in Christian 
morality is different. He asserts that believers should assess the binding moral 
implications of the ‘primitive Christian paradosis’78 found in the New Testament by 
distinguishing between ‘the theologically oriented values and precepts, which we 
describe as appropriate conduct in the presence of the God who, in Christ, reveals 
himself eschatologically and brings about man’s salvation, and “particular” values 
and precepts referring to various areas of the world and of life.’79
James Gustafson’s approach is different again. Gustafson contends that the moral 
admonitions and injunctions found in the Bible may be considered as Christian ethical
76 R a tz in g e r ,  “ T h e  C h u r c h ’ s T e a c h in g  A u t h o r i t y — F a i th — M o r a ls , ”  5 3 .
77 Ib id . ,  67 .
78 S c h u rm a n n , “ H o w  N o r m a t iv e  a re  th e  V a lu e s  a n d  P re c e p ts  o f  th e  N e w  T e s ta m e n t? ”  3 0 .
79 Ib id .
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demands because it is in Christ that all things are created, and Christ is Lord of all 
things. Furthermore, Gustafson argues that the ethics of Christians must be 
exclusively Christian because the community is called to obedience to Jesus, implying 
that all moral actions must be determined by the lordship of Christ. But this is not to 
say that the content of Christian moral actions is different to that of the non-believer. 
In Gustafson’s view Christian ethics and universal human ethics are convertible 
terms. This means that what is ethically justifiable in a rational sense is the Christian 
thing to do, and vice versa.
The claim that all rationally defensible moral actions are Christian is a significant one, 
for it implies that, when Christians make moral decisions, it is not the intention that 
renders the action specifically Christian. This is the case because both Christians and 
non-Christians would justify truthfulness, for instance, on rational grounds. Rather,
what is unique about Christian moral action is the final justification for moral actions:
81Christian moral acts should be consistent with a Christian way of life. In this sense, 
the moral act is qualified by the religious significance it has for the moral agent, 
without undermining the rational grounds upon which it is justified as being a good or 
bad action. Gustafson’s central position is that actions are good for two distinctive 
but related reasons: ‘It is a morally right or good act because of its consequences or 
because of the immediate moral principles that governed it. It is also a “good” act for
the more ultimate “theological” and “religious” reasons it was done; it was done in
82fidelity to God, or done to honor God.’
80 G u s ta fs o n , Can Ethics Be Christian? 170 .
81 See Jam es G u s ta fs o n , “ C a n  E th ic s  B e  C h r is t ia n '? :  S o m e  C o n c lu s io n s ,”  C u r ra n  e t a l. ,  Readings in 
Moral Theology No. 2 , 1 9 8 0 , 1 4 6 -1 5 5 .
82 G u s ta fs o n , Can Ethics be Christian? 174 .
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Although Gustafson is generally thought to be of the Faith-Ethic persuasion, there are 
striking similarities between his stance and that of some of the authors of the 
Autonomy school. Charles Curran springs to mind here because, similarly to 
Gustafson, Curran believes that, through the faculty of human reason, all can arrive at 
the same ethical conclusion. What is distinctive for Curran is the explicitly Christian 
way in which Christians make their moral judgments, i.e., in light of the story of 
revelation and election. This is not unlike Gustafson’s view that the specificity of 
Christian ethics has to do with the reasons why particular actions were carried out 
rather that what was done.
It is for this reason that there are considered to be two versions of the Glaubensethik 
position, called respectively the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’. Those authors who believe 
that there are specific norms available through revelation and known in faith are 
considered to be proponents of the former view. The weaker form, put simply, 
includes those who maintain that, even if there are no specifically Christian norms or 
values, Christians sometimes find themselves ‘going the extra mile’ or beyond the 
merely reasonable because they believe it is part of being a true disciple. Of course, 
this makes distinguishing the Glaubensethik school from the Autonomy school 
difficult, as there appears to be little to choose between some versions of what are 
ostensibly contrasting views. Although generally explained in terms of a belief that 
faith and revelation add new content to human morality, it is difficult to explain the 
Glaubensethik position without over-generalising and presuming that their position 
may be described solely in terms of a belief that faith contributes to the content of 
morality.
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The similarities between the autonomists and the weaker forms of the Faith-Ethic 
school are perhaps one of the reasons why MacNamara says that the Glaubensthik 
School’s use o f the Bible is problematic. For if  one believes that there are no new 
norms given by revelation, one’s view of the Bible would be radically different from 
one who maintained that revelation provides new norms for moral conduct. One is 
left wondering then as to what the authors of the Glaubensethik school intend when 
they speak of the role of the Bible in Christian morality, and how is this different from 
the Autonomy school.
Furthermore, does the Faith-Ethic school always intend to say that the Bible contains 
specific values, or principles of conduct, or norms? Or does it mean to suggest that 
the Bible encourages or motivates Christians to live a good life, taking the figure of 
Christ as a model, and not as a norm? Whether one supports the former or the latter 
view, significant questions arise. The former view seems to suggest that Christian 
morality is a ‘revealed morality’. This is a dubious approach, especially when one 
begins to consider how the first century biblical utterances on morality are relevant in 
today’s world. It also raises serious methodological questions: How can a person or 
an event be considered as a norm? And if  Christ can be considered as a norm for 
Christian believers, in what way does this manifest itself in the every-day lives of the 
faithful? What is the content of such a morality? And how can moral positions be 
justified by saying that ‘Christ willed me do such and such an action’?
1.4 The Limitations of Both Approaches
83 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 60.
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Concerns also arise from the assertion that the figure of Christ as presented in the 
Bible should be taken as a model or an inspiration for moral action. One wonders 
how the example of Christ as the one who ‘goes the extra mile’ affects concrete moral 
actions. What does this kind of morality look like, and how can one differentiate 
between actions that are based on natural law and those that are the result of choices 
that go beyond what is ‘merely reasonable’?
This is not to suggest that the Autonomy school’s presentation of the unique character 
of Christian morality does not have limitations, or that it is to be preferred over the 
Faith-Ethic stance. It, too, has its weaknesses. While the Autonomy school claims 
that the content of Christian morality is available to people generally or, at least, to 
those who sincerely seek to do good and avoid evil, it is difficult to see how this claim 
concretely promotes dialogue with other religions. Frequently authors of this school 
of thought are reticent about their central thesis; they make statements which indicate 
a degree of uncertainty about their fundamental position.84 Stating that the content of 
Christian morality is ‘largely’ or ‘substantially’ the same as it is for the non-believer 
or the sensitively moral individual, for example, raises the question of whether there 
are times when the Christian is expected to behave in specific ways. If this is the 
case, it becomes difficult to see how a natural law approach could always include the 
possibility of inter-religious exchange.
Moreover, while the Autonomy school contends that the biblical moral admonitions, 
injunctions and directives depend upon the natural law for their justification, it does 
not seem to get beyond the proposal itself. Instead, proponents of this view seem
84 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 43.
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merely to hypothesise about the close relationship between philosophical and 
theological ethics. Furthermore, supporters of the autonomy position do not seem to 
give sufficient consideration to the implications of adopting natural law theory as the 
basis of Christian morality. It is often asked whether the natural law theory is 
sufficient in itself, since its reliance on the physicality of acts or circumstances seems 
to provide an impersonal account of human morality. In addition, one has to ask 
whether natural theory is flexible enough to accommodate magisterial teachings on 
human morality, or whether it will lead to the prohibition of certain actions ‘defined 
in nonmoral terms and sometimes defined merely according to [their] physical or
n ^
biological structure’.
Above all, the movement for an ethics of autonomy seems unable to prove 
convincingly that the material content of morality is the same for all. It asserts that 
Christianity gives a specific context or a ‘new motivation’ to Christian morality, but 
one wonders whether these terms are neutral? Is the relationship between the ‘Why?’ 
and the ‘What?’ of human action so clearly defined that the motivation behind an 
action never affects its content?
The criticisms discussed above show that the issues surrounding the 
Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate are complex and that there is much disagreement as 
to the precise nature of Christian morality. It seems that even within their own 
schools of thought, there is little agreement among theologians as to how Christian 
morality should be explained.
85 C h a r le s  E . C u r ra n , A New Look at Christian Morality, 2 nd e d n .; L o n d o n : S h e e d  a n d  W a r d ,  1 9 7 6 , 1 1 5 ; 
f o r  a n  in te re s t in g  t r e a tm e n t o f  w h a t  is  k n o w n  as th e  ‘ n e w  n a tu ra l la w  th e o r y ’ , see Jea n  P o r te r ,  “ N a tu r a l 
L a w  a n d  th e  S p e c if ic i t y  o f  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y , ”  in  S a lz m a n  (e d .) , M ethod and Catholic Moral 
Theology, 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 9 -2 2 9 .
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Perhaps the most striking factor of all is that although generally spoken of as 
opposites, there are clear similarities between weaker forms of the Glaubensethik and 
Autonomy schools. This seems to suggest that classifying them as opposites or 
indeed attempting to show which one has it right is a futile venture. As Alfons Auer 
reminds us, we should perhaps spend more time examining our own understanding of 
morality and less time trying to say what is wrong with that of others. 86 But this 
approach seems rather ambitious given that a large number of scholars seem to have 
moved away from discussions about the Christian proprium  debate. In fact, the 
debate seems to have come to a standstill. According to Auer, however, the lack of 
dialogue should not lead one to presume that the problems have been solved; rather, 
one should feel compelled to find a more modem way of putting the message across 
and of explaining the issues involved.87 Auer is right that an alternative is needed. 
But what should this alternative be?
1.5 Beyond the Impasse
Despite the shortcomings and complexities of the Glaubensethik and Autonomy 
schools’ presentation of Christian morality, there is a common concern in both 
approaches which not only mediates the current impasse regarding the existence of 
specifically Christian norms, but also assists in the reorientation of the debate. This 
common thread is the desire to say what is specific about Christian morality and to 
situate the Bible in a context vis-à-vis its role in the moral life.
86 A l fo n s  A u e r ,  “ D ie  a u to n o m e  M o r a l  im  c h r is t l ic h e n  K o n t e x t , ”  in  W a l te r  S e id e l a n d  P e te r  R e ife n b e rg , 
(e d s .), Moral konkret: Impulse fü r  eine christliche Weltverantwortung, W ü r z b u rg :  E c h te r ,  1 9 9 3 , 15.
87 Ib id .
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Indeed, the similarities between the weaker forms of the Faith-Ethic approach and that 
of the Autonomy school show that the tensions dividing scholars are perhaps pseudo­
tensions, as both schools are similar insofar as they wish to ensure that the Christian 
tradition is protected, and that it continues to function as a life-giving entity. Rather 
than distinguishing these two by their respective stances vis-à-vis specifically 
Christian norms or values, then, the situation between the Glaubensethik and 
Autonomy schools could be put in a more positive way. It could be said that both 
schools of thought are marked by the desire to protect a specifically Christian identity 
in the midst of a secular world.
The move to an approach that places the question of the identity at its center is made 
all the more convincing when we consider the problems that arose from an approach 
that concentrates on the search for specifically Christian norms or principles. Both 
schools of thought run into difficulty about the specific nature of Christian morality, 
for they seem unable to state convincingly where the specificity lies. In fact, the lack 
of conceptual clarification of terms such as ‘content’, ‘motivation’, ‘morality’ and
• ■ RR‘ethics’ makes the positions offered more problematic still. Indeed, if  one believes 
that faith contributes to either of these, in particular to morality, it seems that one is 
overlooking an important observation made by Wittgenstein. Beliefs are so entangled 
in other claims that a person can hardly isolate one belief and definitely say how it is 
specifically Christian or how it contributes to the content of a specifically Christian 
morality.89
88 M a c N a m a ra , Faith and Ethics, 2 0 3 .
89 D a n  R . S t iv e r ,  The Philosophy o f  Religious Language: Sign, Symbol and Story, O x fo rd :  B la c k w e l l  
P u b lis h in g ,  1 9 9 6 , 2 0 2 .
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The belief in Jesus as the Son of God, for instance, involves a range of issues such as 
consideration of what it means in the broader context of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
It implies background beliefs about a God who could have such a Son and 
subsequently raise Him from the dead and about the possibility of such an event 
occurring in such a way as it could be translated into purely Christian norms or 
values. The issue may be summed up in the following way: How can one translate 
religious convictions about an historical event into concrete, specific principles for 
action?
Another not unrelated issue has to do with the way in which one understands the 
development of Christianity as a religion. Of course, it is incontrovertible that 
revelation is the central defining event which gave rise to the Christian community, 
but this community was made up of converts, mainly from Judaism. This meant that 
the early Christian community was made up of people who moved from one tradition 
to another, bringing with them an already-established moral code. As Wayne Meeks 
explains,
The moral sphere within which the new Christians [were] urged to think about 
their own behaviour is a strongly bounded space. Its symbolic shape and 
texture [were] formed by Jewish conceptions and stories about the one God 
and by their peculiar Christian story about God’s crucified and resurrected 
son. Its social boundaries [were] determined by the turning of those who have 
received these stories as their own and by separation from ‘the Gentiles’ who 
include those formerly their families and associates.90
This seems to indicate that attempting to look for purely Christian beliefs or values
unmixed with the surrounding cultures from which Christianity developed and with
which it continued to interact is a dubious venture. Moreover, it carries with the
suggestion that as long as the GlciubensethiklAutonomy debate is discussed in terms
90 Wayne Meeks, The Origins of the First Christians: The First Two Centuries, London & N ew  Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993, 5.
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of the existence of specifically Christian norms or values, it is most certainly bound to 
yield poor results and little agreement. The shift to an approach centered on a 
specifically Christian identity, then, seems all the more promising.
Such an approach asserts that when Christians reflect on moral actions and on human 
behaviour generally, they are not only reflecting on what it means to be a person, but 
on what it means to be a Christian person. This is specific. Christians have a specific 
identity because they are connected to a specific story. It goes without saying then 
that when Christians ask questions about the morality of a particular action, they are 
effectively reflecting on two specific questions. The first is ‘Who am I?’; the second, 
‘What should I do as that person?’
When considered in light of the Christian proprium  debate, this means that what is
specific about Christian morality is not so much the individual actions that ensue from
moral reflection as the way in which Christian moral reflection takes place. As
MacNamara explains,
Moral judgements are not made in a vacuum. They are made by people who 
see life in a particular way.... Like all basic myths, the Christian story gives 
us our stance towards the world and its creation, towards the value and 
significance of the human person, towards body, matter, spirit, towards the 
meaning and significance of history, towards life and death, towards what 
constitutes flourishing and perfection, towards success and failure.91
It is from this perspective that we begin our study of the Christian proprium  debate. 
The fundamental idea will be that the specificity of Christian morality is less about the 
search for specific norms and values and more about the search for a particular 
identity, a Christian identity. In order to show how this shift in focus may be justified
91 MacNamara, “The Distinctiveness of Christian Morality,” 153.
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from a scriptural and magisterial point of view, and in particular how it may assist in 
liberating the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools from the current impasse, the 
work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur will be used.
The preference for Ricoeur’s work is due to his ability to consider ethical problems 
from the perspective of a particular tradition, while maintaining an openness towards 
all sides of the argument. In addition, his work on biblical interpretation and on the 
interpretation of literary texts in general allows him to put forward an assiduously 
balanced position concerning the role of the Bible in ethical reflection, this being one 
of the central issues at stake in the Christian proprium  debate.
Indeed, one of the most important issues surrounding the Christian proprium  debate is 
whether one can be part of a tradition, religious or otherwise, and dialogue with other 
religions as to the content of human morality without falling into a sectarian posture. 
These topics are treated in Ricoeur’s work, which indicates that his philosophy can 
take us to the heart of the issues arising out of the Christian proprium  debate. By 
analysing the aspects of Ricoeur’s thesis that are relevant to the Christian proprium  
debate, we will attempt to show how the French philosopher’s work can help to 
mediate between the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools, thereby showing that 
there may be a way out of the current impasse. More precisely, this study will attempt 
to show that the work of Paul Ricoeur can assist in moving the specificity of Christian 
morality debate away from the disagreements over Christian norms and principles, 
motivation and intention, to a stance which respects the integrity of the Christian 
moral tradition without undermining the concerns of the Glaubensethik or Autonomy 
schools.
5 4
CHAPTER TWO
NARRATIVE AND CHRISTIAN IDENTITY
The previous chapter suggested that the Christian proprium  debate should be looked 
at from the point of view of a specifically Christian identity, and that the work of the 
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur can assist in doing this. But Ricoeur is generally 
spoken of as a philosopher and his contribution to ethics may not be obvious. Indeed, 
the lack of works explaining Ricoeur’s contribution to ethical thought suggests that it 
is necessary to state precisely why Ricoeur’s work is useful in the context of an 
ethical debate. The first section of this chapter will discuss some of the ethical themes 
that feature in Ricoeur’s many works, with a view to determining how they take us to 
the heart of the issues surrounding the Christian proprium  debate.
The second section will focus more specifically on Ricoeur’s contribution to the 
interpretation of texts. As pointed out in chapter one, the debate on the special 
character of Christian ethics gave rise to much controversy as to how or whether the 
Bible contributes to the content of Christian morality or to the motivational aspects of 
Christian moral striving. This led to tensions and much disagreement between 
theologians, as commentators in each school sought to use the Bible in a way that 
would serve their own purpose. The need to determine the role of the Bible vis-à-vis 
Christian morality is clear. Owing to the fact that Ricoeur has published much on the
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interpretation of texts and on the necessity of texts for the construction of a coherent 
self-identity, the second section of this chapter will demonstrate that the primary 
function of texts is to tell us something about ourselves, rather than provide us with a 
code of moral conduct. It is at this point that we will see where ethics and the 
interpretation of texts converge in Ricoeur’s interpretative method, thereby showing 
why his work is congenial to discussion of the Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate.
Our task, then, is twofold: a) to justify using the work of Paul Ricoeur in the context 
of an ethical debate, namely that of the Christian proprium ; and b) show how it assists 
us in determining the precise function of texts in the moral arena. Once we have 
sketched Ricoeur’s contribution to the ethical and hermeneutical fields, we will then 
be able to see how Ricoeur’s work locates the texts of the Christian tradition at the 
heart of the human quest for self-understanding, rather than at the heart of specifically 
Christian moral behaviour, thereby moving the Christian proprium  debate beyond the 
current impasse.
2.1 Ricoeur and Ethical Thought
Unlike his predecessors, Gadamer, Heidegger, Husserl, Schleiermacber and Dilthey, 
Ricoeur’s primary intention is to analyse the human person through texts, signs and 
symbols. Whereas the former seek to explain existence in a direct way, i.e., through 
theoretical or philosophical theories, Ricoeur believes that the only way to understand 
the self is through signs and symbols.1 His hermeneutical project, therefore, is to 
interpret the self through the narrative texts and stories of a given tradition. We thus
1 This idea is expressed by Ricoeur in his well-known ‘wager’: ‘I wager that I shall have a better 
understanding o f  man and o f  the bond between the being o f  man and the being o f  all beings i f  I follow  
the indication o f  sym bolic thought. ’ Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 
355.
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find Ricoeur steering away from the rationalism of Descartes and Kant, as well as the
phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. Whereas Husserl located the self and
‘meaning’ in general in the subject’s intuition of the ‘things themselves’, Ricoeur
prefers to analyse human beings, ethical meaning and existence through language,
symbolic meaning and texts. This is because Ricoeur believes that things are always
given to us indirectly through signs and symbols, which include the signs and
■ • 2symbols contained in cultures, narratives and traditions.
In saying this, Ricoeur does not seek to deny existential meaning in the philosophical 
sense. Rather, Ricoeur’s project is to show that the interpretation of the self includes 
signs, symbols and stories that ask us to think more, not to abandon speculative 
thought altogether. The power contained in symbols and narratives provides 
individuals with a heightened awareness of what it means to be a human person, as 
well as an ethical person. Symbols allow us to understand more than can be explained 
by theoretical means.
This is clear from Ricoeur’s treatment of evil in his work The Symbolism o f  Evil. As 
its title suggests, this work represents an attempt to explain the ethical theme of evil 
through the stories and symbols of evil contained in the major Western traditions— 
Greek, Hebraic and Babylonian. By interpreting a) the prim ary  symbols of stain, guilt 
and sin, b) the secondary symbols of searching for meaning, decline, fall and 
blindness, and c) the tertiary symbols of freedom and will, Ricoeur succeeds in
2 In an attempt to move away from explaining human existence according to the Cartesian expression ‘I 
think, I am ’, Ricoeur proposes to examine being through an indirect route, that is, through signs and 
symbols. Thus he says: ‘The first truth—  I  think, I  am —  remains as abstract and empty as it is 
unassailable. It must be “mediated” by representations, actions, works, institutions, and monuments 
which objectify it; it is in these objects, in the largest sense o f  the word, that the ego must both lose 
itself and find itself. ’ Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, Don Ihde 
(ed.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, 327.
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demonstrating how stories assist moral agents in articulating ethical meaning and
• 3understanding ethical concepts.
For Ricoeur, the more we seek to understand stories and ethical symbols, the better 
equipped we will be to understand ourselves and what is required of us as ethical 
beings. By engaging with stories and symbols of evil, good, virtue and vice, Ricoeur 
believes that we come to the realisation that we exist in relation to others. This again 
implies that ethics is an important theme for the French philosopher. Indeed, Ricoeur 
even goes as far as to say that understanding ethical concepts or subjectivity is only 
attained after we have undergone a series of interpretative steps. Reading texts, 
questioning symbols, listening to the received wisdom of the past are necessary 
projects in the quest for understanding.4 However, this does not mean that once we 
are familiar with the texts of our tradition, the hermeneutical task ends. In fact, the 
opposite is the case.
In Ricoeur’s view, texts require interpretation so that they can effectively convey 
ethical and subjective meaning. But the task of interpreting the self in this way is 
never finished, since rereading texts opens up new meanings and fresh interpretations 
that call us to question once again that which we formerly considered to be true. Here 
again the theme of ethics is introduced into the Ricoeurian corpus. Although reading
3 Cf. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, 269-354.
4 Commenting on his famous phrase le symbole donne a penser (the symbol gives rise to thought), 
Ricoeur says the following: ‘This maxim that I find so appealing says two things. The symbol invites:
I do not posit the meaning, the symbol gives it; but what it gives is something for thought, something to 
think about. First the giving, then the positing; the phrase suggests, therefore, both that all has already 
been said in enigma and yet that it is necessary ever to begin and re-begin everything in the dimension 
o f  thought. It is this articulation o f  thought.. .in the realm o f  symbols and o f  thought positing and 
thinking that I would like to intercept and understand.’ Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Henneneutics o f  Symbols 
and Philosophical Reflection,’ in Charles E. Regan and David Steward (eds.), The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, Boston: Beacon Press, 1978, 36.
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texts and ethical stories heightens our awareness of who we are, it does not offer a 
conclusive account of what it means to be human.5 For Ricoeur, the search for 
authenticity is a constant one, which ends only in death. When we read the texts of 
our tradition, then, there is an ethical element at stake: the self is never master of the 
text but a disciple who allows him/herself to be transformed by the text. Hence the 
self is not so much the originator of truth and self-understanding as an agent who 
critically engages with the world of the text to arrive at a deeper and more authentic 
view of the self and of the world.
By saying this, Ricoeur does not wish to promote the idea that ethical and subjective 
meaning be defined only by cultural symbols and stories of the past. When discussing 
social imagination and the dynamics of socio-political action, for instance, Ricoeur 
states that, although informed by tradition and collective stories of the past, 
communities exist within a creative tension. By this he means that we are informed 
not only by the ideological vision of ourselves, which is handed down to us by 
tradition, but also by utopian images of rupture, novelty and disruption. The 
suggestion here is that communities are the product of a past which is not yet 
complete, and which needs to be critically accessed so that ideological or self- 
interested views do not hinder the development of the future. While ideology gives us 
a sense of identity and belonging, it must be coupled with a healthy suspicion. Thus 
Ricoeur analyses society and its citizens as a balance between past and future, 
between utopia and tradition, between critique and ideology.
5 See Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” in David W ood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and 
Interpretation, London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1991, 33. Here Ricoeur says that ‘what we call the 
subject is never given at the start. Or, if  it is, it is in danger o f  being reduced to the narcissistic, egoistic 
and stingy ego, from which literature, precisely, can free us. So, what w e lose on the side o f  narcissism, 
we win back on the side o f  narrative. In place o f  an ego enamoured o f  itself arises a self instructed by 
cultural symbols, the first among which are the narratives handed down in our literary tradition. ’
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This is no less true of his treatment of texts. Texts of a given tradition provide readers 
with a space in which they may appropriate the story of their past; in short, their 
identity. Nevertheless, this hermeneutical interpretation via texts, he explains, must 
exist alongside a suspicion for the texts and for the possible biases or unhealthy 
ideological perspectives they harbour.6 In relation to society, then, no less than with 
texts, Ricoeur insists that the interpretation of communities and the hermeneutics of 
the self must take place somewhere between belonging and distance. In other words, 
to belong to a tradition, including a narrative tradition, we must be critical, so as to 
avoid falling into a sectarian or self-indulgent stance.
Once again we see an ethical perspective emerging from Ricoeur’s work. Similarly to 
what is taught in fundamental moral theology, for instance, Ricoeur insists that we 
must always ask questions. The search for meaning, truth and authenticity is a never- 
ending quest, which asks us time and time again to rethink who we are and what it is 
we are required to do.
In fact, one of the most urgent ethical tasks today seems to be the need to combat 
illegitimate prejudices or sectarian approaches to religious traditions. Ricoeur’s 
works seems to provide a way in which one could belong to a particular community 
without running such a risk. He explains that we must always question our stance in 
relation to the world from beyond ourselves, i.e., from beyond or outside our tradition. 
The way to do this, according to Ricoeur, is to maintain a healthy suspicion and 
constantly question our prejudices, choices, communities and vision of ourselves. Put
6 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative /, trans. Kathleen McLoughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago and 
London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1984, 68-69; 77-79; 166-208. Note: Hereafter, the abbreviation 
‘77V’ will be used to refer to this work. The volume in question will be indicated by placing T ,  ‘/ / ’ or 
‘III' after the abbreviated title.
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simply, we can only become authentic persons and communities by a process of 
alienation, that is, by a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion which demystifies our illusions, 
permitting us to decipher the masked workings of desire, will and interest.’7
An equally urgent ethical task of the contemporary society is that of individualism 
and the idea that we are completely autonomous beings. It is also an issue that arises 
in the context of the Christian proprium  debate. This issue could be put in the form of 
a question: Does the idea of autonomy promote absolute freedom on the part of moral 
agents? Indeed, the use of the term autonomy is one of the criticisms made against 
the autonomists by theologians of the faith-ethic persuasion. The latter believe that it 
promotes a self-indulgent, self-interested society, since it seems to indicate that 
human beings are both judge and jury. Yet again, however, Ricoeur does not fail to 
offer some reflections on this matter.
Unlike Husserl, who maintained that one could understand reality apart from its 
historical and temporal context, Ricoeur insists that meaning not only precedes us but 
it outlives u s .8 In this regard, Ricoeur moves the hermeneutical debate away from 
the idea that meaning is deciphered easily and in a way that serves the purposes of 
particular individuals or communities. For Ricoeur, we must always be aware of our 
fmitude; we exist in a horizon of consciousness that we have not created but which we 
must interpret. Understanding is a process, not a given, which requires us to engage 
with the past and its significations. This means, then, that understanding of any kind
7 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
2004, 8.
8 Ibid., 15.
61
can never be completely autonomous, since we are not solely responsible for the 
horizon of meaning which surrounds us.9
Here again we see that Ricoeur tends towards an ethical vision of autonomy. His 
suggestion is that we belong to the world, to a horizon of meaning and pre­
understanding which existed long before we did. This means that we are not the 
originators of truth and meaning but companions on a journey of discovery. 
Furthermore, it seems to imply that one can speak of autonomy in such a way as to 
avoid falling into a self-interested, self-justifying and insular perspective.
It comes as no surprise then that Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy includes 
reference to the sacred. For the sacred, he explains, demands that we abandon the 
idea that we are our own gods, and encourages us to acknowledge that our knowledge 
and understanding of all earthly things is finite and limited. Self-righteous certainty 
has no place in Ricoeur’s theory. We must be humble in our approach to knowledge 
but hopeful that we will find meaning and unity of meaning amidst conflicting views 
of every aspect of human existence. Hence the ethical reappears in Ricoeur’s work, 
albeit in a different way, as he suggests that the existence of the sacred serves, among 
other things, as a constant reminder that we do not know everything; like Moses, we 
may catch a glimpse of the promised land but may never possess it.10
The desire to resist an inflated view of the self is a theme which also features in 
Ricoeur’s treatment of texts. To read a text, according to Ricoeur, is to allow oneself
9 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John B. Thompson (ed.), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981, 145.
10 Ib id , 10Iff.
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to be affected by the horizon of meaning contained in the text; we must experience the 
‘otherness’ of the text. The text requires the reader to transcend his/her own 
subjective tendencies and abandon any biases or prejudices about the text and its 
meaning. This will ensure that the text is read in a way that respects its integrity and 
allows its horizon to emerge. Frequently, however, what is proposed by the text may 
be foreign to the reader, i.e., it may ask the reader to reflect upon a situation or an 
experience which his/she has not already encountered. In this way, the text opens up 
new possibilities for the reader, as he/she moves from their ‘first-order reference’, i.e., 
the world which he/she inhabits, to the ‘second-order reference’ contained in the text.
The interaction between reader and text involves a distancing of sorts.11 The reader is
invited to experience something beyond him/herself, something other. It is precisely
this process of distancing that leads to an enlarged view of the self. Being open to
new experiences, new ethical tales and new perspectives is vital for Ricoeur; it leads
to an enlarged ego, which is capable of listening to other perspectives. Reading, then,
...shows that the act of subjectivity is not so much what initiates 
understanding as what terminates it. This terminal act can be characterized as 
appropriation. [But] it does not purport...to rejoin the original subjectivity 
which would support the meaning of the text. Rather it responds to the matter 
of the text, and hence to the proposals of meaning which the text unfolds. It is 
thus the counterpart of the distanciation which establishes the autonomy of the 
text with respect to its author, its situation and its original addressee. Thus 
appropriation can be integrated into the theory of interpretation without 
surrepetitiously reintroducing the primacy of subjectivity.12
In this way, reading texts is ethically formative, as it leads to an openness to the other
(i.e., the text), and constitutes a critique of the self. We are invited to question
ourselves in front of the text. Hence the danger of egocentricism is once again
11 Note: This is often translated as alienation, from the French term alienation.
12 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 101.
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avoided in Ricoeur’s anthropological philosophy, as he invites us to interpret reading 
as complementary dialectic of self and other.
The ethical function of texts is not confined to the process of reading, however. In the 
third volume of Time and Narrative, Ricoeur analyses the ‘testimonial role’ of 
narrative. In fact, this is one of few instances where Ricoeur makes explicit reference 
to the ethical in texts. Speaking of historical narrative, Ricoeur urges his readers to 
consider the ethical task of the historian writing about the atrocities of the past. 
Writing about events such as the Holocaust, for instance, requires an ethics of 
responsibility because of ‘a debt we owe to the dead’.13 The responsibility, Kearney 
tells us, is twofold: ‘On the one hand narrative provides us with figural 
reconstructions of the past that enable us to see and hear things long since gone. On 
the other, it stands for [...] these things as events that actually happened.’14
It is Ricoeur’s belief that events such as Auschwitz could be suppressed from our 
memories were it not for the mediating function of narrative. In this case the ethical 
task is that narrative responds to the need to recount and remember the sadness and 
suffering of the past. Narrative acts as a way of remembering devastating events in 
the hope that they will not happen again, for ‘it is always through some transfer from 
Same to Other, in empathy and imagination, that the Other that is foreign is brought 
closer.’15
13 Ricoeur, TNIII, 185-6.
14 Keamey, On Paul Ricoeur, 100.
15 Ricoeur, TNIII, 185ff.
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Moreover, narrative is a means through which we may respect the individual stories 
of other countries and nations. Telling their story and their experience of suffering 
gives individual communities a voice of their own in the face of accounts of history 
that tell of the triumph of the powerful over the weak. Remembering takes on a new 
meaning; it transforms the act of telling history into an act of justice. The reader is 
now invited to relive the suffering of others as if they had experienced it themselves. 
The tremendum horrendum is felt by the reader; it strikes him/her and the scandal of 
history is revealed.16 In this way, the oppression of others is communicated to the 
world, and the hope of liberation loses its fictional character.
There can be no doubt that, although he is generally read and interpreted as a 
philosopher, Ricoeur has made a significant contribution to some of the major ethical 
themes that concern fundamental moral theology. Good and evil; virtue and vice; 
recognition of the other; the desire to become an authentic self, rather than a self- 
interested ego; the hope of liberation and truth; suspicion and prejudice; freedom and 
autonomy—these are among his central themes. In fact, most of the themes 
mentioned are ones which have been raised in the context of the Christian proprium  
debate, which makes the case for analysing the debate through Ricoeur’s work all the 
more promising.
We have already mentioned that proponents of the faith-ethic persuasion are reluctant 
to accept the autonomy position out of the fear that it will lead to the idea that 
believers exercise absolute freedom. But Ricoeur tells us that we cannot view 
ourselves in this way, for understanding precedes us. Furthermore, he explains that,
16 Ricoeur, TNIII, 187.
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as historical beings, we are naturally limited by history, time and the horizon of 
meaning given to us by a particular tradition. Hence the claim that the content of 
morality is discovered ‘autonomously’ is qualified by the fact that interpretation of 
any kind is limited, because we exist in a world and in a community which we have 
not created. The latter, therefore, interpret us before we interpret them.
Moreover, each time Ricoeur speaks of ethical issues, it is always in relation to 
narrative. Evil is communicated to us through symbols; the good is spoken of by 
telling stories; tradition is communicated through historical narratives and self-interest 
is avoided by respecting and engaging with the world of text. This makes the case for 
incorporating Ricoeur’s work into the Christianproprium  debate stronger still. For it 
seems to suggests that narrative is not only foundational for ethics, but that it is a 
necessary condition for ethics.
In this respect, Ricoeur takes us to the heart of one of the main issues dividing 
scholars of the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools: the role of the biblical texts in 
Christian ethical living and reflection. From what has been said already, it seems that 
each time Ricoeur speaks of ethics, he also speaks of narrative. This is because he 
cannot conceive of ethics without narrative. How would one explain the good without 
stories of the good, for example? Ricoeur’s philosophy, therefore, may be described 
as a narrative approach to ethics, and seems to represent a meeting place for the 
questions asked by scholars of the post conciliar debate in moral theology.
Of course, the most fundamental question of all is to determine not so much how 
narrative educates us ethically, but whether it contributes particular norms to
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morality’s content. Before we engage with Ricoeur on this issue, however, we need 
to investigate a more general question: what do texts contribute to life? Once we have 
determined this, we will then be equipped to answer the subsequent question of 
whether the texts of the faith-community alter the content of human morality.
2.2 Narrative and Memory
As with his interpretation of the ethical function of narrative as a means by which we 
may record past events, Ricoeur interprets historical communities by the texts which 
constitute them. In his work Critique and Conviction, Ricoeur explains that because 
human beings are limited in terms of their historicity, they cannot experience 
everything. They rely, therefore, on narrative accounts of the formation of their 
community to provide them with a coherent story of their community that
17distinguishes them from other communities, religious or otherwise.
This implies that the primary function of narrative is to record the past, so that we 
may return to it and experience historically-significant events which we ourselves 
have not witnessed. Writing narrative is a way of combating the passage of time.
This is what Ricoeur calls narrative configuration. It is a way of holding on to events
18that would otherwise pass away. Taking his inspiration from Aristotle’s Poetics, 
Ricoeur explains that narrative organises historical events, and gives them a coherent 
form, so that they may be read time and time again throughout history. As he puts it,
17 Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, trans. Kathleen Blarney, N ew  York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998, 146.
18 Cf. Aristotle, “On the Art o f  Poetry,” in Classical Literary Criticism, trans. T.S. Dorch, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965, esp. 31-75.
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narrative allows us to recount episodes of the past in a comprehensible way, where 
discordant events are given a concordant form.19
The plot plays a vital role in the recording of time in narrative. It not only synthesises 
heterogeneous events, by placing them in the form of a story that has a beginning, 
middle and end, but it also alters time. This is particularly true in the case of 
historical narrative. The historian gathers the documents of a particular event in order 
to give them a coherent form, that is, a beginning, middle and end, so that the event is 
remembered in the present. The result is that the reader is left with a configuration of 
time, i.e., that which remains over that which ‘passes and flows away.’
It is this kind of configuration of events that, for Ricoeur, founds communities. Take 
the example of biblical Israel; it is a historical and spiritual community that is formed 
on the basis of foundational narratives of the exodus and Genesis. The same is true of 
Judaism. Books and stories are the means through which these ancient societies 
defined themselves and ensured some kind of continuity of identity. Indeed, it would 
be difficult to understand how one could remain faithful to one’s promises and 
covenants unless one had some minimal remembrance of one’s origins and of how 
one’s community came to be. For Ricoeur, then, narrative is a form of memory. The 
‘culture of the book’ is necessary for the continuation of identities formed by 
particular stories or events.
19 Ricoeur, TNI, 31.
20 Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 22; for a clear account o f  how time functions in Ricoeur’s 
narrative theory, see Gerard Loughlin, Telling God's Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 141 ff .
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In fact, in his conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, Ricoeur states 
unequivocally that historical narratives give rise to and sustain religious communities. 
Although he admits that there are certain specific characteristics dividing them, such 
as naming God as Allah or Yahweh, for instance, Ricoeur recognises religious 
communities by the presence of three criteria: a) the anteriority of a founding word; b) 
the mediation of writing; c) the history of interpretation.21
Insofar as all of these elements are present in Christianity it could be said that the 
primary function of the Bible is to communicate a particular identity to Christians and 
provide them with a coherent account of their community. There would be no 
Christian community without a minimum of narration that tells Christians who did 
what in the Christian story, and what that action meant in the broader context of the 
narrative of salvation and resurrection.
This is not to suggest, however, that Riceour is promoting a formal or unchangeable 
account o f the self through the stories of tradition; for if  the identity of an historical 
agent can be understood only through story, it cannot be a substantial or a formal 
identity.22 It is not a fixed identity, since the fragility of the human character suggests 
that identity is not an immutable phenomenon. This means that while narrative 
provides an identity that is constant and cohesive, it ‘can include change, mutability, 
within the cohesion of one’s life-time.’23 Therefore, identity is not simply given;
21 Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 146.
22 Peter Kemp, “Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Ricoeur,” in John Wall, W illiam Schweiker, and 
W. David Hall (eds.), Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, N ew  York and London: 
Routledge, 2002, 34.
23 Ricoeur, TNIII, 246.
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human beings are both interpreted and interpreters of their individual- as well as 
communal life-stories.
It follows then that untruthful narratives of a community may be reinterpreted if they
contain narrow-minded, egotistical or xenophobic suggestions. Although the power
of the historical narrative resides in its ability to provide communities with a bearable
account of who they are, these narratives must always be accompanied by a suspicion
in order to resist insular or sectarian postures. Thus, as Ricoeur explains,
.. .the self of self-knowledge is not the egotistical and narcissistic ego whose 
hypocrisy and naivete [sic] the hermeneutics of suspicion have denounced, 
along with its aspects of an ideological superstructure and infantile and 
neurotic archaism. The self of self-knowledge is the fruit of an examined life, 
to recall Socrates’ phrase in the Apology. And an examined life is, in large 
part, one purged, one clarified by the cathartic effects of the narratives, be they 
historical or fictional, conveyed by our culture. So self-constancy refers to a 
self instructed by the works of a culture that it has applied to itself.24
It goes without saying that Ricoeur envisages the interpretation of the self through
narrative in an ethical way. The ethical task is to constantly question the narratives of
tradition and maintain a responsibility towards other cultures and religions in the
pursuit of self-constancy in an ever-changing and complex world.
From what has been said here, it is clear than that the function of narrative is to 
provide us with a coherent account of ourselves. But this is not to say that religion is 
the only means through which this can be done, for the ‘storied self, to use Joseph 
Dunne’s phrase, begins at birth, and children do not become familiar with the texts of 
their tradition until they can read. The quest of self-perception and self-knowledge is 
enfolded in a web of relationships that begins with one’s parents.
24 Ricoeur, TNIII, 246.
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As with his treatment of the vision of the self presented in narrative texts, Ricoeur 
resists the temptation to explain selfhood in numerical or factual terms. The 
interpretation of the self lies outside the self and depends to a large extent on the
9 S • •stories others tell us about ourselves. The possibility of constructing an empirical 
self, therefore, is out of the question.
In fact, if the interpretation of the self were conceived in such terms, it would be 
impossible to account for the influence of parents on the development of an infant. 
Before a child begins to use the word T ,  he/she needs first to become aware that 
he/she exists in relation to an other. The child’s primary realisation of self comes 
when he/she realises that his/her parents are others. But the child also realises that 
he/she depends on these significant others for basic needs: food and love.
Thus the self is historical through and through, and is enfolded ab initio within a web 
of relationships. At a very early stage these relationships are the means through 
which the child’s physical needs are met and through which meaning is transmitted. 
The child becomes aware for instance that he/she is worthy of love or respect, and 
these feelings are internalised by the child.26 Although this experience is not a 
reflexive one on the part of the child, the loving encounters with his/her parents are 
what provide her/him with a sense of self; in short, of what it means to be a human 
person.
2.3 The Storied Self
25 Cf. Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 30ff.
26 Joseph Dunne, “The Storied Self,” in Richard Kearney (ed.), Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of 
Action, Philosophy and Social Criticism Theory, London: Sage Publications, 1996, 144.
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Gradually, the child adopts the language o f his/her parents and becomes a part o f the 
world o f those around him/her. Indeed, the child may even ask the parents to recount 
what happened on the day the child was bom. Again, this activity o f storytelling 
provides the child with a sense o f worth and identity in the world.
This is not to suggest that the child becomes confined to the language and meanings 
that its parents bestow on it. Deviation from these meanings is necessary so that the 
social construction o f the child’s identity is not lost. Otherwise the child may suffer 
estrangement and alienation.
In fact, without a sense of self (independent from the sense o f self gained from 
parents) the risk of psychological problems is great. Sometimes children who are 
unsure o f who they are need therapy, the function o f which is to give coherency to 
their lives. Ricoeur says that often the function of the psychoanalyst is to help the 
patient to piece together the disjointed episodes o f his/her life so that the patient gains 
a sense o f self that is meaningful amidst the confusion o f broken plots. As the story 
emerges the subject also emerges.27
It is clear, therefore, that although religion and the texts o f religious traditions assist 
believers in maintaining self-constancy throughout their adult lives, the process of 
self-understanding through narrative begins at an earlier stage in life. In fact, it would 
seem that without some form of primary engagement with stories o f one’s life and of 
one’s environment, the possibility o f authentic growth is difficult. As Joseph Dunne, 
one of Ricoeur’s many commentators and interpreters, argues, ‘If  no account can be
27 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of Narrative,” 30.
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given o f my life, it can scarcely be called a human life (this may be related to 
Aristotle’s famously ascribing a life without logos either to a beast or a god); and if  I  
cannot give an account o f it, it can scarcely be said to be my life— or, what perhaps 
amounts to the same thing, I can scarcely be considered a self.’28
To sum up this part o f the argument, then, it seems that the primary function o f 
narrative, be it in oral or text form, is to provide human beings with an identity which 
they can call their own. O f course, the identity of communities that is formed through 
texts interacts with the stories we tell o f ourselves; all forms o f story telling interact. 
Hence the self is entangled in different stories, some of which are shared by other 
people.
Nonetheless, there are limits to this kind of self-interpretation that prevent it from 
degenerating into a quest for superiority at the expense o f others or from becoming 
detached from reality. For example, the story o f biblical Israel could be interpreted as 
a story o f a chosen people and used to justify the view that the believing community is 
to be placed above all others. Thus Ricoeur is quick to point out that although 
narrative provides us with a coherent sense o f self, it has its limits. There is an ethical 
task involved in the interpretation o f the texts o f a community or o f an individual that 
invites us to question constantly our identity in the face o f other communities or, 
indeed, conflicting identities. Narrative identity is answerable to something beyond 
the world o f the text and must be coupled with a responsibility to the other beyond the
28 Dunne, “The Storied Self,” 147.
29 Ricoeur, TN III, 249; cf. Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur, 112,
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But to speak o f the ethical task involved in the interpretation o f the self through story 
leads to an enquiry about what stories contribute to ethics. Most narratives convey 
something o f the Rilkean summons: Change your life! And so we arrive at the second 
aim of this chapter which is to determine the precise role o f texts in the ethical quest 
for goodness. This is so because the presentation of the self through narrative almost 
always involves some element o f ethical persuasion, however subtle or tangential. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to see how narrative could explain what it means to be 
an historical being without carrying with it some suggestions as to how one should 
live. And so we arrive at a crucial question: Does narrative give us rules o f conduct 
and principles o f behaviour by which we are obliged to live?
2.4 Narrative and Ethics
There are three main reasons why Ricoeur answers no to this question. The first is 
related to his maxim ‘life is lived and stories are recounted’. The second is due to the 
process involved in writing ethical narratives (mimesis), while the third has to do with 
the fact that ethical narratives do not give us theoretical justification by which we may 
consider actions to be good or bad. Ricoeur observes that it was Aristotle who first 
acknowledged that the truth contained in ethical narratives is not one o f abstract rules 
and principles, but one that allows us to relate goodness with happiness and evil with 
unhappiness.30 Although related, each of these three reasons merits attention as they 
will allow us to see why narrative cannot be considered as the proximate source of 
morality or used to justify certain ethical positions.
30 Ricoeur, 77V I, 40.
74
‘Life is lived and stories are recounted’ is a phrase used by Ricoeur in his article ‘Life
■ T1m Quest of Narrative’. It immediately suggests that there is a distinction between 
living life and telling stories. For Ricoeur life is lived and the stories we tell or read 
are a means o f talking about life in a symbolic way. This is what Ricoeur calls 
symbolic mediation,32 which is another way o f saying that signs and symbols give 
stories their readability. But this is not to suggest that stories tell us how we should 
live our lives, since the symbols contained in narratives are derived out o f life itself. 
It is for this reason that stories make sense to the reader and are accredited with a 
capacity to provoke ethical reflection.
However, it remains that their ability to communicate ethically relevant stories to the 
reader depends on the fact that the symbols and ethical messages they contain are 
ones with which the reader is already familiar. Narrative does not present us with 
irrational or incomprehensible stories. It communicates to us in such as way that we 
can relate to the events that unfold in the reading process. Yet it remains that 
narrative depends on life for its construction and articulation. There would be no 
narrative without life and without life stories that inspire it. As Ricoeur tells us, 
‘reality is contained neither in the dictionary nor in grammar.’
This means that while narrative has the ability to tell stories about life in a symbolic 
way, it cannot replace life. Nor can it dictate the way in which we should live life. 
Narrative is derived out o f life, but it is not sophisticated enough to deal with its 
complex vicissitudes. If, therefore, it contains specific principles or codes for living,
31 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 25.
32 Ibid., 28.
33 Ibid., 26.
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these codes are ones which have been already tested and considered as valuable by the 
author writing the text, or by the community for whom the narrative was written.
Linked to the idea that stories are derived out o f life itself, and therefore cannot be 
taken as the source o f any ethical rules or principles, is the process of narrative 
composition. For Ricoeur, narrative, including ethical and historical narrative, is the 
‘imitation of action’ {mimesis). In the case o f the historical narrative of the 
Holocaust, for instance, this is an action which has already taken place. The purpose 
o f the Auschwitz narrative is to communicate suffering or injustice to the reader so 
that, by remembering, the human community may avoid the re-enactment of such 
events. And so we see clearly that narratives are not ethically vacuous.
What is important, however, is that the significance o f the event is not determined by
the story itself; this has already been decided by society, which explains why the story
was deemed important in the first place. Furthermore, the story’s ability to transform
the reader does not lie within the story itself, but depends on the reader’s capacity to
decode its meaning and evaluate its proposal. The narrator proposes; the reader
disposes.34 As Ricoeur points out,
The strategy o f persuasion undertaken by the narrator is aimed at giving the 
reader a vision o f the world that is never ethically neutral, but that rather 
implicitly or explicitly induces a new evaluation o f the world and of the reader 
as well. In this sense, narrative already belongs to the ethical field in virtue of 
its claim— inseparable from its narration—to ethical justice. Still it belongs to 
the reader, now an agent, an initiator o f action, to choose among the multiple
• ■ 35proposals o f ethical justice brought forth by the reading.
34 Ricoeur, TN III, 249; cf. Dietmar Mieth, “Moral Identity— H ow is it Narrated?” Concilium 2000/2, 
20ff.
35 Ricoeur, TN III, 249.
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Here we see that Ricoeur is leaning towards an Aristotelian interpretation o f the good 
life. Narrative, comments Ricoeur, has the capacity to present readers with a vision of 
the world that is loaded with ethical significance. Moreover, by identifying with the 
protagonists of a given story, readers learn to relate modes o f good behaviour with 
happiness and bad behaviour with evil. Emotions also play a part in the Ricoeurian 
understanding of ethical narrative. In tragedy, for instance, the reader leams the 
feelings associated with the reversal o f fortune, where the good is not always 
rewarded or where fate overpowers justice.36 We may say, then, that ethical 
narratives not only excite the emotions associated with ethical behaviour, but also 
teach us something about virtue.
It is clear that Ricoeur is not suggesting a morality o f rule but one of virtue. From his
treatment of ethical narrative it seems that stories provide readers with an imaginative
space in which they may try out various proposals for living. By following the
development o f the characters in stories, readers become familiar with the kinds of
character traits necessary for authentic growth and moral maturity. More importantly,
perhaps, readers are given a stock of stories which allows them to recognise and
describe virtues such as courage, wisdom and caritas. Narrative fleshes out the
contours of the virtues which would be all but incomprehensible without stories which
explain their meaning. ‘To understand what courage means, we tell the story o f
Achilles; to understand what wisdom means, we tell the story o f St Francis of
Assisi.’37 Thus writes Ricoeur:
Aristotle did not hesitate to say that every well-told story teaches us 
something; moreover, he said that the story reveals universal aspects of the 
human condition and that, in this respect, poetry was more philosophical than
36 Ricoeur, TNI, 59ff.
37 Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur, 114.
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history, which is too dependent on the anecdotal aspect o f life. Whatever may 
be said about this relation between poetry and history, it is certain that tragedy, 
epic and comedy, to cite only those genres known to Aristotle, develop a sort 
of understanding that can be termed narrative understanding and which is 
much closer to the practical wisdom of moral judgement than to science, or 
more generally, to the theoretical use o f reason.38
Thus we begin to see that the wisdom contained in narrative is not theoretical enough
to provide adequate justification for considering certain norms and rules o f conduct to
be true. The function o f ethical narrative is more general; it functions less in terms of
rules and principles and more in terms o f a familiarity with what virtuous behaviour
should look like.
For this reason Ricoeur, again drawing on the work o f Aristotle, believes that the 
‘lessons’ contained in narratives are universals: they can be understood by all 
cultures, nationalities and religions. Nonetheless, Ricoeur is quick to point out that 
the particular stories used by traditions, religious or otherwise, are specific to them, 
which means that stories of virtue and happiness, etc. are context-sensitive. This is 
similar to Ricoeur’s interpretation o f myth: on the one hand, myths are specific to a 
particular tradition, while on the other hand they have a horizon of universality that 
allows them to be understood by other cultures.39 As is the case with myth, therefore, 
we must conclude that while ethical narratives, symbols and stories o f goodness and 
virtue are rooted in a particular culture, they also have the capacity to reach beyond 
their implicit horizon to include all cultures, religions and members o f the human 
community.
38 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 22-3.
39 Ricoeur, “Myth as the Bearer o f  Possible Worlds,” in Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur, 122.
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2.5 Ricoeur’s Contribution to the Christian Proprium Debate
Having sketched Ricoeur’s contribution to ethical thought and in particular to the 
interpretation o f narrative, we begin to see what his work brings to the Christian 
proprium debate. The first point of contact concerns the role o f texts in organised 
religion. Ricoeur tells us that texts are the means by which one religious community 
differentiates itself from another. Stories act as a memory by which believing 
communities are reminded o f the history and formation o f their identity.
In an interview with Richard Kearney, Ricoeur remarks that the ‘biblical experience 
of faith is founded on stories and narratives— the story of the exodus, the crucifixion 
and resurrection and so on— before it expresses itself in abstract theologies which 
interpret these foundational narratives and provide religious tradition with its sense of 
enduring identity. The future projects o f every religion are intimately related to the 
ways in which it remembers itself.’40 This is a crucial point for our discussion o f the 
Christian proprium debate, since one of the overriding issues dividing proponents of 
the Glaubensethik and Autonomy views concerned the function o f the biblical story in 
the moral quest for goodness. The divisions seemed irreconcilable and led to a long 
and acrimonious debate about the nature o f the biblical texts and their role in moral 
theology.
Ricoeur’s work, however, seems to provide an alternative orientation, one that pushes 
the function o f texts into a more foundational role. If Ricoeur is right, it would seem 
that the significance o f the biblical texts is not so much in terms of a moral teacher, 
who provides rules and specific nonns of conduct, but rather in terms o f an identity
40 Ricoeur, “The Creativity of Language,” in Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur, 135.
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giver. The texts of the biblical canon recount the history of the Christian tradition in a 
way which, although open to critique and revision, allows believers to construct a 
coherent account o f who they are. In the context o f the Glaubensethik/Autonomy 
debate, Ricoeur’s work seems to offer the prospect of transcending the polemics of 
the discussion as it has up to now been conducted.
Ricocur’s contribution does not stop here, however. When discussing the function of 
the biblical narratives, for instance, Ricoeur reminds us that the promises made by 
Yahweh to his people are not ones which can be realised in the same way as a legal 
promise. Whereas a legal promise can be realised immediately and requires no 
further action, the promises o f the faith community cannot be earned out in this way. 
The promise made to Abraham, for instance, that his people would have a salvific 
relation with God, is an inexhaustible promise. Moreover, it is repeated with Moses 
on Sinai, with David, and so on. This implies that faith requires a commitment to a 
way of life that cannot be summed up in a legal promise, a rule or a code o f conduct. 
It is a promise that is eschatological in character and therefore ‘not-yet-realised’.41
Another not unrelated point has to do with the way in which the various writers in the 
Bible interpret the Law. Saint Paul talks about the Christ event as an overcoming of 
the Law; and yet we find the synoptic authors continually affirming that the Christian 
event is a response to the prophets, as recounted in the Scriptures. Here we see 
disagreement and a lack of continuity concerning the way in which the Law should be 
interpreted for the faith community. This for Ricoeur is significant, since it
41 Ricoeur, “The Creativity of Language,” 135,
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demonstrates that the promises made in the Covenant cannot be described 
unequivocally or in terms of specific rules and principles.
Considered in light o f what the authors o f the post-conciliar debate in moral theology 
sought to achieve, it would seem that once again we are confronted with the weakness 
o f an approach centred upon the search for specifically Christian moral rules and 
principles. If the texts of the biblical tradition show little or no sign o f agreement 
about the content or indeed interpretation o f the Law, it leaves little hope o f such 
being the case today.
Nevertheless, Ricoeur’s work appears again to come to our assistance. The giving o f 
the Covenant is not disregarded, but affirmed in terms o f a life-project and 
commitment to God. It involves an invitation to become part o f a community that 
strives to be the best it can be, in the hope that it will one day realise the eternal 
promises made in the Covenant.42 In this respect, the Torah refers to a commitment to 
love and to constantly strive to be the best one can be, even in the face o f adversity. 
And the texts of the biblical tradition are placed at the service o f a community which 
needs to understand itself if  it is ever to realise the covenantal promises made again 
and again by its ancestors.
O f course, it could be argued that certain biblical narratives are not lacking in terms of 
their moral worth and in terms o f what they expect from Christian believers. The 
Creation narrative, for instance, shows the activity o f a loving God who entrusts 
creation to human beings and expects them to care for creation with compassion,
42 Ricoeur, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, 439.
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reverence and love. In this respect, its moral orientation is definite, and it could be 
argued that it contributes to the content o f morality.
Further, the image of God that is presented in the Creation narrative is o f one who 
provides human beings with a moral space in which they are to interpret themselves 
as stewards o f the human community. As William Schweiker asserts, ‘The creation 
narrative [...] provides orientation for how people can and ought to live in response to 
the decidedly natural features o f existence.’43 The crucial question then is whether or 
not it can be interpreted as a narrative that adds to or alters the content o f Christian 
morality.
Showing again his reluctance to concede that narrative alters the content of ethics, 
Ricoeur argues that the significance o f the Creation story lies in its ability to teach us 
that we are ultimately dependent upon a power that ‘precedes us, envelops us, and 
supports us.’44 Hence we are not isolated beings endowed with absolute freedom, but 
beings who belong to a ‘cosmos’ in which we are set where ‘nature is between us, 
around us— not just something to exploit but as an object o f solicitude, respect, and 
admiration.’45 The story supports a vision of interrelatedness and of ultimate 
dependence upon something outside and beyond us. We are not the originators of 
creation and all it entails, but stewards o f a creation entrusted to us. The picture of 
human existence presented to us in the Creation narrative, therefore, is not one that 
requires obedience or one that tells us precisely what we must or should do with it.
43 W illiam Schweiker, “Starry Heavens and Moral Worth,” in Wall et al.(eds.), Paul Ricoeur and 
Contemporary Moral Thought, 2002, 133.
44 Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer and 
Mark I. Wallace, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995, 287-298.
45 Ibid.
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Instead, as Ricoeur sees it, we are invited to consider human existence as ‘participants 
in a complex and differentiated reality infused with worth who also, in the core of 
their being, are enabled and required to assume responsibility for existence— that is, 
to respect and enhance the integrity o f life.’46
Thus Ricoeur suggests that what is significant about the Creation story is not the legal 
or moral implications that ensue from the giving of creation by God, but the freedom 
that human beings now have as a result. This freedom brings with it a responsibility 
that Christians are required to develop precisely because the offer o f creation was an 
act of freedom on God’s part. We are not given precise rules as to how we should 
care for creation, but we are invited to act responsibly to protect the goods of creation, 
since we are now accountable for it.
The implication here is that the content o f ethics is ‘open-ended’, not predetermined 
or written in the form of a legal code. It could be argues, therefore, that the Scriptures 
symbolically demonstrate two significant ethical concepts: a) freedom and b) 
responsibility. But this raises another question: Do the Scriptures leave us empty 
handed in terms of how these should be used?
From what has been said here already it would seem that Ricoeur’s response is no. 
The Gospels leave clues as to what a possible ethical response would look like. 
Recall what was said about the ethical function o f narrative. Narrative allows us to 
try out various proposals for living in a way that resembles virtue ethics. As we 
follow the development of various biblical narratives, we learn to relate good
46 Schweiker, “Starry Heavens and Moral Worth,” 134.
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behaviour with happiness and vice versa. In this respect it could be argued that the 
biblical texts do not leave believers empty handed as to what good behaviour looks 
like, but they remain general and open-ended, allowing us only to grasp what being 
virtuous means in a particular context, i.e., that of the story.
Nevertheless, their moral worth should not be underrated, for, as Aristotle reminds us, 
it is only by reading and telling stories o f virtuous behaviour that we become virtuous. 
In this way, narrative has the power to summon the self symbolically, thereby playing 
a part in the construction o f an autonomous self that is not absolute, but instructed by 
the signs, symbols and paradigms of behaviour offered by tradition.
There is a further point that is useful here, however. It pertains to Ricoeur’s
understanding of the interaction between the reader and the text. Unlike
Schleiermacher and many of his predecessors, who believe that the interpretation of a
text involves deciphering the mind of the author who wrote it, Ricoeur gives equal
status to the text and to the reader. In his view, the text must communicate more than
the author’s intentions; narratives are not merely expressions o f that which the author
believes to be important. Texts are much more dynamic than this. They represent
concrete possibilities o f action, possible ways o f doing things, possible worlds. The
world o f the text, notes Ricoeur, opens up a horizon o f possibility and meaning within
which the reader could live.
A text is not something closed in upon itself, it is the projection o f a new 
universe distinct from that in which we live. To appropriate a work through 
reading is to unfold the world horizon implicit in it which includes the actions, 
the characters and the events of the story told. As a result, the reader belongs 
at once to the work’s horizon of experience in imagination and to that of his or
1 • 47her own real action.
47 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f Narrative,” 26.
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Ricoeur envisages the reader’s interaction with the horizon o f the text as an imaginary 
way of experiencing behaviour and o f deciphering possible ways of living. This 
explains why he often refers to narrative as an ‘immense laboratory’ for ethical 
reflection, or, to use his own phrase, for ‘thought experiments’.48 For we cannot 
understand the good life if  we do not have ways of imagining what the good life 
would look like, or if  it were not gathered together in some way.49
Returning to the case of the biblical narrative, then, it can be seen that a Ricoeurian 
approach suggests that its ethical import consists in its ability to provide believers 
with the space to imagine possible ways o f living and to figure out possible ways of 
living fitting for life in a messianic community. Although he admits that other forms 
of writing can also do this, Ricoeur does not fail to point out that the Gospels project 
possible worlds that are oriented towards eternity.50 Hence he does not underestimate 
their eschatological character.
But it is for precisely this reason that one might find fault with Ricoeur’s theory o f 
interpretation. For if  the biblical texts provide believers with possible ways o f living 
oriented towards eternity, one might ask why or how it is possible to contend that they 
do not provide new norms or values that go beyond what is merely rational. If they 
are eschatological in character, do they not contribute more to the moral search for 
truth than secular literature or myths? In what sense can we say that the Gospels 
announce something new?
48 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney, Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 
1991, 159; cf. p. 164.
49 Kemp, “Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Ricoeur,” 36.
50 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, 224.
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If reading secular narratives opens up possibilities for living for its readers, it becomes 
difficult to accept that the possibility o f life in Christ asks nothing more o f believers 
than an imaginative possibility. What difference does Christ make? Does the 
Christian narrative not offer more than secular narratives or myths? We must 
conclude this part of the argument, therefore, with a few comments on the place 
accorded to the man Jesus in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics o f biblical narrative.
2.6 Biblical Revelation and the Power of the Possible
For Ricoeur the Gospel narrative is an imaginative, revealed and possible world. The 
Gospels are imaginative because they invite the reader to imagine ways o f living in 
the world; revealed, because they show what human existence is capable of doing; 
and possible because the world proposed by the text is one with which the reader can 
identify and appropriate. Revelation, therefore, is not understood in terms o f a 
morality of obligation, but in terms of what is humanly possible. Thus Ricoeur says: 
‘I believe that the fundamental theme of Revelation is this awakening and this call, 
into the heart o f existence, o f the imagination o f the possible. The possibilities are 
opened before man which fundamentally constitute what is revealed. The revealed as 
such is an opening to existence, a possibility o f existence.’51
This means that the Gospel narratives provide the symbols o f freedom or new life for 
which humanity hopes. Revelation is not simply about the showing forth o f the 
person of Jesus Christ; it is the offer o f a possible existence and liberation in him. For 
Ricoeur, therefore, the newness o f the Christ event is not bound up with obedience or 
new principles o f morality. Instead, it is understood as a new existence, one that
51 Ricoeur, The Philosophy o f  Paul Ricoeur, 237.
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allows us to imagine what was formerly thought to be impossible, that is, resurrection 
after death.
Here again we see Ricoeur’s emphasis on the power o f narrative to act as a memory 
or to remind us o f past events. The Gospels recount the Christ-event, and, in so 
doing, they serve to awaken possibilities, possibilities that may have been forgotten. 
According to Ricoeur, this is the function o f poetic language (i.e., the language 
contained in texts); it does not alter our existence, but it makes something possible 
which was formerly impossible.
On this view, the passion narrative is truly a ‘poem of existence’, whose purpose is to 
recall and awaken us to a vital, though forgotten, human possibility. The implications 
of awakening to resurrection, however, are not transposed into dogmas, theologies or 
codes for moral living. Instead, Ricoeur believes that the possibility o f resurrection in 
Christ confirms that we have freedom, because Christ has freed us, and enables us to 
go on searching for truth ‘in spite o f  evil, suffering and mortality.53 By affirming the 
possibility of meaning in spite o f meaninglessness, the Gospels enable us to trust and 
to affirm life.
Nevertheless, it is Ricoeur’s belief that Jesus did not change something in the stucture 
of the world or in the way human freedom is understood and exercised. Rather, as 
Vanhoozer puts it, ‘Through the story o f Jesus we are able to look at the world 
differently. One might say that Jesus came not to abrogate our structural possibilities 
but to fulfill them. [...] In short, the passion story discloses an existential possibility
52 Ricoeur, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 231.
53 Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative, 235.
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that is always-already there. Jesus did not inaugurate a new way o f being-in-the- 
world, but rather illustrated a universal possibility.’54
Thus Ricoeur fulfils his duty as a philosopher. Although he asserts that communities 
distinguish themselves by their narrative texts, he does not concede that the 
possibilities which texts open up are limited to a particular community. The 
possibility o f liberation in Christ, for instance, is considered to be a universal one and 
therefore open to all. To some theologians, however, this may seem rather strange. 
Indeed, some might argue that divine grace plays little or no part in Ricoeur’s 
philosophy, and that the moral significance of the Christ event cannot be understood 
without some reference to divine grace. This is an issue which arises in the context of 
the debate on the Christian proprium: proponents o f the Glaubensethik position could 
not accept a morality based on natural law because it could not account for the effects 
of divine grace on Christian moral action.
By way of response, however, it is clear from Ricoeur’s work that he believes that 
such an argument presumes that divine grace was not already present in the giving of 
the Covenant or in the Creation story, where in each case the human community was 
invited to share freely in the divine life but failed because o f the way in which it used 
its freedom. Thus Ricoeur maintains that if  one considers that grace contributes to 
ethics in any way, one runs the risk of suggesting that grace or God’s favour has to be 
won through obedience, rather than received in spite o f disobedience.55 Put simply, 
Ricoeur argues that grace is always already present before the Christ event, and that it
54 Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative, 236.
55 Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, 321.
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will continue to be available— not only to specific religious communities, but to all 
those who seek to do the truth in love.
And so we see that for Ricoeur the Christian religion is not one that is full o f specific 
moral norms and principles. It is concerned with the gift o f freedom rather than its 
lawful regulation. Moreover, the faith story offers the believer a vision of the world 
which is radically new; it offers the possibility o f resurrection in spite o f death. Thus 
Ricoeur’s work suggests that Christians have more reason to hope rather than to 
despair. This is what leads Ricoeur to define human freedom as follows: ‘For my part 
I should say that freedom is the capacity to live according to the paradoxical law of 
superabundance, o f denying death and o f asserting the excess o f sense over non-sense 
in all desperate situations.’56 In short, it is Ricoeur’s belief that in the Christ event the 
ultimate possibility is offered, which means that Christians can hope in spite of 
everything.
Returning to our discussion of the Christian proprium debate, we can now see the 
significance of Ricoeur’s contribution. His work suggests that the texts o f the 
Christian tradition are the means through which believers interpret their lives and their 
history in a coherent way. This means that their primary function is to provide the 
believing community with a coherent account o f who they are, rather than what they 
should do.
This shift in emphasis means that the ethical stories contained in the biblical narrative 
can no longer be viewed as offering specifically Christian norms and values, but as
56 Paul Ricoeur, “Hope and the Structure o f  Philosophical System s,” Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Association 64 (1970), 59.
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exemplary narratives that are helpful in understanding all that is involved in a life of 
virtue. In this respect, they offer human and ethical possibilities to the Christian 
community. But perhaps the ultimate possibility offered by the Christian narrative is 
that of hope in spite of suffering; liberation in spite of oppression; and resurrection in 
spite of the cross.
Whether one can agree with Ricoeur or not, it is clear that his work encourages a 
move beyond considerations of the legal implications of the biblical texts to 
considerations of a more basic kind. The most fundamental question is ‘Who am I?’, 
not ‘What am I to do?’ Consequently, Ricoeur’s work seems to move the 
Glaubensethik!Autonomy debate beyond discussions about specifically Christian 
norms to the quest for identity and self-understanding through the narrative texts of 
the Christian tradition. After all, without a coherent sense of self and an imaginative 
space to reflect on moral behaviour, it would be difficult to see how one could act in a 
morally responsible way.57
Of course, the suggestion that the unique element in Christian ethics pertains to a 
unique identity is not a new one. It may well have been ignored by the authors of the 
post conciliar debate in moral theology on the special character of Christian morality, 
but virtue ethicists are now discussing the idea of identity. The most important 
question for virtue ethicists has less to do with the obedient following of texts or rules
57 Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Life,” in James Fowler and Antoine Vergote (eds.), Towards Moral 
and Religious Maturity, Illinois: Silver Burdett Company, 1980, 467. Here Hauerwas argues that our 
primary story is that we have no story, or that the stories we have must be overcome i f  we are to be 
free. Very often, we seek to be objective in issues o f  socio-political or ethical nature so that we can 
choose between pluralistic stories. Nonetheless, the fact o f  the matter is that we all need narrative in 
some form or other. Narrative allows us to make sense o f  our lives; it connects birth to death, etc., and 
it provides us with a way we can understand and interpret ourselves. This is similar to what Ricoeur’s 
work achieves in the context o f  the Christianproprium debate; it places narrative at the heart o f  self- 
understanding rather than at the heart o f  moral obedience, rules or principles.
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than with developing an understanding of oneself (identity) that will ensure that moral 
agents continue to use their freedom in a way that is faithful to their master story. The 
similarities between Ricoeur’s work and all that is involved in the current return to 
virtue ethics seem to strengthen the case that the Christianproprium  debate should be 
interpreted from the perspective of identity. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
RICOEURIAN THEORY AND THE RETURN TO VIRTUE 
ETHICS
Thus far, this study has attempted to show how the work of Paul Ricoeur takes us to 
the heart of the issues arising out of the Christian proprium  debate. We have also 
endeavoured to show how Ricoeur’s work is able to move the discussion away from 
the search for specifically Christian norms and place self-knowledge, freedom and 
responsibility at the centre of Christian ethics. This shift in emphasis is similar to 
current trends in moral theology, especially when one considers all that is involved in 
the return to virtue ethics advocated in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley 
Hauerwas.
Interest in virtue ethics has stemmed from the conviction that Christian character, 
moral dispositions and habits are more fundamental than the question of the morality 
of individual acts. Moreover, who a believer is and what a believer does or becomes 
is as important as any faith claim a believer makes.1 As James Keenan puts it, virtue 
ethicists are not primarily interested in particular actions.2 They do not ask, ‘Is this
1 Benjamin Farley, In Praise of Virtue: An Exploration of the Biblical Virtues in a Christian Context, 
Michigan: W illiam B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995, 1; cf. Lee H. Yearley, New Religious 
Virtues and the Study of Religion, Fifteenth Annual University Lecture in Religion at Arizona State 
University, Arizona State University: Department o f  Religious Studies, 1994, 10-12.
2 James Keenan, “Virtue Ethics,” in Bernard H oose (ed.), Christian Ethics: An Introduction, London: 
Cassell, 1988, 84.
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action right?’ or ‘What are the circumstances of an action?’ Rather, virtue ethicists 
invite people to see themselves as they really are, to examine themselves, and see who 
they can become, rather than to what extent they demonstrate conformity to rules and 
principles. Virtue ethics therefore invites all people to see that they set the goal of 
their life, as well as choosing the means to accomplish that ultimate end.
Hence virtue ethics offers an alternative to any purely rational or ahistorical system of 
ethics. Similar to what Ricoeur’s work can achieve in the context of the Christian 
proprium  debate, virtue ethics highlights the importance of knowing oneself before 
knowing what one should do. Furthermore, like Ricoeur, virtue ethicists highlight the 
need for narratives in understanding the virtues. For without a stock of stories that 
make virtuous action intelligible, it would be difficult to see how we could know what 
is required of us to become morally good.
Here we see a correlation between Ricoeur’s work and that of Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Stanley Hauerwas. These scholars are at one in the belief that one cannot know what 
the good life requires or what it would look like if its constituents were not gathered 
together in some way.4 Although each stresses a different function of narrative in the 
pursuit of goodness, all three seem to transcend former preoccupation with acts and 
principles of conduct in favour of an approach that places story at the centre of 
Christian ethics. This makes the case for moving the Glaubensethik/Autonomy 
debate in a similar direction all the more promising.
3 Keenan, “Virtue Ethics,” 89.
4 Cf. Peter Kemp, “Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Ricoeur,” in John W all, W illiam  Schweiker, and 
W. David Hall (eds.), Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, N ew  York and London: 
Routledge, 2002, 36.
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In order to see clearly the links between Ricoeur’s work and that of virtue ethicists, 
we will proceed in two stages. First, we will explain what is meant by virtue ethics; 
second, we will discuss the approaches to virtue ethics offered by Hauerwas and 
MacIntyre. We will then attempt to show how similar trends may be seen in 
Ricoeur’s work, which seems to strengthen the case for approaching the 
Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate from the perspective of self-knowledge and identity 
instead of acts and principles.
3.1 What is Virtue Ethics?
In recent years, many theologians have encouraged a return to the virtues as a way of 
moving away from the legalistic style morality typical of the manual period in moral 
theology. This is the case because, unlike rules and principles, virtues are not 
primarily concerned with individual actions, but with the effect that particular actions 
have on a person over the course of his/her life. The scope is wider than that offered 
by moral principles; virtue ethics expects the moral agent to want to do the good 
rather than be coerced into doing it.5
Virtue ethicists believe that, if we are to live a truly good life, we must maintain a 
course of good activity over time. The emphasis is placed on sustaining good 
behaviour and on striving to be consistently good rather than on individual actions 
which will ensure that evil is avoided. In this respect, there is no definite map one can 
follow in order to be good. Therefore, one must concentrate on cultivating 
dispositions and habits that enable moral agents over the course of their lives to
5 Cf. David Solomon, “MacIntyre and Contemporary Moral Philosophy,” in Mark C. Murphy (ed.), 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 114-151, esp. 138-141.
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choose consistently good actions.6 This implies virtues. A virtue, as defined by Jean 
Porter, is:
...a trait of character or intellect which is in some way praiseworthy, 
admirable or desirable. When we refer to somebody’s virtues, what we 
usually have in mind are relatively stable and effective dispositions to act in 
particular ways, as opposed to inclinations which are easily lost, or which do 
not consistently lead to corresponding kinds of actions. And so, for example, 
someone who has the virtue of generosity will consistently respond in 
generous ways in a variety of situations, including those in which generosity is 
difficult or costly, in contrast to someone who is moved by pity to one 
uncharacteristically generous act, or someone whose generous impulses are 
frequently overcome by desires for self-indulgence.7
For the virtue ethicist, then, the motivation for seeking what best befits human
subjects is not based on any finite theory of the good; rather, it comes from a natural
desire for and a genuine willingness to seek the truth.
This desire to find what pertains to human flourishing was typical of Greek ethics. 
For the Greeks, ‘Obligation simply is not a fundamental category because it makes no 
sense to say that we have an obligation to seek happiness when happiness is already 
what we most yearn for in our lives. What the Greeks called virtue is simply another 
name for what makes our lives good lives, that is, lives of happiness.’ Although 
Aristotle, Plato and Socrates differ somewhat in their individual presentations of the 
‘good life’ and of the virtues, they share the belief that good behaviour has less to do 
with external compliance with rules and norms of conduct than with a personal desire 
to do the good and to cultivate character traits that sustain virtuous behaviour. Thus 
Aristotle writes:
6 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, London: 
Duckworth, 1999, 119ff.
7 Jean Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” in Robin Gill (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 96.
8 Raymond Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks, Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002, 3.
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[The good person] wishes for what is good for himself, and what appears 
good, and he does it (for it is a mark of a good person to work hard at what is 
good), and for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the thinking element 
of himself, which is what each of us is thought to be). He also wishes himself 
to live and to be kept safe, and most of all that with which he understands, 
since to the good person existing is something good, and each of us wishes 
good things for himself.. ,.9
Of course, since both ancient and contemporary accounts of virtue ethics underline 
that a desire to do good is preferable to the mere following of rules of conduct, both 
approaches raise the question of how we understand, learn or describe the virtues. At 
least with rules and principles one has a definite description of the action that is to be 
avoided, but the same cannot be said of the virtues. The issue could be put in the 
form of a question: When we call somebody gentle, or kind, or caring, or patient, 
what do we mean? How do we go about explaining what a virtue is?
3.2 Describing Virtues
According to Porter, we do not describe virtues by referring to a dictionary.10 Nor do 
we use theoretical definitions to describe what is truly virtuous. Instead, we give 
examples of people who exhibit virtuous behaviour. This indicates that our 
description of a particular virtue will be tied to a notion of a certain kind of action in 
such a way that our concept of a particular virtue will be inseparable from the concept 
of an action typical of that virtue. In fact, as human beings who have experienced life 
in one way or another, we are able to pick out instances or events where a particular 
character trait manifests itself. Hence, one camiot adequately describe a virtue except
9 Christopher Rowe & Sarah Brodie, trans. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Introduction 
and Commentary, N ew  York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2002, 230.
10 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics, Great Britian: 
Cromwell Press, 1994, 100-101. Porter’s work is used here because it has been very well received by 
other virtue ethicists. For a review o f  Porter’s work, see Simon Harak, review o f  The Recoveiy of 
Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics by Jean Porter in TS 52 (1991), 581-582.
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by giving some account of how this notion is exemplified in recurring features of our 
common experience.11
But this seems to be another way of saying that story is at the heart of any 
understanding of virtue. Describing a virtue involves telling stories that indicate the 
boundaries of a particular character trait. As Paul Ricoeur asserts, ‘It is due to the 
familiarity we have with the types of plot received from our culture that we learn to 
relate virtues, or rather forms of excellence, with happiness or unhappiness.’12 We are 
fundamentally story-telling animals (homo narrans), and the stock of stories we 
inherit from our community and environment allows us to understand more about 
ourselves, our roles in society, ways of being in the world, and the difference between 
virtue and vice.
Moreover, narrative allows us to interpret our lives in a coherent way, since it does 
not interpret life as a series of individual actions but as a complete story which links 
birth and death, being and doing, past and present. As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, 
‘There is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own,
13except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources.’ 
Moreover, according to MacIntyre, when trying to understand what someone is doing 
and why, ‘We always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a
11 Cf. John Horton and Susan Mendus, “Alasdair MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work o f  
Alasdair MacIntyre,” in John Horton and Susan Mendus (eds.), A fter MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives 
on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, 1-15, esp. 8-14.
12 Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” in David W ood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and 
Interpretation, London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1991, 23.
13 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, London: Duckworth, 1985, 201.
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set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the setting 
in which they act and suffer.’14
This is also true of the heroic societies. Arete, the classical Greek term for virtue, was 
all but untranslatable for the Greeks.15 Nevertheless, they overcame this obstacle by 
describing what it would look like when manifested in human action. Courage, for 
example, was closely related to the Greek understanding of arete ,16 and the process of 
telling stories of courageous war heroes served as a medium through which the 
concept of virtue was explained and exemplified.
Indeed, it could be argued that the Greek understanding of virtue promotes a culture 
of war and glory, rather than peace and humility, since it is linked to incidences 
excellence and courage in battle. Moreover, owing to the fact that morality and social 
structure were inseparable in the world of ancient Greece—what one was expected to 
do was determined by the place one occupied on the social ladder—it would seem that 
the Greek concept of virtue is incompatible with the Christian vision of caritas, love 
and equality.
In spite of these criticisms, however, the Greek understanding of virtue is useful in 
two ways. First, as MacIntyre argues, it shows us that all morality is to some extent 
tied to the socially local and particular and that the morality of modernity, which
14 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 197; cf. Peter Johnson, “Reclaiming the Aristotelian Ruler,” in John Horton 
and Susan Mendus (eds.), After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, 44-64, esp. 56-58.
15 Joseph W oodhill, “Virtue Ethics and its Suitability for Orthodox Christianity,” St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Quarterly 41 (1997), 72.
16 Rosemary Radford-Reuther, “Courage as a Christian Virtue,” CC  (Spring 1983), 8.
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seeks to free universality from all particularity, is an illusion; and second, there is no 
way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we inherit them and 
our understanding of them from a series of predecessors in which series heroic 
societies hold first place.17
This is a view which MacIntyre shares with Stanley Hauerwas. Both scholars are of 
the opinion that the virtues can only be learned within the confines of a community 
through its narrative stories, otherwise the members of the community become
1 o
‘unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions and in their words.’
3.3 Hauerwas and a Community of Character
According to Hauerwas, questions only receive answers, and actions receive 
explanations, only by reference to a narrative that provides the background against 
which answers and explanations make sense at all.19 This is what he means when he
asserts that communities embody stories. For Hauerwas, communities need stories
■ 20because they make sense out of our actions and out o f our lives.
But the centrality of story in the moral life of Christians does not stop here. 
According to Hauerwas, the believing community and its narratives perform at least 
three vital functions in our lives. First, being part of community and its story points to
17 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 119.
18 Ibid., 201.
19 Brad J. Kallenberg, “Positioning MacIntyre within Christian Ethics,” in Nancey Murphy, Brad J. 
Kallenberg & Mark Thiessen Nation (eds.), Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian 
Ethics After MacIntyre, Harrisberg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1997, 59.
20 Stanley Hauerwas, “Towards an Ethics o f  Character,” TS 33/4 (2001), [ATLA Religion Database], 
698-715. (02/11/2004); cf. idem, “The Church in a Divided World: The Interpretative Power o f  the 
Christian Story,” JRE  8/1 (2001), [ATLA Religion Database], 55-82. (02/11/04).
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the fact that moral agents never exist in isolation. Although modem society expects 
and demands one to be a self-creator, the fact of the matter is that we need to belong 
in some way to a community before we can claim to be a person at all.21 Hauerwas 
observes that if a person could ever be successfully ‘freed’ from his or her historical 
and communal ties, the person’s identity would be lost, not gained. This means that 
for Hauerwas the human self cannot be explained without some reference to his/her 
historical ties, background and shared narrative story. As Brad Kallenberg puts it, 
‘the human self is not monadic—a generic and interchangeable political atom—but 
dyadic, which is to say, having only the identity that derives from occupying a place 
in each other’s lives!’22
Since Hauerwas believes that there is no objective vantage point from which the 
moral life can be described, the second function of narrative is to provide us with a 
way of developing the capacity to deal with moral questions. Before we can answer 
the questions, ‘Why be moral?’ or ‘What does it mean to be moral?’ we must talk 
about a set of skills called virtues, which an individual must possess if he/she is to act 
responsibly when called to act. For Hauciwas, these skills can only be found in 
communal life. They are passed on through stories and practices from one generation 
to the next, and become the means through which communities define themselves. 
Hence we can speak of a Christian ethics, since the ethics of Christians is worked out 
from stories, skills and practices that are formed by the Christian community.
The belief behind this view is that the key to right action cannot be simply a matter of 
obedience to moral rules or principles. Nor can it be explained in terms of motives
21 Hauerwas, “Towards an Ethics o f  Character,” 698.
22 Kallenberg, “Positioning MacIntyre in Christian Ethics,” 59.
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and intentions, for in Hauerwas’ view we can only act in a world we see, a seeing 
partially determined by the kind of beings we have become through the stories we 
have learned throughout our lives and embodied in our life plan. Thus Hauerwas 
explains: ‘Christian ethics must not be reduced to a conception of the moral life that 
does not share its stories and metaphors.’23
A third function of narrative in the construction of a virtuous life, as Hauerwas 
understands it, lies in its ability to provide a master story that makes sense out of our 
individual stories. In the absence of a community that embodies and extends a master 
story, the moral life, argues Hauerwas, cannot be navigated because the map would 
remain hidden.24 In this way, the moral stories of the Christian community provide 
purpose and meaning to moral actions because they tell us where they are headed, i.e., 
towards God. This has implications for the way in which the Christian community 
understands freedom.
The liberal story, for instance, has its root in the Promethean myth that humans 
control the future of society by making policy decisions that can be implemented by 
an authority or by an institution. In addition, liberals view freedom as the continuous 
effort to free oneself from external constraints. Freedom is thus defined in terms of
25autonomy and liberation, from which we get the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism’. In 
contrast, the Christian story sees freedom as the power to live faithfully to a master
23 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, Notre Dame Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1974, 75. For a brief 
statement o f  Hauerwas’ ethics o f  character, see Paul Lewis, “The Springs o f  Motion: Jonathan Edwards 
on Emotions, Character, and Agency,” JRE  22/2 (2001), [ATLA Religion Database], 275-297, esp. 
287ff. (02/11/04).
24 Stanley Hauerwas and David Burrell, “From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality 
in Ethics,” in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (eds.), Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative 
Theology, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1989, 158-190.
25 Kallenberg, “Positioning MacIntyre in Christian Ethics,” 60.
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story. Autonomy that promotes individualism is not the primary issue. What is 
important, rather, is subordination to a community in which skills for moral living are 
learned and passed on. The truths about morality are not mediated by a universal 
theory. Instead, the moral life is embodied in a particular people. Sustaining, 
educating and forming character and identity becomes the chief end of human 
existence,26 and the truth value of the Christian story lies in its ability to shape 
characters and provide believers with the necessary resources to act virtuously when 
called to act.
In short, then, it could be said that for Hauerwas the Bible helps to shape the moral 
character of the Christian community. It provides a context for reflecting upon and 
making sense of moral actions. Thus he states: ‘The moral use of Scripture, therefore, 
lies in its power to help us remember the stories of God for the continual guidance of 
our community and of individual lives.’27 In this approach the ethical teachings of the 
Bible are not so much laws or rules as they are a part of the Christian community’s
story of faith, and they provide believers with the necessary tools for developing
* . . .  28 moral character and virtuous dispositions.
MacIntyre’s position is similar to Hauerwas’ in that it represents an attempt to show 
how a return to virtue ethics, as exemplified in the work of Aristotle, Plato, Augustine 
and Aquinas, can help to combat the ‘depcrsonalisation’ of ethics. MacIntyre’s
26 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character, Notre Dame: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 
1981, 1 0 ,3 6 ,5 1 ,6 2 , 93, 95.
27 Ibid., 66.
28 For a brief statement o f  Hauerwas’ position, see Daniel Harrington and James Keenan, Jesus and 
Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology, Chicago: Sheed 
and Ward, 2002, 22.
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concern is that ethicists have become overly rational in their approach to morality, 
with the result that they are left only to comment on actions to the detriment of the 
narrative and historical character of human existence. Hence, like Hauerwas, 
MacIntyre’s project is to show how communities assist in the moral formation of 
individuals by providing them with a stockpile of stories, rather than rules and 
principles, to which they can refer when making moral decisions.
3.4 MacIntyre’s Narrative Ethics
According to MacIntyre, life can only be understood through narrative. He suggests, 
moreover, that knowledge of any kind is narrative-shaped in the sense that no action 
performed, no sentence spoken can be understood apart from a wider context/story 
that gives it its sense. In the equation x = y, for example, we must understand what 
both ‘x ’ and ‘y ’ mean before we can begin to say whether or not one is equal to the 
other. Hence, the stories told about ‘x’ and ‘y’ provide the background for
• 29understanding the significance of ‘x ’ and ‘y’ when they appear in other contexts.
For MacIntyre, the same is true of ethics. We learn ethics by means of stories. The 
stories of a given community are necessary for transmitting values and meaning to its 
members. Without them, argues MacIntyre, children cannot become confident in the 
pursuit of moral truth.30 With stories, however, children learn to distinguish between 
good and bad behaviour. By telling stories of good and evil, virtue and vice, children 
learn to interpret with confidence situations which require a moral response. Thus 
MacIntyre points out:
29 For an outline o f  MacIntyre’s position, see Horton and Mendus, “Alasdair MacIntyre,” 1-15, esp. 8ff.
30 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 216.
103
We enter into human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters— 
roles into which we have been drafted— and we have to learn what they are in 
order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses 
to them are construed. It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, 
lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, 
youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in the 
world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and go into 
exile to live with the swine that children learn or misleam both what a child 
and what a partner is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into 
which they have been bom and what the ways of the world are.31
It is clear that, according to MacIntyre, the only way we can begin to know the kinds 
of moral response expected from us in any given situation is by becoming familiar 
with stories that tell of the kinds of roles people occupy in society and the kind of 
behaviour expected from those who occupy these roles. This is another way of saying 
that our community and its stock of moral stories provide us with our moral starting 
point. Stories give us the tools we need to consider all that is involved in making 
responsible moral decisions. Of course, there is no guarantee that we will use these 
tools correctly or interpret the stories of our tradition correctly, but there is more 
reason to hope than to despair since they are available to us. Possessing a genuine 
understanding of our own narrative stories and those of others makes it more likely 
that we will know how to act when we are called to do so.
Thus MacIntyre rejects the conception of a person as principally a chooser and 
decider, in favour of a conception of a person as having an identity which is at least 
partly given in advance of any decisions or choices the person makes. As a 
consequence, the central question of our moral lives is not, as the liberals maintain, 
about which choices we ought to make, or which principles we ought to follow, but
31 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 201.
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rather how we are to understand who we are, independent and antecedent to our 
choices.
To understand what we ought to do, therefore, we must recognise that the story of our
lives possesses a certain narrative structure in which what we are now is continuous
with what we were in the past. This implies that the search for who we are and what
we ought to do is indeed a search, not simply a set of rules or decisions that must be
followed. According to MacIntyre, it is this search that is essential to the moral unity
of a person’s life. Thus he writes:
In what does the unity of an individual consist? The answer is that its unity is 
the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask ‘What is the good for 
me?’ is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion. 
To ask ‘What is the good for man?’ is to ask what all answers to the former 
question must have in common. But now it is important to emphasise that it is 
the systematic asking of these two questions and the attempt to answer them in 
deed as well as in word which provide the moral life with its unity. The unity 
of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest.
And so we begin to see the links between Ricoeur’s work and that of Hauerwas and 
MacIntyre. It will be recalled that Ricoeur emphasises the following four points 
(which we will only mention here since they were discussed in detail in chapter two):
1) the self cannot be understood in the Cartesian sense, that is, as a disembodied ego;
2) the stories contained in our communities are the means through which we interpret 
ourselves and leam about the virtues; 3) narrative provides us with a way of 
remembering who we are and maintaining a certain amount of self-constancy as we 
search to do the truth in love; and 4) narrative allows us to identity evil. For if we had 
no way of identifying evil, how would we know it was evil? From the above it can be 
seen that Hauerwas and MacIntyre also discuss these.
32 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 203.
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3.5 Ricoeur and Virtue Ethics
But this is not to suggest that MacIntyre, Hauerwas and Ricoeur interpret the narrative 
quality of the moral life in the same way. For instance, MacIntyre is mainly 
considering stories enacted in everyday life, while Hauerwas’ main focus is on the 
role of biblical narrative in the navigation of the moral life. Ricoeur, on the other 
hand, uses narrative as a way of remembering who we are and of trying out various 
proposals for ethical living.
Yet, in spite of these differences, all three agree that the key to good living is not to be 
found in the obedient following of rules and principles in which good actions are 
predetermined, but in the way in which we use the narratives of our tradition as a way 
of educating us into the life of virtue. Good behaviour does not arise out of a simple 
desire to do good; rather, it stems from an understanding of what the good life entails 
as exemplified in the narratives of our tradition. As Peter Kemp, one of Ricoeur’s 
commentators, asserts, ‘Without emplotment [i.e., the activity of placing episodes in a 
narrative sequence, that is, a story] there would be no sense in unfolding some models 
for action. Thus ethics must necessarily be the narrative configuration of the good 
life.’33
All of this points to the fact that the proposal of using Ricoeur’s work to move the 
Christian proprium  debate away from the search for specifically Christian rules and 
principles to the search for self-understanding through the texts of the biblical canon 
is a promising one. In fact, it would seem that many scholars, especially those 
involved in discussions on virtue ethics, have already made this move. As with
33 Kemp, “Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Paul Ricoeur,” 38.
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MacIntyre, Hauerwas and Ricoeur, they prefer to interpret to the moral life as a quest 
for goodness which depends on narrative for its articulation.
Of course, telling or reading stories about virtuous men and women, although 
essential for the acquisition of virtue, is not in itself sufficient for the sustenance of a 
virtuous life. Becoming virtuous requires time, effort and support in the form of 
practices, rituals and institutions that help to reinforce beliefs about the good and 
create a culture within which the virtues can flourish. Behaviour building takes time. 
Our behaviour is influenced over a long period of time as we become habituated to 
choosing the right ends for the right reasons and begin doing the right thing at the 
right time for the right purpose. 4 The more we practice being virtuous, the more 
likely we are to sustain a course of activity which promotes the virtues over the course 
of our lives. One virtuous act, for example, encourages the moral agents to perform
c
another and so on.
This suggests that any account of Christian ethics which emphasises the virtues, rather 
than rules and principles p e r  se, must be sustained by the practices of a community. 
As MacIntyre explains, the virtues cannot flourish in a society that does not promote 
or sustain a culture of virtue.36 The practice of any virtue is intrinsically connected to 
culture, environment and institution. Without practices that help to create a milieu in 
which the acquisition of virtue is encouraged, virtues risk falling prey to the
34 Farley, In Praise of Virtue, 14.
35 Ibid.
36 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 180.
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corrupting power of institutions. To echo MacIntyre’s words, the relationship 
between institutions and practices is so intimate that they form a single causal order in 
which the ideal and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the
TO
competitiveness of the institution.
And so we must conclude this part of the argument with a few comments on the kind 
of social practices that help to sustain the virtues and give meaning to the moral 
sensibilities of the believing community. Once we have defined a practice and 
offered some examples used by the Christian community to sustain a culture of virtue, 
we will then suggest possible links with Ricoeur’s work.
Although Ricoeur’s primary task is that of a philosopher, not a virtue ethicist, there 
are certain aspects of his work that hint at the kinds o f practices which he deems 
necessary for a life of virtue. Drawing attention to these practices will allow us to see 
again that Ricoeur’s potential contribution to the Christianproprium  debate is similar 
to all that is involved in the retrieval of virtue ethics: Christian ethics is not simply a 
matter of following or finding Christian principles of conduct; rather, it is based on 
cultivating and maintaining a desire to constantly seek the truth and act responsibly 
when called to act. The first step, however, is to define what is meant by the word 
‘practice.’
3.6 Sustaining Virtue
According to MacIntyre, a practice may be defined as: ‘any coherent and complex 
form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal
37 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 180.
38 Ibid.
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to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
O Q
conceptions of the ends and goods, are systematically extended.’
Although MacIntyre’s definition of a practice may appear complex, Patrick Riordan 
offers a useful example which makes its meaning clear. Riordain considers all that is 
involved in the teaching profession to show what is meant when we speak of a 
practice.40 An individual teacher measures him/herself against the standards of 
excellence set by the best teachers he/she has encountered. In this way, the teacher 
attempts to be the best he/she can be, by striving to accomplish the goods internal to 
the teaching practice, that is, the development of the student in their mastery of the 
course or curriculum. The success of the project, however, does not depend solely 
upon the student, but upon the teacher’s achievement and mastery of their practice. A 
life devoted to teaching means that the quality of one’s whole life is dependent, at 
least in part, on one’s success or excellence in teaching. This is experienced as 
worthwhile if the goals are achieved. There is an additional pleasure in striving for 
excellence in teaching, because it gives the teacher a sense of joy that he/she has 
helped the student to pass and achieved something for themselves. In other words, the 
teacher has attained the goods associated with the practice.
Although in the case of the teaching the standards o f excellence set by the practice are 
defined by other teachers, this does not mean that the achievement of excellence in
39 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 175.
40 Patrick Riordan, S ,J., A Politics of the Common Good, Dublin: Institute o f  Public Administration, 
1996, 52.
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the pursuit of internal goods does not include change or revision. Indeed, it is almost 
inevitable that, as the teacher begins to achieve excellence in the profession, his/her 
own performance will lead to a redefinition and deeper awareness of what constitutes 
good teaching.
In a similar way, good moral behaviour is determined by the kinds of practices in 
which we are engaged. This is not something that we decide for ourselves from the 
first instance we are bom, but developed over time. Practices make us more attuned 
to the standards of excellence required of us as moral human beings. But practices 
need to be situated in a wider context, that of a tradition. For being part of a tradition 
that promotes moral behaviour requires that we periodically engage in practices that 
will help us to define the virtues and provide the resources with which the individual 
may pursue his or her quest for the good.
As MacIntyre explains, the practices of a community provide us with the space in 
which we can reflect on and judge our moral performance. To enter into a practice is 
‘to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences, and tastes to the standards which 
currently and partially define the practice.’41 It is this dimension of a practice, as 
defined by MacIntyre, that is present in the various practices of the Christian 
community. The practices of Eucharist, of baptism, of reading the Scriptures, etc. 
provide believers with a way of measuring their own moral performance against the 
suggestions offered by these practices either in a paradigmatic or in a 
literary/imaginative way. The standards of excellence which they recount help to
41 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 190.
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sustain the believer on his/her quest to do good and avoid evil, since they promote a 
culture of goodness rather than evil.
The most obvious practice of the Christian community that contributes to promoting a 
culture of virtue is that of the Eucharist. Its memorial character serves as a reminder 
to the faithful of their specific identity and of the covenantal promises made between 
Yahweh and Israel. This was also true of the Passover meal. Recall Matthew’s 
account of the event. Central to the rite Mathew describes are two acts of sharing by 
Jesus: one of bread, the other of a cup (of wine). The words that accompany these 
two acts (‘Take and eat.. .Drink from it, all of you.. ..This is my blood poured out for 
many for the forgiveness of sins. (26:26-28)) serve as a reminder to the disciples that 
the blood of Christ represented by the wine is the blood of the Covenant. Moreover, 
Matthew’s account of the rite, as well as the Eucharistic prayer read out at Mass every 
day, can be inteipreted as a means of remembering who we are as believers and the 
new union we have with Christ—a union which is of course linked to the wider 
Jewish tradition.42
In moral terms, this means that the practice of the Eucharist is understood less in 
terms of rule and more in terms of memory. The Eucharistic celebration and the 
Scripture readings that accompany it give us a sense of who we are, which is vital in 
the quest for moral goodness. As Mark Allman puts it, the celebration of the 
Eucharist invites believers to ‘enter into the story, the meta-narrative of salvation and 
retrace the steps of their ancestry, thereby giving a multigenerational backdrop to the
42 James Wm. McClendon, Jr., “The Practice o f  Community Formation,” in Nancey Murphy et al. 
(eds.), Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition, 1997, 90.
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story of God’s intervening on Israel’s behalf against which one comes to understand 
his/her own place in that history.’43
However, practising the Eucharist is not only important in the construction of a 
coherent account of the identity of the community, it also plays a part in reminding us 
that we are not masters of our own moral lives, but members of a community that 
constantly searches for moral meaning. In fact, the eschatological character of the 
Eucharist prayer seems to support this view. For, in recounting the events of the 
Passover meal, we are reminded that, although we are redeemed in Christ, we await 
the full disclosure of the Kingdom: ‘Christ has died. Christ has risen. Christ will come 
again.’ (Eucharistic Prayer I-IV). This thrust towards the future is similar to what we 
find in the Matthean text: ‘I tell you, [Jesus says] I will never again drink of this fruit 
of the vine until that day when I drink it anew with you in my Father’s Kingdom. (Mt. 
26: 29). The moral implications of the Eucharistic celebration are clear, therefore: the 
following of Christ involves acknowledging the limitations of the human quest for 
goodness, since the Kingdom is both already and not-yet.
Another practice necessary for the sustenance of a moral community that seeks to 
educate people into the life of virtue is that of forgiveness. To see why this is so, it is 
necessary to recall the nature of forgiveness. To forgive is to grant pardon without 
resentment. According to James McClendon, this points to two elements: one formal 
and juridical (the granting of pardon), the other affective, attitudinal and inward 
(establishing new ties with the one forgiven).44 This means that forgiveness requires
43 Mark Allman, “Eucharist, Ritual and Narrative: Formation o f  Individual and Communal Moral 
Character,” JRS 14/1 (2000), [ATLA Religion Database], 63. (07/03/02).
44 McClendon, “The Practice o f  Community Formation,” 98.
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an act and an accompanying attitude to be considered as genuine. Possessing the 
desire to forgive, however, is often complicated or hindered by feelings of resentment.
Nevertheless, as the nineteenth century theologian and preacher Joseph Butler 
explains, feelings of resentment are normal: they protect us from greater harms by 
inciting us to seek a justice we might otherwise be too placid or too compassionate to 
enforce.45 This is not to suggest that resentment may be used as justification for 
harbouring feelings of betrayal. For while we are meant to resent the suffering of 
others, and the pain that others bring into our own lives, resentment must come to an 
end. This is another way of saying that resentment is healed by the practice of 
forgiveness.
Indeed, the practice of forgiveness is one which is of particular importance in the 
Eucharistic celebration. Reciting the Our Father serves as a reminder to the faithful 
that mature moral growth requires us to forgive in two senses. We ask God for 
forgiveness (‘forgive us our trespasses’), and we are invited to forgive those who have 
sinned against us (‘as we forgive those who trespass against us’). Thus the practice of 
forgiveness is useful in the acquisition of the virtuous life: in the act of forgiving 
others, we learn a new story about ourselves. We discover that both our lives and our 
sins are bound up with those of others.
Moreover, we become aware that while moral failure is a reality, it can be healed. We 
can start anew. As McClendon points out, ‘ Attitudinally speaking, forgiveness is this: 
one takes another’s life up into one’s own, making the offender a part of one’s own
45 Joseph Butler, Butler's Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel and a Dissertation on the Nature 
of Virtue, London: SPCK, 1970, 72-79.
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story in such a way that the cost of doing so overcomes the power of the injury, 
healing it with a new bond of union between them.’46 Thus we can speak of the 
practice of forgiveness as essential to any understanding of the moral life, since it 
encourages believers to move beyond incidences of failure, evaluate and learn from 
them and be reconciled with the community in the ongoing search for truth and moral 
meaning.
It is clear, therefore, that many of the practices found at the heart of the Christian 
community help to promote a culture of virtue. The Eucharistie meal reminds 
believers of their ancestry and keeps their imaginations focused on the spiritual 
promises made by Israel in the past and repeated by the faithful in Baptism. 
Furthermore, it encourages them to focus on the power of forgiveness as a way of 
being liberated from sin and resentment.
Having defined the concept of a practice, we must now look at examples from 
Ricoeur’s work which hint at the kinds of practices he believes are necessary to 
sustain the believing community in the moral quest. Some of the practices suggested 
by his work are similar to those mentioned above. This will allow us to see again how 
his work is congenial to all that is involved in the current retrieval of virtue ethics.
3.7 Ricoeurian Practices and the Quest for Self-Knowledge and Virtue
The first practice is that of reading the texts of one’s tradition. Since for Ricoeur the 
only way to understand ourselves or what is required of us morally is through reading 
the signs and symbols contained in the texts of tradition, it goes without saying that he
46 McClendon, “The Practice of Community Formation,” 100.
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considers reading narrative as an important, if  not essential, practice in the pursuit of 
goodness.47 This is particularly true when we look at the context in which Ricoeur 
considers the term phronesis.
In chapter two it was shown that, according to Ricoeur, the stories we inherit from our 
culture allow us to relate good behaviour with happiness and vice versa. Drawing on 
the work of Aristotle, Ricoeur asserts that the ‘lessons of poetry’ contained in 
narrative are comparable to the universals of which Aristotle spoke. Moreover, he 
explains that the kind of wisdom contained in narrative ‘develops a kind of 
understanding that can be termed narrative understanding and which is much closer to 
the practical wisdom of moral judgement than to science or, more generally, to the 
theoretical use of reason.’48 For this reason Ricoeur believes that ethical narrative 
gives us a phronetic account of the good. But what does this mean?
The word phronetic is derived from the Greek term phronesis—or prudentia as the 
Latins called it. Although the secondary literature on Ricoeur’s work seems to 
suggest that some commentators have unresolved questions about his use of the 
term,49 what is certain is that it is based on the Aristotelian understanding of 
phronesis. In the Greek world phronesis was thought to be an intellectual virtue 
necessary for making practical decisions and shaping character virtues. The belief 
was that without the intellectual virtues of understanding (nous), knowledge
47 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, Don Ihde (ed.), Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974, 327.
48 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 23.
4'J Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Ricoeur on Tragedy,” in Wall et al. (eds.), Paul Ricoeur and 
Contemporary Moral Thought, 2002, 264-276, esp. 274-275.
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(episteme), philosophy (philosophia), skill (techne) and prudence (phronesis), the 
character virtues of temperance, courage and justice would be incomplete and lacking.
Moreover, Aristotle believed that possessing good character traits is not sufficient in 
itself; intellectual virtues are also needed so that moral subjects can make intelligent 
decisions.50 Left to themselves, character virtues can lead to unhealthy moral actions 
and choices that do not enrich our lives with fulfilment and happiness. As Rosalind 
Hursthouse puts it, the virtuous Aristotelian agent does not characteristically act from 
the kind of desire that humans share with animals, but from reason {logos) in the form 
of choice {prohairesis).51 This means that character virtues should not be interpreted 
as a priori guides for deciding the reasonable course of action one should take when 
faced with an ethical decision. Temperance, courage and justice are the result of prior 
intelligent decisions, as well as reflection on these virtues carried out by the 
intellectual virtues. Of these intellectual virtues practical wisdom or prudence 
(phronesis) is considered to be cardinal.
While prudence {phronesis) is often interpreted by scholars as something which fine- 
tunes our capacity to make effective moral decisions, or to see where exceptions need 
to be made in respect of certain principles, it had a much richer meaning in the Greek 
world. It referred to prudence in relation to decision making that preceded principle.
50 For an interesting treatment o f  the necessity o f  intellectual and character virtues, see Joseph Kotva, 
Jr., The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996, esp. 
27ff. Kotva suggests that although virtue theory assumes that good character traits are necessary for 
making good moral choices, intellectual virtues help us to give reasons for acting in particular ways, 
thereby preventing the character virtues from degenerating into a quest for self-fulfilment, (p. 27).
51 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 12Iff; cf. idem, 
“Virtue Ethics and Emotions,” in Daniel Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1997, 99-117.
52 Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 73.
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For the Greeks, adherence to principles did not guarantee prudence; instead, they 
believed that principles followed prudence. In this respect, prudence was considered 
necessary for the development of authentic character virtues because it involved 
making a deliberate choice to do something for its own sake, not for the sake of 
conformity to rule. Thus the prudent person did not have to forfeit his/her freedom in 
order to be prudent. Of course, this raises the question of how one becomes prudent. 
If becoming prudent does not require obedience to principles, how is prudence 
learned?
According to Aristotle, we learn about prudence by watching people who are prudent, 
not by theorising about it. ‘We understand what phronesis and how it works by 
watching thephronimoi [i.e., prudent people], the people who manage their lives well. 
Prudent people are the virtuous people; we learn about virtue by watching how they 
live virtuously. We learn how to live a successful human life by looking at those who 
are already doing it.’
Owing to the fact that Ricoeur’s use of phronesis is taken from the Aristotelian 
understanding of the term, it seems likely that he shares the same view as Aristotle, 
that we become prudent by watching prudent people. Nonetheless, it is important to 
remember that Ricoeur’s project is to explain human beings and ethical behaviour 
through texts. This means that when Ricoeur speaks of phronesis it is in relation to 
literature. In so doing, he expands the Aristotelian account of phronesis to include
53 Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 111. It is interesting to note that in the Aristotelian view  
prudence also corrects the flaws o f  the moral sense. For instance, prudence can help the overly 
generous person to understand that giving to the poor does not require that one gives all o f  one’s 
money away. For other examples o f  how  a lack o f  prudence can lead to extreme behaviour, see Julia 
Driver, “The Virtues and Human Nature,” in Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live? Essays on the 
Virtues, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 112-129, esp. 112-113.
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reading texts. Whereas Aristotle believes that one becomes prudent by watching 
those who are prudent, Ricoeur underlines the point that one can also become prudent 
by reading about prudent people. Hence, for Ricoeur, the practice of reading is vital 
for all that involved in becoming prudent, since reading ethical texts allows us to 
emulate the prudence of others and provides us with a way of shaping and evaluating 
character virtues lest they become self-interested.54
3.8 Metaphor and Moral Striving
Still, Ricoeur’s work suggests that the practice of reading is also useful in another 
sense. This is clear from his treatment of the role of metaphor in texts, especially 
those of religious significance. Metaphor, as defined by Ricoeur, ‘is the rhetorical 
process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to re­
describe reality.’55 This means that the function of metaphor is to bring unrelated 
images and descriptions of objects together in order to create a feeling of discomfort 
in the world of the reader. The bringing together of unusual images creates a tension 
in the text and shatters preconceived notions of reality by bringing new ideas into 
focus. For Ricoeur this is particularly true of religious texts. For example, ‘Lamb’ 
and ‘God’ are two distinct terms that seem logically unrelated. But the union of both 
terms in the biblical metaphor of ‘Lamb of God’ sets free a new understanding of the 
divine life—as a bloody and innocent salvation-bringer—hitherto unavailable to the 
reader.56
54 For an interesting account o f  how virtue ethics may be connected with self-interest and/or the well 
being o f  the self, see Michael Slote, Morals and Motives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
55 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czem y with Kathleen McLoughlin and John 
Costello, Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1977, 7.
56 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer, 
(ed.), Mark I. Wallace, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995, 8.
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The same may be said of the parabolic texts contained in the gospels. Seemingly 
unrelated images are brought together and create a new metaphor or, to use Ricoeur’s 
phrase, a new way of ‘seeing’ or ‘feeling’.57 The parable of the mustard seed is a 
useful example, as it unites the image of the Kingdom of God with that of a tiny 
vulnerable seed. Ordinarily, it would be difficult to see how or why these images 
could function in complementary terms, since one would assume that the greatness of 
the Kingdom could not be encompassed using the metaphor of a seed. Nevertheless, 
as the parable tells us, the smallest of seeds grew into the biggest shrub, so that the 
birds of air could take shelter in it (Mt. 13:31). Here we see that placing unrelated 
images side by side encourages the reader to see more, to ask more questions, to 
examine any preconceived notions they may have had about the nature of the 
Kingdom. Moreover, it demonstrates that the weak can become strong, the vulnerable 
can become great and the disheartened can be saved.
In this respect, reading and interpreting metaphors plays an important role in the quest 
for moral goodness: bringing together unrelated images and symbols creates a feeling 
of discomfort in the reader. The reader is invited to question his/her world-view and 
any preconceived notions they might possess concerning what it takes to become 
great, good or just. Metaphors act as ‘mini-texts’ that call us time and again to re­
examine our moral stance. As Ricoeur argues, the power o f poetic language (i.e., 
language contained in texts) lies in its ability to ‘set forth novel ontologies that 
disorient readers in order to reorient them by way of an ever-expanding vision of the 
whole.’58
57 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 245.
58 Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, 8.
119
The disorientation of the reader’s world-view invites a new beginning, a new way of 
seeing the world; like Christ, the reader loses his/her way in order to find it.59 The 
process of orientation-disorientation-reorientation generated by reading biblical texts 
is one which, for Ricoeur, is necessary in the search for goodness and virtue: it 
ensures that the search for goodness does not become a single-minded quest for self- 
satisfaction or superiority.60
3.9 The Practice of Pardon and Forgiveness versus Amnesty as Amnesia
Another practice suggested by Ricoeur’s work is one which was mentioned earlier, 
that is, forgiveness. Although Ricoeur’s use of the term has been used in legal studies 
and jurisprudence to explain the difference between forgiveness and amnesty in cases 
of genocide and ethnic cleansing,61 it may be also be used in understanding the kind 
of practices necessary for the sustenance of morality of virtue rather than principle. 
Indeed, Ricoeur admits that the practice of forgiveness is one that belongs to the 
moral sphere. In order to see this, we must distinguish between forgiveness and 
amnesty.
According to Ricoeur, forgiveness is a ‘marvel’ because it surpasses the limits of 
irrational calculation and explanation. Pardon is not a rational necessity. In fact, it is
59 Paul Ricoeur, L ’ herméneutique biblique, trans. François Xavier Amherdt, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 
2001,262-265.
60 See Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, 284-288.
61 Cf. Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis, “A  N ew  Ethos for the Balkans: Collective Memories, the Weight o f  
Suffering and Forgiveness,” Paper presented at the 54th annual conference o f  the Political Studies 
Association, University o f  Lincoln, UK, 6-10 April, 2004, 1-13.
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something which makes little sense before we give it but much sense once we do.62
Thus Ricoeur defines forgiveness as a charitable action.
Forgiveness falls within the scope of an economy of the gift whose logic of 
superabundance exceeds the logic of reciprocity....Insofar as it exceeds the 
order of morality, the economy of the gift belongs to what we would be able to 
term the ‘poetics’ of the moral life if we were to retain the twofold sense of the 
term ‘poetics’, that is, the sense of creativity at the level of dynamics of acting 
and the sense of song and hymn at the level of verbal expression. It is thus to 
this spiritual economy, to this poetics of the moral life, that forgiveness 
especially belongs. Its ‘poetic’ power consists in shattering the law of the 
irreversibility of time by changing the past, not as a record of all that has 
happened but in terms of its meaning today. It does this by lifting the burden 
of guilt which paralyses the relations between individuals who are acting our 
and suffering their own history. It does not abolish the debt insofar as we are 
and remain the inheritors of the past, but it lifts the pain of the debt.63
Forgiveness can be therapeutic, notes Ricoeur, because it does not involve forgetting 
offences but encourages all involved to remember them so that they might be avoided 
in the future. In the practice of forgiveness the offence is discussed, the offender 
takes responsibility for the injury caused, and the injured party agrees to forgive. 
Consequently, the sin or debt is not forgotten but worked through and remembered 
before it is forgiven.
In contrast, amnesty ‘purports to erase the debt and the fact’.64 This is another way of 
saying that amnesty is a kind of amnesia, where ‘the slate is wiped clean’ and wrong­
doing is forgotten or erased from memory. To echo Peter Krapp’s words, a general
62 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 96.
63 Paul Ricoeur, “Reflections on a N ew  Ethos for Europe,” in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of 
Action, in Richard Kearney (ed.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, 3-13.
64 Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, 
N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1998, 125.
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amnesty would allow one to go on ‘as if nothing had happened’.65 It is for this reason 
that Ricoeur considers amnesty as a kind of amnesia about the past that should be 
used as infrequently as possible.66
Forgiveness, however, is different. It requires an exact call of the injury to be 
forgiven. It conjures up the past to the extent of making it present again, opening the 
wound, so that its full extent might be forgiven.67 This is what allows us to 
distinguish genuine forgiveness from amnesty. Whereas amnesty goes to the limits of 
forgetting, forgiveness goes to the limits of memory, requiring that all involved 
understand what is being forgiven, thereby providing the hope of a peaceful future, 
where all are reconciled with one another.
And so we begin to see how Ricoeur’s interpretation of forgiveness is useful in the 
pursuit of virtue. According to Ricoeur, forgiveness has a healing power insofar as it 
seeks not so much to erase the sinful act as to discuss it and understand why it was 
sinful, so that a genuine reconciliation might be achieved. In this respect, the practice 
of forgiveness (rather than amnesty) helps to promote a culture of peace, where 
immoral actions are discussed and all are invited to take responsibility for their 
actions before being forgiven. This is similar to McClendon’s view that forgiveness 
helps to heal broken bonds so that individuals and communities may start anew and
65 Peter Krapp, “Amnesty: Between an Ethics o f  Forgiveness and the Politics o f  Forgetting,” German 
Law Journal 6/1 (2005), www.germanlawjoumal.com, 4. (21/02/05); for an interesting discussion on 
the abuse o f  memory and o f  collective forgetting, see Sarah Gensburger and Marie-Claire Lavabre, 
“Entre ‘devoir de mém oire’ et ‘abus de mém oire’,” in Bertrand Müller (ed.), L ’historié entre mémoire 
et épistémologie-. Autour de Paul Ricoeur, France: Editions Payot Lausanne, 2005, 75-98.
66 Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 125; cf. Louis Fèvre, Penser avec Ricoeur: L ’introduction à la 
pensée et à l ’action de Paul Ricoeur, Lyon: Chronique Sociale, 2003, 62-65.
67 Krapp, “Amnesty,” 5.
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learn a truer story about themselves, as well as the kinds of actions required of them 
as free individuals in search of goodness.68 As Ricoeur puts it, forgiveness is a kind 
of healing of memory, the end of mourning. Delivered from the weight of debt, 
forgiveness gives us a future.69
Of course, for the believer, the practice of forgiveness is linked to the practice of 
confession, since believers confess their sins to God in the hope of gaining 
forgiveness. According to Ricoeur, this is a specifically religious practice. Its 
significance lies in the fact that it provides believers with a way of ‘placing evil 
before God’.70 Religious invocations, such as that of the Psalmist ‘Against you, 
against you alone have I sinned, I have done evil in your sight,’ provide believers with 
an opportunity to acknowledge that they have sinned and used their freedom in a 
sinful manner.
Moreover, Ricoeur believes that the practice of confessing sins before God places sin 
in a context of hope. This is so because the religious community uses confession not 
only as a means of admitting wrongdoing, but as a means of renewing the covenantal 
promises. The confession of sins represents a way of beginning again for the 
believing community. Faith encourages the believing community to believe that, 
adapting Saint Paul’s phrase, ‘Wherever evil “abounds”, there hope “superabounds”.71
68 McClendon, “The Practice o f  Community Formation,” 99; cf. John Milbank, Being Reconciled: 
Ontology and Pardon, London: Routledge, 2003, 15ff.
69 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “Sanction, Rehabilitation, Pardon,” in The Just, trans. David Pellauer, Chicago and 
London: University o f  Chicago Press, 133-145. For a summary o f  Ricoeur’s treatment o f  pardon and 
forgiveness, see Fèvre, Penser avec Ricoeur, 62-65.
70 Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, 437-8.
7’ibid., 439.
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The view of faith, according to Ricoeur, is that man is essentially benevolent and that 
in spite of sin there is the hope of freedom and liberation.
In summary, the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur invites us to interpret the narrative texts 
and practices of the Christian community as a means of educating and sustaining 
believers in the quest for goodness. Ricoeur’s work necessitates a hermeneutics of the 
self: it interprets the Christian story and tradition as the locus for all understanding, 
both ethical and personal. The whole of the Christian life of faith is interpreted as a 
dialectic between two questions: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What is required of me if I am to 
continue to be that person?’
Since Christians use the Christian story to answer the ‘Who?’ of personal identity, this 
means that they will inevitably refer to it to answer the ‘What?’ of morals. (For who 
we think we are, and what we believe we should do are inextricably linked.) This is a 
help to Christians in search of truth, for a familiarity with what virtuous behaviour 
looks like leads to an ability to identify what is required in moral decision making. 
Indeed, the similarities between the work of Stanley Hauerwas and MacIntyre cohere 
with Ricoeur’s belief that narrative is the key to understanding morality and the self, 
which makes the case for interpreting the distinctiveness of Christian morality debate 
in this way all the more promising.
Of course, using Ricoeur’s work to move the Christian proprium  in the general 
direction of virtue ethics means that Christian ethics is offered more resources than 
before. This is the case because, as James Keenan explains, virtue ethics not only
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■ • * ■ 72provides bridges between Scripture and moral theology, Church life and worship, 
but also between ethics and spirituality. Owing to the fact that the emphasis is now 
placed upon self-knowledge and the cultivation of good character traits, rather than on 
obedience to principles, a link is opened up between Christian ethics and spirituality. 
In fact, given that spirituality is comprised of various practices that serve to awaken 
affectivity, it would seem that spirituality is vital for the sustenance of the virtues. 
Moreover, the moral life for Christians is not simply about becoming good, it is also 
about becoming holy. It makes sense, therefore, that our understanding of Christian 
morality should include reference to the affective and transcendental dimensions of 
Christian moral striving.
And so we begin to see that one of the advantages of approaching the Christian 
proprium  debate from the perspective of identity, as suggested by the work of Paul 
Ricoeur, is that it provides a space where Christian ethics and spirituality can coexist 
as we strive to integrate our lives in goodness and holiness. This will be the focus of 
the next chapter.
72 Harrington and Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics, 24-5.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY, VIRTUE ETHICS AND MORAL 
THEOLOGY
In the previous chapter it was shown that moving the Christian proprium  debate away 
from the search for Christian norms and principles is similar to all that is involved in 
the return to virtue ethics advocated by Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
The general thrust towards character and identity highlights the fact that the key to 
understanding Christian morality is not to be found in individual acts but in the 
particular way the Christian community interprets itself. Stories and practices 
supplement ethics with the kind of personalism that was lacking in traditional moral 
theology. The similarities between Ricoeur’s work and the current retrieval of virtue 
ethics strengthen the proposal that the Christian proprium  debate should be 
approached from the perspective of identity.
Yet the advantages of a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate are not 
confined to the area of virtue ethics. The change in focus, from acts to person, also 
invites a healthy dialogue with those who wish to emphasise the unseen, spiritual or 
devotional aspects of moral living. Christian ethics is offered a broader horizon of 
understanding. This broader horizon can account for the spiritual dimensions of the 
search for goodness, and makes it impossible to separate morality and spirituality. In 
this way, a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate can create a space
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where spirituality and moral theology meet and find a common language of 
expression. The primary concern is with persons in relationship and in community, 
which makes it an attractive and promising alternative to the search for Christian 
norms or values.
In order to see how interpreting the Christian proprium  debate through the eyes of 
Paul Ricoeur can create a space where the spiritual dimension of moral striving is 
considered, we must first define the term spirituality. We will then show how 
spiritualities are specific to the tradition within which they are lived. This will allow 
us to see how the Christian community interprets morality as the expression of its 
spirituality. Later sections will focus on some of the obstacles that stand in the way of 
current attempts to relate morality to spirituality, with a view to determining how Paul 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of biblical revelation can provide a way forward.
A preliminary clarification offered by William Spohn will help to explain the kind of 
spirituality being discussed here. Spohn draws a distinction between ‘lived 
spirituality’ and ‘reflective spirituality’. The former is analogous to morality, and 
refers to the practice of holistic and transformative disciplines that seek to assist in 
connecting persons with their inner core and with their desire to live a life that 
consciously seeks to live in tune with ultimate or comprehensive realities. ‘Reflective 
spirituality’, which is analogous to ethics, has to do with the practical communication 
of the spiritual experience.1 The first part of this chapter will discuss spirituality in 
the ‘lived’ sense. The second part will include reference to ‘reflective spirituality’. 
The context will make it clear which one is being discussed.
1 W illiam Spohn, "Spirituality and Ethics: Exploring the Connections,” TS 58 (1997), 109.
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For all the interest in spirituality today, there remains a lack of precision about what 
exactly is meant when one speaks of spirituality. In moving towards a general 
definition it might be useful to note that, although various forms of spirituality exist, it 
appears to be grounded in two central ideas: (a) that there are dimensions of reality 
which we do not see; (b) that an acknowledgement of these dimensions helps us to 
live in a less fragmented way, and move towards the fullness of being, both ethically 
and spiritually.
Yet, there are many spiritualities and the term is used to cover a range of beliefs and
practices in areas as diverse as the occult and self-help programmes. The term
spirituality has also been used by anti-religious and non-religious groups, (the most
obvious examples being Marxist spirituality, black spirituality and feminist
spirituality), which further complicates the task of giving it a clear definition. In
religious circles one of the difficulties has to do with the different types of
Christianities, e.g. Catholic, Lutheran, evangelical, charismatic, etc. Each tradition
leads to different types of spiritualities, thereby making it difficult to give a precise
definition of the term spirituality.4 Michael Downey, however, offers a number of
ways in which lived spirituality might be explained.
The term “spirituality” is used by some to describe the depth dimension of all 
human existence. Here the emphasis is on spirituality as a constitutive 
element of human nature and experience. Joann Wolski Conn speaks of 
spirituality in terms of the capacity for self-transcendence. For Ewert Cousins, 
spirituality refers to the “inner dimensions of the person...[where] ultimate
2 Bernard McGinn, John M eyendorff and Jean Leclerq (eds.), Christian Spirituality: Origins to the 
Twelfth Century, N ew  York: Crossroads, 1985, 14-15.
3 Cf. Sandra Schneiders, “Theology and Spirituality: Strangers, Rivals, or Partners?” Horizons 13/2 
(1986), 224-225.
4 Alister E. McGrath, Christian Spirituality, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999, 13.
4.1 What is Spirituality?
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reality is experienced.” John MacQuarrie understands spirituality to be 
concerned with “becoming a person in the fullest sense.” For Gordon 
Wakefield, spirituality has to do with the “constituent of human nature which 
seeks relations with the ground or purpose of existence.” Edward Kinerk 
envisions spirituality as the expression of the dialectic by which one moves 
from the inauthentic to the authentic. Perhaps the most open-ended 
formulation of all comes from Raimundo Panikkar who speaks of spirituality 
as “one typical way of handling the human condition.”5
When viewed in a broad sense, then, spirituality is used to describe an element in
human experience which is both human and spiritual. It refers to the individual’s
ultimate goal: authenticity and fullness of living. It involves a personal striving for
perfection, and is consciously pursued by the individual within a specific horizon or
context. Spirituality involves a genuine effort to pursue ideals and goals which
individuals consider to be essential to who they are and to the persons they wish to
become.
None of this is to suggest that the desire to achieve perfection or to attain one’s 
ultimate goal is an individual or strictly religious quest, as the need for perfection 
involves a self-transcendence towards the good one perceives. A non-religious 
example would include a person who devotes his/her life to the pursuit of peace and 
justice, channelling all of life’s energies to bear upon this pursuit.6 Even though it 
does not refer to God, and is conducted outside the context of a faith community, the 
pursuit is still an authentic one. In the same way, one could give one’s life to 
promoting equality among men and women in every sphere of life. Again, the 
absence of a religious context does mean that this effort is not a spiritual one. 
Striving for personal perfection or for an ultimate goal does not have to be carried out
5 Michael Downey, Understanding Christian Spirituality, N ew  York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 
1997, 14.
6 Ibid., 15.
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in a religious community to be authentic: spirituality is a way of consciously pursuing 
the highest values one holds or perceives.
This is similar to the idea that one does not have to be religious to be moral, and that 
one can give an account of morality without any reference to religion. For this 
reason, many writers argue that spirituality allows for conversations between persons 
of different traditions and faiths. According to Sheldrake, the shift to experience in 
the disciplines of spirituality and theology has also led to dialogue with other 
disciplines. Postmodernism, he says, blurs the boundaries that previously hindered 
such dialogue.7 Within the academic world, the modernist approach to knowledge 
tended to produce a series of inwardly consistent but mutually exclusive disciplines, 
which prevented interdisciplinary conversation. The mood has changed, however, 
and spirituality has necessitated the possibility of mutual exchanges with other 
disciples, including literary ones.
But staying with the discussion of ‘lived spirituality’, it must be said that, in spite of 
its diverse forms, spirituality is lived in a context. For the Christian, this context is 
that of a faith community, whose focus is the work and teachings of Jesus. In this 
sense we may speak of a specifically Christian spirituality.
4.2 Spirituality in Context
Since spirituality in its widest sense includes the whole person’s or group’s spiritual 
experience or orientation, it may involve beliefs, ways of thinking and feelings that
7 Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology: Christian Living and the Doctrine of God, Trinity Truth 
Series, London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1998, 62.
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are specific to a particular tradition. This is so because spirituality is all-embracing: it 
includes every aspect of one’s existence, as well as attitudes which underlie it.
Therefore context is an essential element of the contemporary study of spirituality. 
Imported from the social sciences and history, it refers to the specific framework in 
which the study of theological and spiritual experience takes place. Sheldrake points 
out that context is not really ‘something’ that may be added to or subtracted from 
spiritual experience but is the very element within which such experiences take their 
forms and expressions. Even though religions claim a transcendent dimension, all
Q
faiths throughout their long histories have been embedded in specific cultures.
This is no less the case for Christian spirituality: it is rooted in the context of the 
person and the story of Christ revealed in the New Testament. Christian spirituality is 
grounded in the revelation of God through Jesus and facilitates the faith experience. 
The move away from doctrine, the basis for earlier forms of spirituality, facilitates the 
experience of faith and the self in its unique relationship with God. Christian 
spirituality cannot avoid the question of tradition, since it does not purport to an 
isolated quest for self-fulfilment but to the communal search for wholeness of an 
entire community which takes revelation as its starting point. In this way, Christian 
spirituality relies on the story of a people who are capable of entering into a special 
relationship with a God whose presence is felt in all aspects of their lives. It is not 
simply about belief in doctrine. It is about faith. For, as MacNamara puts it, ‘Faith is
8 Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology, 59.
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what opens the spirit and provides the climate for a living acceptance of the great 
religious symbols and stories.’9
The faith community, then, interprets spirituality as the quest for fulfilment and union 
with God. While some find ultimate meaning in the configuration of the stars and 
make the horoscope the map for living, believers make God their map for living. In 
Christian spirituality, we believe that God’s desire for us, revealed in Jesus, gives 
ultimate foundation, meaning, worth, energy and direction to our lives.10 This is 
based on the belief that God loved us first (1 Jn. 4:10). Knowing that God loves us 
not only brings him close to us, but also empowers us to care for the things he cares 
for, that is, creation in all its forms. And so we begin to see that spirituality and its 
drive to fulfil our deepest longings and live in a unified way is inseparable from 
morality.
4.3 Morality and Spirituality
Recent scholarship in the areas of moral theology and spirituality is marked by the 
thrust to show how the moral life is bom out of spirituality. The key question for 
moralists is no longer, ‘What should I do?’ but ‘Who should we be and how should 
we live if we believe that God loves us and that we love God?’11 This indicates that 
the moral life begins in that spiritual space where we realise that we are loved, and we 
are subsequently awakened to the responsibility to care about what God cares about.
9 Vincent MacNamara, New Life for Old: On Desire and Becoming Human, Dublin: Columba Press, 
2004, 56.
10 Richard Gula, “Morality and Spirituality,” in James Keating (ed.), Moral Theology: New Directions 
and Fundamental Issues: Festschrift for James P. Hanigan, N ew  York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist 
Press, 2004, 164.
11 Cf. Edward C. Vacek, Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics, Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 1994.
132
Our love for God and for spiritual fulfilment is thereby transformed into the moral 
quest to protect the things God loves. This means that Christian morality is rooted in 
the desire to bring all people together in love, in short, to perfect the art of right 
relationships.
In this way, Christian morality loses its legalistic character and becomes a genuine 
and loving search to find ways of living that mirror the love God has shown us 
through the giving of his Son, Jesus Christ. The moral starting point is no longer one 
of obedience p er  se, but one of love and reciprocity, call and response. In fact, one
1 9 .could say that it is a ‘loving obedience’ in the sense that it involves a genuine 
commitment to find ways of living based upon a desire to love in the fullest possible 
sense. As Richard Gula puts it, ‘We are living morally when we give freely in love
13what we have received in grace. ’
However, this is not to say that the relationship between morality and Christian 
spirituality is one-dimensional. Morality and spirituality mutually enhance each 
other. For instance, without morality, spirituality can spin off into some otherworldly 
concern and lose its connection with reality and the world, the place where God’s love 
for us is expressed.14 In short, then, morality is rooted in spirituality, nurtured by its 
practices and its drive for loving union with God, while morality provides spirituality
12 Paul Ricoeur, “Une obéissance aimante,” in André LaCoque and Paul Ricoeur, Penser la Bible,
Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998, 162-195.
13 Gula, “Morality and Spirituality,” 165.
14 For an interesting discussion on the need for guidance in the spiritual life, see Brian Noble,
“Tradition, Spiritual Direction, and Supervision,” The Way 2005, 105-112. Noble argues that ‘[t]he 
maps for the spiritual life provided by doctrine and liturgy reflect the insights o f  others who have 
already made the journey. They have a crucial role in guiding us, and without them, perhaps, our 
journey is simply impossible. The spiritual journey w ill inevitably be personal, but it can never be 
solitary, purely private” (p. 109).
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with a way of reasoning about how this loving union should be lived in our interaction 
with others. It is for this reason that ‘holiness’ includes moral aspects even if  it is not 
reducible to the moral life.
4.4 Morality and Spirituality: A Difficult Union
Although contemporary trends in spirituality assert that spirituality is at the root of 
morality, and can never be reduced to some kind of external aid that helps us to be 
good, moral theology has not always made the connection clear. In fact, since moral 
theology formerly focused on acts and principles and on the necessity of obedience in 
the quest for goodness, it seemed to separate morality from its grounding in 
spirituality.
Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the Christian proprium  debate, with its 
emphasis on determining whether there are specifically Christian norms, has diverted 
attention away from the relationship between morality and spirituality.15 This is so 
because some scholars, most notable those of the Autonomy school, have affirmed 
that natural law and reason are reliable foundations for Christian moral norms.
Of course the advantage of a natural law approach is that it allows the Catholic 
tradition to enter into moral dialogue with non-Christian traditions and with ‘all 
people of good will’. Such dialogue is particularly important in pluralistic and secular 
societies. But the very presupposition that reason is a reliable source for the 
attainment of moral truths seems to detract attention from non-rational foundations of 
Christian ethics. As Mark O’ Keefe points out,
15 See  M a r k  O ’ K e e fe ,  Becoming Good, Becoming Holy: On the Relationship between Ethics and 
Spirituality, N e w  Y o r k ;  P a u l is t  P re ss , 1 9 9 5 , 1 8 ff .
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.. .the effort to affirm that moral norms are “in principle” available to those 
without explicit Christian faith can detract from the equally important 
questions of how explicit Christian faith—as lived and celebrated by ordinary 
Christians—does, in fact, impact, form, and guide the Christian moral life. 
Finally, the vitally important task of dialogue on moral questions in a 
pluralistic society can divert attention from the essential intra-community task 
of helping committed Christians to make sense of their moral lives in light of 
their spiritual longing.16
In spite of the ongoing renewal of Catholic moral theology and the drive to reclaim
the discipline’s theological and biblical foundations, therefore, there is still a need to
explore and acknowledge the spiritual dimensions of Christian moral striving. This
explains why some scholars are calling Catholic moral theology to consider the full
dynamism of authentic Christian living, and reflect the actual lives of Christians who
1 7must pray in order to become both good and holy.
To echo Richard Gula’s words, since Christian morality is a living response to God’s 
love, it is more than the sum of our reasons for acting.18 It involves the whole self— 
spirit, soul, body and mind. What we care about deeply and our understanding of 
what love is are prior to rational consciousness. This means that we are also living 
from the heart and the spirit. Feelings, emotions and spiritual yearnings to give and 
receive love are just as important as the critical reason in the pursuit of goodness. 
Hence, morality and spirituality must be considered together, so that we might 
interpret what is going on and order our feelings and values to create a world in which 
all of Creation can flourish.
16 O ’ K e e fe , Becoming Good, Becoming Holy, 19.
17 Ibid.
18 G u la , “ M o r a l i t y  a n d  S p ir i t u a l i t y , ”  167 .
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Other obstacles that obscure the view that morality and spirituality are inseparable 
arise out of our image of God. For it is believed that our image of God is what 
influences the quality of our spirituality and morality. A morality that rises out of 
spirituality asks what kind of God we experience and what difference it makes. The 
image we have of God says something about who we are and who we think God is for 
us. Images of God evoke affections and feelings that make us more attuned to what is 
required of us morally.19 For instance, the image of God as one who is involved in 
creation, who loves the creation and wills its rescue from bondage and decay (Rom. 
8:21) helps to sensitise us morally. Moreover, it engenders a spirituality of liberation 
and compassion, and a morality of hopeful engagement with the world.
On the other hand, the image of God as a distant and threatening God engenders 
feelings of guilt and fear rather than freedom, hope and loving engagement. Instead, 
it leads to a preoccupation with sin and failure, and gives us a disappointing and 
demoralising view of ourselves and of our moral capabilities. Negative images of 
God engender a timid spirituality and a morality that is afraid to embrace life in new 
and creative ways.20
Of course, both of the obstacles mentioned here have to do with the way in which we 
interpret the Christian story. If we interpret the biblical image of God as an 
impersonal rule-maker, morality loses its grounding in spirituality and becomes a 
matter of following rules and being obedient. On the other hand, if we assert that the 
Bible cannot be taken as a source of Christian morality, and that morality’s content is 
discovered using natural law, it becomes difficult to see how the Christian story can
19 P a t r ic k  H a n n o n , “ M o r e  th a n  M e e ts  th e  E y e , ”  The Furrow  5 5 /1 2  ( 2 0 0 4 ) ,  6 7 0 .
20 Gula, “Morality and Spirituality,” 169.
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operate as a resource for the kind of spiritual conversion necessary in the search for 
truth. For when we experience God’s love, we feel compelled to act morally: our 
hearts are opened, and our spiritual desire to love and be loved spills out into our 
moral actions, so that the moral and spiritual strands of our lives are integrated.
So how, then, could one assert that the content of morality is the same for all without 
undermining the spiritual transformation necessitated by the Christian story which 
empowers Christians to love as God does? This is where we begin to see the benefits 
of a Ricoeurian approach to Christian morality.
4.5 Ricoeur and Revelation
The move from acts and principles necessitated by Ricoeur’s work seems to broaden 
the horizon of Christian morality: it interprets the biblical texts as revelatory in the 
symbolic rather than the literal sense. Rather than submission to an authoritative 
divine word that demands obedience, Ricoeur prefers to speak of the imagination 
being transformed in the living encounter with God through Scripture. Similarly to 
current trends in spirituality, Ricoeur is more interested in how symbols and images of 
God help in the transformation of human hearts and imaginations than in norms and 
principles.21 A closer look at how Ricoeur interprets the biblical texts will make this 
assertion clearer.
For Ricoeur, the biblical texts are revelatory in the sense that they communicate
something to us about the inner-life of God. His agenda, therefore, is not to determine
who wrote a particular text, or whose voice is heard behind the text. Nor is Ricoeur
21 C f.  P a u l R ic o e u r ,  The Symbolism of Evil, B o s to n :  B e a c o n  P re ss , 1 9 6 7 , esp . 3 -2 4  a n d  Interpretation 
Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, T e x a s : T e x a s  C h r is t ia n  U n iv e r s i t y  P re ss , 1 9 7 5 , 4 5 -8 7 .
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interested in determining whether or not the texts of the Old Testament given at Sinai 
may be considered as specifically Christian norms. In fact, he suggests that the 
biblical texts cannot be properly understood if they are considered in a legalistic way, 
for this only serves to overlook their symbolic and revelatory function.22 Instead, 
Ricoeur’s purpose is to emphasise the power of the biblical texts in terms of the self­
disclosure of God.23
Ricoeur argues that what is significant about the Sinai event, for instance, is that it 
establishes a Covenant between God and Israel. In this respect, the Law (Torah) is no 
longer understood in terms of obedience but in terms of relationship, evoking what 
scholars sometimes offer as what is perhaps a more basic sense of the word Torah 
(way). Furthermore, Ricoeur believes that the Sinai event tells us something about 
the nature of God. It shows us that God is interested in Creation and wishes to 
liberate it from oppression. Hence, Ricoeur’s project is to show that the Decalogue is 
significant because it symbolises the transformation of God’s relationship with his 
people, Israel. The content of the Law is secondary, while the relationship it 
establishes is primary.
By interpreting the revelatory texts of the biblical canon in this way, Ricoeur avoids 
undermining the spiritual engagement that revelation intends. This is the case 
because he interprets God’s design for humanity in terms of an invitation to share in 
the Divine Life, rather than in terms of the giving of an immutable codification of 
every communal or individual practice. The implications for the believing
22 P a u l R ic o e u r ,  “ T o w a r d  a H e rm e n e u t ic  o f  th e  Id e a  o f  R e v e la t io n , ”  in  L e w is  E d w in  H a h n  (e d .) , Essays 
on Biblical Interpretation, P h ila d e lp h ia :  F o r t re s s  P re ss , 1 9 8 0 ,9 3 f f .
23 P a u l R ic o e u r ,  “ T o w a r d  a H e rm e n e u t ic  o f  th e  Tdea o f  R e v e la t io n , ”  HTR  7 0 /1 -2  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  5.
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community, then, are that it is invited to experience a relationship with God, to care 
for Creation in the way He does, and to strive for perfection in all subsequent 
relationships.
The well-known biblical scholar Sandra Schneiders is at one with Ricoeur in the 
belief that the revelatory power of the biblical texts lies in their ability to reveal 
something about God. In fact, she argues that personal revelation, even in the human 
order, is first and foremost self-disclosure. A person chooses to invite another into his 
or her interiority. But unless the other accepts the invitation and reciprocates, 
revelation does not achieve itself. Revelation, notes Schneiders, though often initiated 
by one person, ‘is necessarily a mutual experience of personal disclosure giving rise 
to a mutual treasuring of what has been shared, for the “what” is really a “who.”’24
The purpose and result of revelation, therefore, in whatever garb it may take, is a 
shared life characterised by irrevocable commitment. It is mutual self-gift expressive 
of and terminating in love. Such an understanding of the biblical texts, as suggested 
by Ricoeur and echoed by Schneiders, moves considerations of Christian morality 
away from the legalistic tone formerly found in the manuals of moral theology, and 
reinforced by a literal reading of the biblical texts, to considerations of a more 
spiritual kind. If we may speak of God’s claim on us and his call to obedience, it is 
now understood in terms of a personal and intimate union with a God of love, who 
asks us to love. Revelation is now the locus for the transformation of human hearts. 
To echo the text of Ezekiel, ‘[God gives us ] a new heart and [puts] a new spirit in
24 S a n d ra  M. S c h n e id e rs , The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred Scripture , 2 nd 
ed n ., C o l le g e v i l le ,  M in n e s o ta :  T h e  L i tu r g ic a l  P re s s , 1 9 9 9 , 34 .
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[us]; [he removes] the heart of stone from [our] bodies and give [us] a heart of flesh’ 
(Ezek. 11:19) 25
Hence, a Ricoeurian interpretation of the biblical texts can account for the 
transformational and spiritual aspects of Christian morality. When the texts of the 
Bible lose their legalistic character, the spiritual emerges, and believers are invited to 
share in a special relationship with a God of love. In terms of morality, this sharing 
means that we are asked to express God’s love for us in all other relationships. The 
experience of a loving God as witnessed by the biblical texts poured into the hearts of 
Christians can no longer be considered as a ‘extra’ or as a minor addition to Christian 
ethics but as the basis for all Christian morality.
Furthermore, Ricoeur’s work encourages us to see that God is not a superego God but 
a God of love, who calls us to love. When we experience this love spiritually, we feel 
the moral tug to mirror it in other relationships. In this way, morality gives 
expression to spirituality, and the moral and the spiritual strands of our lives can be 
considered together.
It is important to note, however, that although Ricoeur’s analysis of the Bible suggests 
that the biblical image of God is not one of retribution and punishment but of love and 
mercy, he is not suggesting that the image of God presented in every text is identical. 
This is the case because the scriptural figuration of the divine life—the phenomenon 
of revelation—is not one-dimensional. In fact, the various literary genres and images 
used by the scriptural authors are chosen to suit their theological itineraries. Thus
25 M y emphasis.
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Ricoeur writes: ‘Throughout these discourses, God appears differently each time: 
sometimes as the hero of the saving act, sometimes as wrathful and compassionate, 
sometimes as he to whom one can speak in a relation of an I-Thou type, or sometimes 
as he whom I meet only in a cosmic order that ignores me.’26
In this way, Ricoeur wishes to indicate that no one image can adequately describe the 
divine life. Images alternately clash and complement one another. The Bible, 
therefore, bears witness to a many-sided God by using a range of images: father, 
mother, husband, rock, king, lover, judge, potter, whirlwind, etc. In terms of 
spirituality, this variety of images keeps our hearts attuned to the fact that God is still 
a mystery, and that human images are limited in terms of what they can tell us of God. 
Moreover, it keeps our hearts continually focused on our relationship with God, lest 
we become over familiar and presumptuous in our spiritual understanding of him. 
Alternating images also ensures that our spirituality is always nourished by, and open 
to, new images and new perspectives of what God is enabling us to do morally.
Further examples of how a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate 
provides a space where the affective dimensions of moral striving are considered can 
be found in his treatment of the Creation story. In Ricoeur’s view, the Creation story 
should be interpreted in terms of a symbol of a gift.27 It recounts the story of God’s 
supreme work, which he considers to be intrinsically good (Gn. 1:31).28 In this 
respect, Ricoeur argues that the symbol of God’s Creation contained in the biblical
26 P a u l R ic o e u r ,  Figuring the Sacred'. Religion, Narrative and Imagination, tra n s . D a v id  P e l la u e r  a nd  
M a r k  I .  W a l la c e ,  M in n e a p o lis :  F o r t re s s  P re s s , 1 9 9 5 , 87 .
27Ib id . ,  3 2 5 .
28 I b i d ,  132 .
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texts is a moral one, for it joins the idea of God’s power with goodness. When we 
read this text, we are invited to recognise that creation is good: God saw it was good. 
Consequently, the texts of the Bible summon believers to see the depth and worth of 
creation as God sees it, and to find ways of living worthy of such a generous God. Of 
course, there is no obligation on the part of the reader to do so. The reader is free to 
accept or reject the proposals offered by the text; but the person of faith will be 
summoned by the call to respond to God’s gift in a fitting way.
This suggests that for Ricoeur the symbol of God’s creation gives direction to moral 
sensibilities and helps to engender feelings of solicitude, respect and admiration for 
all that God has created.29 Although we are not told precisely how we should do this, 
the sensibilities and feelings necessary to respond morally are awakened. Thus a link 
is established between spirituality and morality: Ricoeur’s work shows us that the 
biblical texts help to cultivate feelings and dispositions necessary to ‘live from the 
heart’, and embody in our relationships the kind of love God has shown to his 
Creation.
4.6 Critically Reading the Text as a Transformative Experience
Of course, none of this is to suggest that Ricoeur is encouraging a naive reading of the 
texts of the biblical canon. For he acknowledges the need to supplement any spiritual 
reading of the Bible with the critical tools of exegesis so that false and idolatrous 
representations of God are avoided. Ricoeur uses the terms ‘first naivete’ and ‘second
29 W i l l i a m  E . S c h w e ik e r ,  “ S ta r r y  H e a v e n s  a n d  M o r a l  W o r t h , ”  in  J o h n  W a l l ,  W i l l i a m  S c h w e ik e r ,  a nd  
D a v id  W .  H a l l  (e d s .), Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, N e w  Y o r k  a n d  L o n d o n : 
R o u t le d g e , 2 0 0 2 , 134 .
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naiveté’ to explain how the biblical texts can only transform the world of the reader
• TOwhen they are critically interpreted.
First naiveté is a spontaneous immediacy of the reader to subject matter through a text
that is so totally transparent that one is not aware of its existence, much less its
deficiencies. Understood in this way, reading is a naïve activity. Sandra Schneiders
uses the example of reading a street sign to show the kind of understanding that arises
from reading in the first naiveté sense. In fact, she suggests that much of our
everyday reading is naïve.
When I see a street sign I do not see it as sign but am simply aware, through it, 
that the street I am driving on is Broadway. My reception of that knowledge is 
unreflective and uncritical. Such reading is made possible by the reader’s and 
the text’s sharing the same tradition. The sign is written in English, has the 
literary form (one word, capitalized on a placard, at an intersection, etc.) of a 
street sign within the culture of the reader, is a recongnizable word from the
T  1
lexicon, and so on.
Or take the example of a child listening to a fairy tale or the person reading a novel 
for the sheer enjoyment of the experience. In both of these activities the text is 
experienced in an immediate way; it is transparent.
The same may be said of the biblical texts: the first reading of a text may be naïve. 
Indeed, the spiritual images of God that nourish the moral life and seek to convert 
human hearts may be perceived immediately. We may be awestruck by the 
possibilities that the text opens up, and believe that we have grasped its full 
significance.
30R ic o e u r ,  The Symbolism o f  Evil, 3 4 7 -3 5 7 .
31 S c h n e id e rs , Revelatory Text, 169 .
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Nevertheless, as Ricoeur argues, the first encounter with a text (first naivete) is 
merely a preengagement with the text. In terms of the biblical texts, he explains, this 
means that while we may hear a certain call, we cannot hear it authentically because 
we have not yet acquired the critical tools of exegesis to decode correctly its full 
significance. To quote Lewis S. Mudge, ‘Our “first naivete” is surely the condition 
of being in some sense “called” but unable to distinguish the authentic message from 
reality-apprehension of our culture or from the dogmatic and ecclesiastical framework 
in which we hear it.’33 In terms of interpreting the biblical images of God and their 
significance for spirituality and morality, then, this shows that a naive reading of the 
Scriptures can be deeply idolatrous.34 Thus a more critical reading of the text is 
required.
Ricoeur refers to this critical reading a second naivete. Second naivete is a critical 
reading of the text that is achieved when the reader distances him/herself from the 
text. The reader begins to ask questions about whether the text is accurately, fairly, or 
honestly conveying that which it seeks to communicate. Indeed, it could be said that 
the reader is required to become suspicious of the text and sift through it for errors or, 
in the case of a spiritual reading of the Bible, for false or idolatrous images of God.
The purpose of a critical reading of the text, however, is not simply to detect its 
deficiencies. Rather, it is to enhance its meaning and our appreciation of the power 
contained in the text, uncovering its strategies, and placing in relief its enriching
32 R ic o e u r ,  “ T o w a r d  a H e rm e n e u t ic  o f  th e  Id e a  o f  R e v e la t io n , ”  3 3 .
33 L e w is  S . M u d g e , “ P a u l R ic o e u r  : O n  B ib l ic a l  In te rp r e ta t io n ,”  in  L e w is  S . M u d g e  (e d .) , Paul Ricoeur:
1 9 8 1 ,2 3 .
34 R ic o e u r ,  “ T o w a r d  a H e rm e n e u t ic  o f  th e  Id e a  o f  R e v e la t io n , ”  3 3 .
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internal and external connections.35 Furthermore, the critical reading of the text 
encouraged by Ricoeur serves to protect text from a premature appropriation by the 
reader. It invites a healthy, rather than naïve, fundamentalist or misinformed, 
dialogue between the text and its reader. In this way, the text is allowed to say what it 
says and make proposals which the reader can either accept or reject.
Yet this is not the final stage in the interpretative process. The critical activity of 
interpreting the text leads to a post critical moment (post naiveté).36 It is at this stage 
that the reader’s world may be transformed by the proposals of the text, and the 
transformation can be considered as authentic since it is the result of critically probing 
the meaning of the text. As Schneiders points out, without critical interpretation, the 
text cannot be considered as a space where a new worldview or horizon of existence 
may be perceived.
This points up the fact that when Ricoeur speaks of the transformative (spiritual) 
power of biblical images of God, he is not suggesting a naïve appropriation of these 
images; Ricoeur’s interpretation is always a critical one. In terms of morality, this 
ensures that the biblical images of God continue to nourish the moral quest for 
goodness without confining us to one biblical image of God.
Ricoeur’s critical reading of the biblical images of God is particularly useful in 
response to the feminist argument that our image of God as the Father over­
35 S c h n e id e rs , Revelatory Text, 169 .
36 See M u d g e , “ P a u l R ic o e u r :  O n  B ib l ic a l  In te rp r e ta t io n ,”  2 6 .
37 S c h n e id e rs , Revelatory Text, 169 .
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emphasises the masculine image of God and suggests that biblical spirituality is
piQ
intended for a masculine Church. A naive reading (first naivete) of the biblical texts 
could lead to the idea that God is on the side of men, calling them to pour out his love 
in their moral actions.
A more critical reading of the texts (second naivete), however, calls us to consider the 
full tenderness of God’s love for us in terms of images of both mother and father 
(Hos. 11:1-4; Isa. 66: 9-13; Jer. 31:20). This effectively conveys the idea that God’s 
love for us goes beyond gender and includes the whole human family, male and 
female. It is this kind of reading of the biblical texts that engenders a healthy 
spirituality, one which nourishes the moral actions of all members of God’s 
community without subordinating anyone or giving the impression that only male 
power saves.
To sum up, then, Ricoeur’s interpretation of the biblical texts and their role in the 
Christian community shows that he is attuned to the fact that Christians do not split 
themselves into religious and moral compartments. His critical reading of the biblical 
texts affirms that the personal gift of God’s love instilled in our hearts and recounted 
in the Scriptures remains a fundamental resource for the moral life, even if it does not 
yield any specifically Christian norms. Hence, the natural law tradition remains intact 
and the argument for the autonomy of morals can still be justified.
The difference Ricoeur’s work brings, however, is that it demonstrates how the moral
and the spiritual mesh. The spiritual awakening to a life of union and love with God
38 F o r  e x te n s iv e  a c c o u n ts  o f  th e  fe m in is t  v ie w ,  see S a n d ra  S c h n e id e rs , Women and the Word, M a h w a h , 
N J :  P a u lis t  P re s s , 1 9 8 6  and  E liz a b e th  A .  J o h n s o n , She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist 
Theological Discourse, N e w  Y o r k :  C ro s s ro a d , 1 9 9 2 .
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is considered to be foundational for a community which takes revelation as its starting 
point. God’s gift of himself represents an invitation to be moral and calls for a 
commitment to love in the fullest possible sense.39 Given that current scholarship in 
the area of spirituality is calling for an approach to Christian morality that can account 
for God’s call to love and our response (call and response) without undermining the 
autonomy of morals, Ricoeur’s work seems to illuminate the way.
Another advantage of an approach to Christian morality that emphasises character and 
the inner dimensions of moral striving is that we can now suggest various ways in 
which virtue ethics and spirituality, in the reflective sense, can enhance each other. It 
is important to remember, however, that Ricoeur’s work is not that of a theologian but 
of a philosopher; he does not discuss the relationship between spiritual practices and 
the virtues p er  se. For this section of the argument, we must rely, therefore, on the 
suggestions of Jean Porter and William Spohn, both of whom have contributed much 
to our contemporary understanding of how the practice of spirituality can enhance the 
life of virtue, and vice versa.
4.7 Integrating Virtue Ethics and Spirituality
A first way in which the cultivation of the virtues is helped by spiritual practices is 
that the latter can help to sharpen moral perception. According to William Spohn, 
two ordinary spiritual practices play an important role in correcting our moral myopia: 
the Eucharist and intercessory prayer.40 Although the practices mentioned remind us 
of our specifically Christian identity, by recalling the story of the Christian 
community, they also play a part in tutoring moral dispositions and affections. As
39 R ic o e u r ,  “ U n e  O b é is s a n c e  a im a n te ,”  1 7 0 ff .
40 W i l l i a m  C . S p o h n , Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics, N e w  Y o r k :  C o n t in u u m , 1 9 9 9 , 112 ,
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spiritual practices, they aim to engender feelings of gratitude, forgiveness, and love 
into the hearts of the faithful.
According to Spohn, the practice of worship may be understood by looking at Paul’s 
first letter to the Corinthian Church (1 Cor. 8:1-23). Here Paul speaks of the change 
in moral perception that Christian worship aims to bring forth. The Church at Corinth 
was divided into two groups, which he calls the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’. The former 
group saw themselves as being superior because they could in conscience eat meat 
that had been sacrificed to idols. The ‘strong’ looked down upon those who had 
reservations about doing so. Paul refers to this scrupulous group as the ‘weak’. The 
‘weak’ worried that they would be contaminated if they ate meat that had been 
sacrificed to pagan gods. This posed a problem for Paul’s Church when they sat 
down at the Lord’s table: some were willing to eat meat and some were not.
The significance of Paul’s narrative, however, lies in its call for understanding and 
tolerance in the community. Paul does not ask the ‘strong’ to change their views. 
Nor does he tell the ‘weak’ to do so. Instead, he invites the ‘strong’ to change their 
image of the ‘weak’. As Spohn explains, ‘Paul exhorts the “strong” to look at these 
people in a different metaphorical frame.’41 Paul calls on the ‘strong’ to consider the 
weak in the way that Christ would, that is, as members of the Christian family. Christ 
thought enough of the human family to give up his life. Therefore, Paul sees it fitting 
to assert that when one sins against another (in this case by calling them ‘weak’), one 
sins against Christ (I Cor. 8: 12).
41 S p o h n , Go and Do Likewise, 1 1 4 .
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Thus Paul interprets the gathering of the community at the Lord’s table as an 
opportunity to be reconciled with all members of Christ’s body. All are one, 
regardless of differences of opinion or judgement. Although Paul does not give the 
‘strong’ a set of rules that will ensure that further divisions are avoided, he attempts to 
reorient vision. In terms of virtue ethics, the spiritual practice of coming together in 
worship invites Christians to transcend disagreements and to consider ‘others’ as 
equal partners in the pursuit of goodness and holiness.
The spiritual practice of prayer is a second common spiritual practice that shapes 
moral perception. When we make a petition to God, it is a self-involving statement; it 
commits the faithful to do something about the problems and incidences of injustice 
in the community. Praying for peace should make us recognise and identify our own 
hostility and try to overcome it. Praying for equality invites us to acknowledge 
incidences where we have contributed to inequality in the world. While spiritual 
practice of prayer does not guarantee that we will become more virtuous or give us 
solutions to moral issues, it prevents believers from thinking they are alone in the 
search for goodness. Intercessory prayer gives us confidence that God is with us 
throughout the moral journey and offers hope that we will find the path of 
righteousness.
This does not mean that the spiritual practice of prayer ensures an instant 
transformation or a direct route to acquiring the virtues. Nothing is automatic. To 
quote Richard Gula, ‘While we can say that our love of God as expressed through the 
practices can and ought to lead to loving what God loves, the causal connection is not 
an inevitable one. Spiritual practices might keep alive our relationship to God and
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engender a way of seeing things in relation to God, but it takes intentional effort to 
implement our spiritual experience and vision.’42
Moreover, cultural and personal influences play a role in how we understand the 
virtues and what is required of us morally. To believe that God will automatically 
make us love others is to misunderstand the complexity of becoming good. While 
worshiping God may encourage us to look favourably upon our neighbour, there can 
be no certainty that one will lead to the other. Christians ought not to expect, 
therefore, that spiritual practices are all that is required to become good. They are not 
the sole determining factor in shaping moral character; rather, they represent one of 
the ways in which Christians attempt to transform their love of God into a love of 
neighbour.
Hitherto we have suggested ways in which spiritual practices can help to shape moral 
perception and encourage a genuine commitment to develop good character traits. 
The interaction between virtue ethics and spiritual practices is not one-dimensional, 
however. The tradition of the virtues is equally important for the development of 
spirituality and its forms.
Jean Porter, for instance, argues that a significant point of contact between the 
tradition of the virtues and spirituality concerns the ways in which the virtues can set 
parameters for what is acceptable within the spiritual life.43 This is a point which has 
been brought up again and again by scholars who wish to highlight the point that
42 Gula, “Morality and Spirituality,” 175.
43 Jean Porter, “Virtue Ethics and its Significance for Spirituality,” The Way 88 (1997), 32.
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spiritual practices need reflective guidance from the tradition of the virtues, for 
example, or from moral theology, so that the practice of spirituality does not become 
an instrument of self-deception, narcissistic good feelings, or destructive ideology.44 
Although it must be said that moral perception and the affective dimensions of 
morality may be enhanced by spirituality and its various forms, ‘insofar as 
[spiritualities] are not accountable to other voices, they run the risk of being insular 
and ideological, because they will inculcate some of the very oppressive and 
exclusionary traits their writings denounce.’45 As Spohn explains, spiritualities that 
arise from an experience of great trauma, such as the Holocaust, ecocide, or the 
oppression of women and the poor, for instance, may be more susceptible to using 
spirituality ideologically. The sacred is often enlisted as an ally to remedy social 
conditions of evil. However, if used primarily as an instrument rather than 
appreciated in its own right, legitimate suspicions arise.46
Spirituality needs the tradition of the virtues and the critical reflection of moral 
theology in general to guard against lived forms of spirituality becoming isolated from 
an adequate reflective spirituality, that is, communities which provide ways of 
discerning healthy forms of spirituality from their unhealthy counterparts. The 
tradition of the virtues can also prevent forms of spirituality from becoming sectarian: 
it grounds spirituality in a reflective framework and seeks to provide ways of 
sustaining good character traits rather than narcissistic or deceitful ones.
44 Spohn, “Spirituality and Ethics,” 113.
45 Ibid., 123.
46 Ibid., 113; cf. idem, Go and Do Likewise, 180ff. Here Spohn explains that when a finite community 
becomes the exclusive source o f  value and meaning, a limited portion o f  reality has been inflated to 
stand for the whole. ‘That is how idols are made; the loyalty that should be directed to the One God is 
concentrated on one group. Loyalty that fails to be sufficiently inclusive eventually becom es 
exclusive’ (p. 180). In Spohn’s view  a reflective and mature spirituality can prevent Christians from 
becoming sectarian in respect o f  their identity.
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And so we may speak of the tradition of the virtues and spiritual practices as existing 
in a mutually supportive relationship. Spiritual practices help to expand our 
imaginative skills and our perception of what it means to be a human being, while the 
tradition of the virtues provides the critical tools necessary to distinguish between 
authentic and ideological forms of spirituality. Each has a particular role to play in 
the quest for goodness. Consequently, we must avoid the temptation to consider 
morality and spirituality as one and the same. Although morality is bom out of 
spirituality, spirituality and its forms cannot formulate the virtues. Nor can it answer 
the ‘What?’ of morals. Instead, it helps to open hearts, so that love of God is 
transformed into love of neighbour. Considered in this way, the Christian moral 
response is not disembodied from faith in God but bom out of a desire to respond to 
God’s love in every aspect of their lives.
And so we are brought back to the central thrust of current trends in the area of 
spirituality, and can offer some concluding remarks. That there is a call for greater 
alliance between morality and spirituality is clear. This stems from the conviction 
that Christians do not separate their spiritual yearning from their moral actions. For 
the Christian, faith in God and the experience of God’s love requires a commitment to 
finding ways of giving expression to God’s love, even if  faith in God does not yield 
any new norms or values.
Of course, if act-centred approaches to Christian morality or, indeed, to the Christian 
proprium  debate continue to be the norm in Catholic moral theology, the assertion 
that moral actions are the expression of God’s love poured into the hearts of the 
faithful will fall silent. Spirituality and morality will not achieve the kind of
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integration called for by contemporary theologians. Moreover, as long as Christian 
revelation is discussed in terms of norms and principles of obedience, Christian 
morality will remain estranged from its roots in spirituality.
This is one of reasons why consideration of what Paul Ricoeur’s work can bring to the 
Christian proprium  debate is promising. For Ricoeur does not interpret revelation or 
any aspect of the biblical story in terms of law. Obedience is not the key issue. 
Relationship, however, is. The biblical texts lose their legalistic character and 
symbolise an invitation to love for the believing community, rather than a call to 
obedience. In this way, Ricoeur neither reduces the moral response to the 
heteronomous following of rules found in texts nor undermines the significance of the 
biblical texts for the faith community. He successfully manages to affirm that, 
although they are not required to do anything that cannot be discovered by the non- 
Christian, Christians will explain their moral actions as the outpouring of God’s love, 
as recounted in the biblical narrative. For this is what they believe they are called to 
do because of who they are.
Thus interpreting the Christian proprium, debate through the eyes of Paul Ricoeur can 
account for the fact that, for the Christian, morality is understood in terms of a 
commitment to finding ways of giving expression to God’s love, even if faith in God 
does not yield any new norms or values. In this way, Ricoeur’s interpretation of 
revelation and its significance for the faith community seems to put morality and 
spirituality back together again. Moreover, it gives us more reason to hope that the 
contemporary call made by scholars of spirituality who wish to generate a greater 
alliance between morality and spirituality can be answered.
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Yet given that the general thrust of a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  
debate is similar to all that is involved in the retrieval of virtue ethics and current 
trends in spirituality, problems arise about the place of the Magisterium. If our 
ultimate guide to goodness and holiness is no longer considered to be found in norms 
or objective rules but in the way we see and interpret ourselves through the Christian 
story, one wonders whether there is a need for a magisterial teaching authority.
In fact, it could be argued that our approach is fundamentally flawed to the extent that 
it appears to resist any attempt to describe morality in terms of obedience to an 
external authority. And so we must ask, ‘Does a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian 
proprium  debate envisage a need for a magisterial teaching authority?’ Or, to put it 
differently, ‘Does it undermine the role played by the Magisterium in the moral 
formation of the believing community?’ It is to this issue that we now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NARRATIVE THEORY AND TRADITION
The previous chapters demonstrated how the work of Paul Ricoeur can move the 
Christian proprium  debate away from the tensions over specifically Christian norms 
and values to emphasise the role of the Bible in self-understanding and in the 
acquisition of virtue. Possessing good character traits and engaging in the practices of 
one’s community are thought to be more important than the following of rules and 
principles. The shift from acts to persons in relationship can also account for the fact 
that the Christian sees his/her moral actions as the outpouring of God’s love for 
creation, without suggesting that faith contributes to the content of morality. 
Interpreting revelation as the symbolic self-disclosure of God facilitates a richer 
understanding of Christian morality, one which can account for the affective 
dimensions of the moral quest.
But the drive to move away from the search for specifically Christian norms and 
principles to emphasise character, self-knowledge, interiority and relationship might 
seem to raise serious questions about the role of the Magisterium in Christian 
morality. Since the general thrust of a Ricoeurian interpretation of the Christian 
proprium  debate is similar to currents trends in virtue ethics and spirituality, one 
begins to wonder whether it is at odds with the idea that a teaching authority is
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necessary to protect the ‘truths of faith’. Indeed, it could be argued that approaching 
the Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate from a narrative perspective over-emphasises the 
role of the individual in the search for truth, thereby making it impossible to assert the 
need for a magisterial teaching authority, or indeed an authority of any kind.
One might also find fault with a Ricoeurian analysis of the Christian proprium  debate 
because it may appear one-sided. Although we began this study by saying that the 
intention was not to determine which school has it right, so to speak, thus far it may 
seem as if Ricoeur’s interpretation of the biblical texts shares more in common with 
the Autonomy view than that of the Glaubensethik.
Recall the Autonomy school’s central position: a) the content of morality is 
discovered by reason and the natural law; b) belief in revelation is not necessary to 
know what morality requires; c) revelation and faith give a context to moral striving, a 
vision o f  life which informs moral choices; a motivation for action, and model for 
action in the figure of Jesus Christ. Recall Ricoeur’s position: a) the texts of the Bible 
do not give believers any new or ‘extra’ norms or values; b) the texts of one’s 
tradition assist in the articulation of personal identity and assist in the formation of 
moral character; c) revelation is the symbolic disclosure of God, rather than the 
disclosure of a legal code by which Christians are expected to live.
In both cases the most important question is not whether faith in God or the texts of 
the faith community contribute to morality’s content, but the particular way in which 
believers see and interpret their moral lives. The whole moral enterprise is considered 
through the lens of the Christian story. Moreover, in each case the content of morality
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is left open-ended, which indicates that the natural law tradition is vital in the search 
for moral truth.
Given the similarities between Ricoeur’s position and that of the Autonomy school, 
supporters of the latter position might welcome a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian 
proprium  debate. Supporters of the Glaubensethik position, however, might not. In 
fact, proponents of the Glaubensethik view might reject it for the same reasons they 
rejected the autonomy school’s position1: Ricoeur’s reliance on natural law could lead 
to a rationalistic style ethics and thereby undermine the role of tradition and the 
Magisterium in the protection and teaching of moral truths.
It is clear that there is a need to determine whether analysing the Christian proprium  
debate through the eyes of Paul Ricoeur undermines the role of the Magisterium, and 
that of tradition in general. Furthermore, given the similarities between the autonomy 
view and all that Ricoeur’s work can bring to the debate on the Christian proprium, 
there is also a need to reaffirm that Ricoeur does not favour the autonomy view. In 
fact, in attempting to determine the role of the Magisterium and tradition in a 
Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate, it will become clear that 
Ricoeur’s position is one which seems to satisfy the concerns of the Autonomy and 
Faith-ethic schools vis-à-vis tradition and Magisterium without choosing one over the 
other.
In order to do this, we will proceed in three stages. First, we will outline Ricoeur’s 
view on history and tradition, paying particular attention to its Gadamerian and
1 Vincent MacNamara, Faith and Ethics: Recent Roman Catholicism, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1985, 43ff.
Habermasian heritage. Then, we will examine how Ricoeur combines elements of 
Habermas’ and Gadamer’s work to provide an assiduously balanced interpretation of 
both history and tradition. Subsequent sections will discuss the issues regarding 
tradition and Magisterium situated at the heart of the divisions between the Autonomy 
and Glaubensethik positions, with a view to showing how Ricoeur’s work offers a 
more inclusive alternative, where the concerns of both schools are considered.
As with the previous chapters on virtue ethics and spirituality, it is important to 
remember that Ricoeur’s account of history and tradition is that of a philosopher, not 
a theologian. This explains why we must begin by examining Ricoeur’s account of 
history in its philosophical context before we can suggest how it might be used in a 
theological one. It also explains why Ricoeur does not use the word Magisterium or 
refer to tradition in the theological sense, that is, as revelation, sacred Scripture and 
sacred Tradition.
5.1 Towards a Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness
Ricoeur’s understanding of history and tradition combines aspects of Hans-Gcorg 
Gadamer’s and Jürgen Habermas’ thought.2 From Gadamerian thought, Ricoeur 
borrows the idea that the past should not be viewed as a fossilised residue of events or 
facts but as an ongoing process of reformulation, revision and interpretation. From 
Habermas, he borrows the idea that tradition must always be questioned so that it 
continues to provide us with an authentic view of the past. A brief sketch of both 
Gadamer’s and Habermas’ positions will help to show how and why Ricoeur 
combines the works of his predecessors.
2 For a more detailed discussion o f  the similarities between Ricoeur’s work and that o f  Gadamer and 
Habermas, see S. H. Clark, Paul Ricoeur, London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1990, esp. 110-119.
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Gadamer interprets tradition (history) as a process. He believes that history is not a 
closed entity because history has yet to be made. Included in our understanding of 
history and the past is the hope or expectation of a future. This means that history and 
tradition are always open-ended, never complete. Indeed, to understand history, we 
must acknowledge that while it might recount events that occurred in the past, these 
events are interpreted in the present, and may be interpreted and reinterpreted again in 
the future. Hence, history and tradition must be considered as a process.
Gadamer also makes the point that understanding of any kind is conditioned by 
history and the past. This is another way of saying that when we attempt to interpret 
our own lives, for instance, our interpretation is already influenced by history and 
tradition. In other words, reason itself is historical. Heidegger’s influence on 
Gadamer’s thought emerges here.
According to Heidegger’s conception of the prestructure of understanding, we are 
capable of understanding a given text, matter or situation because we hold an already 
established way of seeing these phenomena, as well as certain ‘preconceptions’ of 
what they mean.4 The fundamental consequence of this can be seen from the outset: 
there is no pure seeing or understanding of the present without reference to the past.
5.1.1 Gadamer’s Interpretation of History
3 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: Mohr, 1960, 375. For a similar statement, 
see Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Replik,” in Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, Hermeneutik und 
Ideologiekritik, Frankfurt, 1971, 307.
4 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and 
Gadamer, John Wild (ed.), James M. Edie (associate ed.), Herbert Spiegelberg, W illiam Earle, George 
A. Schrader, Maurice Natanson, Paul Ricoeur, Aron Gurwitsch, Calvin O. Schrag, (consulting eds.), 
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969, 176.
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Nor can there be an understanding of history without a consciousness located in the 
present.
Hence, for Gadamer, as well as for his predecessor Heidegger, the present can only be 
examined and seen through the intentions, ways of seeing and preconceptions 
bequeathed by the past. The past must not be viewed as a pile of dead facts or 
objects, but as a continuing force throughout history in which we move and 
participate in every act of understanding in the present. Tradition is not something 
that exists over and against us; it is something in which we stand and through which 
we interpret our being.5
In more basic terms, this means that human beings are required time and time again to 
consider the horizon of meaning offered to them by the past. Owing to the fact that 
the consideration of the past takes place in the present, ‘[t]he grasping of meaning 
cannot be understood but as an ever-provisional truth-requisition. [For both Gadamer 
and Heidegger], the very idea of temporality cautions us against the presumption that 
a once-and-forever-established “fixation” of truth is possible. In this respect, insights 
which have proved true in the past ought to be regarded as replaceable by other, more 
refined insights, in accordance with the novel circumstances of a particular epoch.’6
5 Ricoeur uses the Latin expression res gestae et historia rerum gestarum (we make history and we are 
made by history (my translation)) to formulate his dialectic understanding o f  history. For a clear 
account o f  how Ricoeur uses this Latin phrase to interpret history and tradition, see Domenico  
Jervolino, Paul Ricoeur: Une herméneutique de la condition humaine, Paris: Ellipses, 2002, 61.
6 Georges De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” JES  19 (1982), 32.
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According to Georges De Schrijver, Gadamer’s approach to history and tradition is 
one which attempts to understand history in a hermeneutical way;7 it locates truth in a 
dialectic between stagnation and fluidity.8 Viewed in this way, history is a dynamic 
process of value transmission and reinterpretation in the present. This means that our 
understanding of history lies not in totally leaving our own experience to one side, but 
in realising that we ourselves are historical beings. It is for this reason that Ricoeur 
sees value in Gadamer’s understanding of history: it asserts that nothing can be 
understood apart from its historical context or apart from the horizon of meaning in 
which it is located.9
Of course, this is another way of saying that reason itself is a historical phenomenon. 
It is conditioned by the past. Unlike some Enlightenment philosophers who attempted 
to explain reason as something detached from tradition, Gadamer insists that reason is 
a product of tradition. Yet, this is not to suggest that reason is incapable of criticising 
the past from which it developed, and in which it continues to develop. Reason also 
exists in the horizon of the present, which gives it the space it needs to interpret and 
reinterpret the past. In fact, in Gadamer’s view one cannot accept tradition at all,
7 When the word ‘hermeneutics’ is used here it refers to the interpretation o f  the se lf  through texts or 
through history. The sense o f  the term is derived from H eidegger’s ‘hermeneutics o f  facticity’. This 
approach to both texts and history is based not on the way that the world belongs to a human subject, 
but on the way in which the human subject belongs to the world. So basic is the process that it is not so 
much one thing among others which one does but that process in which and through which one exists 
as a human being. Cf. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 180ff.
sDe Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 32.
9 Ibid; cf. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 177ff. Ricoeur borrows his interpretation o f  history and o f  ‘historical 
consciousness’ from Gadamer and Heidegger. The critique o f  ‘historical consciousness’ in both 
Gadamer and Heidegger is primarily directed at the ‘historical school’ in Germany, whose most famous 
representatives in the nineteenth century were J.G. Droysen and L. von Ranke. These represented a 
group o f  thinkers who supported ‘romantic hermeneutics’, i.e., as an effort to attain an objective 
understanding o f  history. The task o f  the historian was to enter into the world o f  the past and give an 
accurate and objective account o f  it, Heidegger, Gadamer and later Ricoeur are among those who 
believe that the interpretation o f  histoiy must consider the present, and what it means to exist as 
historical being in the present, so that the past does not becom e a series o f  facts and dates.
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unless one is critical.10 For when we subject our notion of tradition to critical 
scrutiny, we gain a better understanding of our tradition and our convictions about the 
past become more authentic and credible. Consequently, Gadamer believes that an 
individual may possess ‘legitimate prejudices’.11 For these are the result of a critical 
engagement with the past in the interpreting present.
Gadamer’s view of history and tradition maybe compared to all that is involved in the 
interpretation of texts. In the process of interpretation the horizon of the text fuses 
with the horizon of the reader, which is another way of saying that the past and the 
present interact with each other permitting the presence of the past in the present, and 
vice versa. This is so because the act of reading takes place in the present; while the 
text itself was written before the reading process could take place. Even though 
historical texts configure events which occurred in the past, the present cannot be 
abandoned in order to go into the past; the meaning of a work cannot be seen solely in 
terms of itself.12 Hence, the Gadamerian understanding of history and tradition, 
whether configured in texts or considered in their own terms, is a dialectic between 
the horizon of the past and the present, where both are interconnected. Understanding 
as such is always functioning simultaneously in three modes of temporality: past, 
present and future.
10 Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blarney and John B. 
Thompson, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991, 280 (Note: Hereafter the 
abbreviation ‘ TA ’ w ill be used to refer to this work.); cf. Rod Coltman, The Language of Hermeneutics: 
Gadamer and Heidegger in Dialogue, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Dennis J. 
Schmidt (ed.), Albany: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1998, 34.
11 Ricoeur, TA, 278.
12 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 182.
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However, Gadamer’s understanding of history and the interpretation of texts as a 
dialectic between past and present was criticised by Jürgen Habermas, one of 
Ricoeur’s influential figures. While Habermas sees the value of Gadamer’s dialectic
approach to history, he argues that it should be accompanied by an element of critique
1 ^and suspicion.
5.1.2 Jurgen Habermas and the Hermeneutics o f Suspicion
According to Georges De Schrijver, Habermas cannot accept an account of history
that overlooks the fact that language is often be used as a source of power and
domination by various political groups who wish to promote their own cause.
Georges De Schrijver summarises Habermas’ objections in the following way:
Since factual history contains power and domination as its elements, it is 
likely to use a language differently from that worked out by some ethereal 
philosophical system focusing on the quiet process of value-transmission in 
the best of all worlds. History fleshed out in socio-economic facts takes full 
advantage of the language of manipulation, subjection, and deceit. The 
distorted rhetoric of politicians succeeds in throwing dust in people’s eyes, so 
as to attain recognition as the legal authorities, even among those whom they 
manage to keep in subjection. In the light of these legitimation methods, one 
should be on guard against the magic of philosophies which talk people into 
complying with the fundamental law of “harmonious fusion”. The “wise” 
philosopher speaking in defence of easy integration might on closer inspection 
prove to be the secret ally of the established authorities in power. They take 
advantage of the subdued who conform to their wishes.14
The element of suspicion in Habermas’ account o f history and tradition is clear.15
Tradition must be summoned to the tribunal of critique and suspicion in order to be
evaluated for its truth and authenticity. It needs to be unmasked and scrutinised so
13 See Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, London: Heinemann, 1972, 191-213.
14 De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 40.
15 Karl Otto-Apel, “Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening? An Attempt to Answer the Question o f  the 
Conditions o f  the Possibility o f  Valid Understanding,” in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Library o f  Living Philosophers Series, vol.24, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: 
Open Court, 1997, 81.
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that our understanding of tradition does not consist in accepting the ideologies of 
interest groups who are in power. For an authority may distort our vision of our past 
for its own political or ideological gain.16 This will ensure that our understanding of 
tradition does not involve accepting unhealthy or biased accounts of who we are or of
1 n
what we should become.
While Gadamer’s work helps in understanding the horizon of the past and that of the 
present in complementary terms, Flabermas introduces a critical element into this 
linguistic understanding of tradition. That both scholars make important points 
regarding our understanding of history is certain, which explains why Ricoeur 
chooses to combine both approaches. Ricoeur adopts Gadamer’s understanding of 
tradition and combines it with the hermeneutics of suspicion as explained by 
Habermas. This allows him to put forward a stronger argument than that of either 
Gadamer or Habermas for understanding history in the same way as literary texts, i.e., 
as a critical dialectic between past and present.
5.2 Paul Ricoeur: Continuity and Discontinuity in History
Following in the footsteps of Gadamer and Habermas, Ricoeur renounces the 
Hegelian claim to a ‘total mediation’ of history in the form of absolute knowledge. 
By this he means that history and its meaning are not mediated directly. Instead, he 
proposes that history be understood as ‘an open-ended, incomplete, imperfect 
mediation; namely, the network of interweaving perspectives of the expectation of the
16 Ricoeur, TA, 284.
17 Graeme Nicholson, “Answers to Critical Theory,” in Gadamer and Hermeneutics, Continental 
Philosophy IV, edited and with an introduction by Hugh J. Silverman, London: Routledge, 1991, 158.
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• 1 Rinto a totality where reason in history and its reality would coincide.’
Ricoeur rejects the idea that the past can be understood by simply analysing the past 
as past, i.e., as something accomplished, fixed and fossilised, and advocates an 
approach to history that considers it as something which has yet-to-be-made.19 In so
doing, Ricoeur intends to show how history may be understood as a dialectic—which
20takes place in the present—between the past and the future.
Similarly to Gadamer, Ricoeur is of the opinion that we are not only ‘affected-by-the- 
past,’21 but are also in the process of making it. His intention is to move our 
understanding of history from being a fa it accompli to being a dynamic process of 
interpretation, dialogue, critique and legitimation. Tradition is now to be understood
as an ongoing dialectic between our past which affects us and our hope and
22expectation of a future.
Thus, like Gadamer and Habermas, Ricoeur reverses the traditional way of examining 
the past as past and replaces it with a dialectical model. ‘The immediate benefit of 
this reversal of strategy [he argues] is that it gets rid of the most tenacious abstraction
18 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellaucr, Chicago and 
London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1988, 207.
19 Paul Ricoeur, “La crise: un phénomène spécifiquement moderne?” Revue de théologie et de 
philosophie 120(1988), 1-19.
20 Leonard Lawlor, “The Dialectical Unity o f  Hermeneutics: On Ricoeur and Gadamer,” in Gadamer 
and Hermeneutics, Continental Philosophy IV, edited and with and introduction by Hugh J. Silverman, 
London: Routledge, 1991, esp. 88ff.
21 Ricoeur, TNIII, 207.
22 Richard Kearney, “Between Tradition and Utopia: The Hermeneutical Problem o f  Myth,” in David 
Wood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1991, 
56.
future, the reception of the past, and the experience of the present, with no Aufhebung
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of the past as past. This abstraction is a result of forgetting the complex interplay of 
significations that takes place between our expectations directed towards the future 
and our interpretations oriented toward the past.’23 Ricoeur warns against looking at 
the past as a static phenomenon. He believes that as soon as we lose or choose to 
ignore our anchorage in the experiences of the past, history loses its direction and 
becomes tainted by the ideologies of the dominant political groups of our time.
In an article entitled ‘La crise: un phénomène spécifiquement moderne?’ Ricoeur 
adverts to the dangers of ignoring the effects of history on our decisions and on the 
way in which we interpret ourselves.24 He maintains that we cannot strive towards 
our ideals or goals without any reference to our past. Moreover, he argues that if we 
attempt to remove ourselves from our historical ties, our goals become empty and
25ideological. This is what he calls ‘schismatic negation’.
This emphasises the idea that history and tradition play a role in formulating the goals 
we set for ourselves in the future. Tradition, argues Ricoeur, makes our ideals more 
determinate and realistic. Moreover, if we can accept the suggestion that the 
orientation of our goals arises out of history, our understanding of history becomes 
less static and inhibiting. This is so because while it plays a role in telling us about
23 Ricoeur, 77V777, 208; cf. Alain Thomasset, Paul Ricoeur: Une poétique de la morale, Louvain:
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 1996, esp. 185-189.
24 Cf. Ricoeur, “La crise,” 1-19.
25 Ricoeur, 77VIII, 215. Here Ricoeur explains what he means by schismatic negation: ‘If the newness 
o f the Neuzeit was only perceived thanks to the growing difference between experience and 
expectations — in other words, if  the b elief in new times rests on expectations that distance themselves 
from all prior experience— then the tension between experience and expectation could only be 
recognized at the moment when its breaking point was already in sight. The idea o f  progress which 
still bound the past to a better future, one brought closer by the acceleration o f  history, tends to give 
way to the idea o f  utopia as soon as the hopes o f  humanity lose their anchorage in acquired experience 
and are projected into an unprecedented future. With such utopias, the tension becom es schism ’ (p. 
215).
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our history and ourselves, it does not imprison us but offers us a sound basis for 
formulating goals and expectations.
In fact, as Ricoeur tells us, if our ideals are not grounded in our understanding of the
Of*past, they forfeit the potential to solicit responsible commitment. Only by 
acknowledging the split character of history may we prevent our future goals from 
dissolving into an empty ‘dream-world’, and ground them in the history that precedes 
us.27 This ensures that our actions and goals are not detached from our history but are 
the result of a critical engagement with it.
Ricoeur’s interpretation of history could be seen as a struggle against the tendency to 
consider the past only from the angle of what is done, unchangeable and past. The 
aim is to reopen the past and revivify its unaccomplished and, perhaps, suppressed 
potentialities. It represents an attempt to prevent the future from becoming ideology 
ridden and to ensure that the past does not become a lifeless fossil, which has nothing 
to contribute to the present or the future. Interpreting history in this way will help to 
‘make our expectations more determinate and our experiences less so. For these 
[Ricoeur explains] are two faces of one and the same task, for only determinate 
expectations can have the retroactive effect on the past of revealing it as a living 
tradition. It is in this way that our critical meditation on the future calls for the 
complement of a similar meditation on the past.’28
26 Ricoeur, TNIII, 216ff.
27 Ibid.
28 Ricoeur, TN III, 216.
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None of this is to suggest that Ricoeur’s fusion of the horizon of the past with that of 
the present and the future is a naïve one. For he advises that we should also be critical 
about the way in which we interpret the past. As Richard Kearney explains, Ricoeur’s 
dialectical model of history preserves the idea we are historical beings, who possess a 
historical consciousness, while ‘at the same time taking full stock of the “decentering
• • • 29of the thinking subject” carried out by the hermeneutics of suspicion.’ That Ricoeur 
combines Gadamer’s and Habermas’ understanding of history is clear: he completes 
Gadamer’s attempt to understand history in a hermeneutical way with Habermas’ 
hermeneutics of suspicion.
Although it is clear that for Ricoeur tradition is essential if we are to interpret who we 
are in every age, and if we are to make responsible judgements about our future and 
the goals we set for ourselves, questions arise as to how one could make an apologia 
for tradition. If tradition must be questioned and reinterpreted time and time again so 
that it continues to answer the ‘Why?’ of who we are and what we should become, it 
becomes difficult to see how a tradition may be considered as orthodox in any sense. 
The issue may be put as follows: How can one be critical of a tradition and still claim 
to belong to an orthodox tradition? An elaboration of Ricoeur’s three categories of 
tradition is useful here.
29 Kearney, “Between Tradition and Utopia,” 58.
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5.3 Ricoeur’s Three Categories of Tradition
5.3.1 Traditionality
Ricoeur understands history in a triadic manner: (1) traditionality, (2) traditions, and 
(3) Tradition (with a capital T). The first category of tradition, traditionality, accounts 
for the fact that we are bom into history and are affected by it before we are in a 
position to critique it or judge it. History precedes us: the past judges us first before 
we judge it.
Furthermore, in line with the Gadamerian understanding of history, this category of 
tradition suggests that tradition is something transmitted to us from previous 
generations. This transmission, however, is not carried out in a lifeless way; rather, a 
process of mediation carries it out, i.e., ‘by the chain of interpretations and 
reinterpretations.’30 Traditionality is to be understood in the more general sense of a 
formal style which transmits the heritage of the past to us.31 This means that we 
should not interpret the past as a phenomenon that separates us from our ancestors and 
from what happened before we were bom. Instead, we should look at history as being 
the bearer of a rich heritage of experience and knowledge which it transmits to us in 
the present.32
Traditionality, then, is a dialectic between the effects of history upon us (which we 
passively experience) and our response to this history (which we are in control of and
30 Ricoeur, TN III, 220.
31 Kearney, “Between Tradition and Utopia,” 58.
32 Ricoeur, TN 111,221.
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actively operate).33 This first category of history invites us to consider that we are, 
first and foremost, heirs of our tradition.34 This is the case because human beings are 
historical, and they do not begin reasoning, thinking or, indeed, being who they are 
without any reference to the past or an already existing tradition.35 This point is 
significant, since it suggests that we cannot either completely abolish the past as an 
irrelevant consequence of our historical being or exclude it from discussions 
concerning our understanding of ourselves in the present.
5.3.1.1 Traditionality and  The In terpretation o f  L iterary  Texts
Ricoeur’s first category of history is similar to his understanding of literary texts in 
the sense that both may be described as the living transmission of our sedimented 
history. The implication here is that if one understands the phenomenon of tradition, 
one will also understand the functioning of narrative. For Ricoeur, the ‘constituting 
of a tradition...depends on the interaction between two factors, innovation and 
sedimentation.’36 He explains further that ‘[i]t is to sedimentation that we ascribe the 
models that constitute, after the fact, the typology of emplotment which allows us to 
order the history of literary genres; but we must not lose sight o f the fact that these
models do not constitute eternal essences but proceed from a sedimented history
37whose genesis has been obliterated. ’
33 Kearney, “Between Tradition and Utopia,” 58.
34 Ricoeur, TN III, 221.
35 Ibid.
36 Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” in David W ood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and 
Interpretation, Warwick Studies in Philosophy and Literature, London and N ew  York: Routledge,
1991,24.
37 Ibid.
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When stories or narratives are constructed, we can normally say that they belong to a 
certain genre or history of literary genre. The history of human action is recorded in 
texts, which ensures that certain events or stories leave a trace or a mark and become 
the documents of human action. Ricoeur understands history itself as the record of 
human action. Texts record history and allow us to retain something which happened 
in the past and revise it in the present. In this sense, argues Ricoeur, texts act as 
‘archives.’38 Furthermore, ‘Thanks to this sedimentation in social time, human deeds 
become ‘institutions’, in the sense that their meaning no longer coincides with the 
logical intentions of the actors. The meaning may be “depsychologized” to the point 
where the meaning resides in the work itself.’39 In turn, we can categorise texts as 
belonging to a certain literary genre. However, the mere fact that we can categorise 
texts does not imply that the models are static and not open to change. This is where 
the idea of ‘innovation’ comes into play.
In Ricoeur’s view, the tenn sedimentation, when it refers to texts and history, takes 
into account the idea of innovation because the sedimented models themselves came 
out of an innovative idea. Thus, our understanding of sedimented narrative should not 
exclude the possibility of innovation or deviation from the standard genre. This is not 
to deny the ability of texts or of history to guide our reasoning and our interpretative 
capacity in the present. Rather, it is to indicate that tradition, be it literary or 
otherwise, must be interpreted in the present, and therefore must include the 
possibility of revising what was previously taught or reactivating elements of tradition 
that have been forgotten.
38 Ricoeur, TA, 154; cf. Ted Klein, “The Idea o f  a Hermeneutical Ethics,” in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), 
The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, The Library o f  Living Philosophers Series, vol. 22, Chicago and La 
Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995, 349-366, esp. 356-358.
39 Ricoeur, TA, 154.
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One only has to look at trends in the area of biblical scholarship to see that the 
interpretation of texts is constantly changing from one paradigm to another. The rules 
of genre change when a new innovative idea exerts its influence, which explains why 
Ricoeur can legitimately consider human action, texts, history and tradition 
considered as ‘open works.’40
The same could be said about fundamental moral theology. Very often, traditional 
moral rules and principles need to be reinterpreted in light of new circumstances or 
contexts, which arise in the present, so that the rules remain relevant in an evolving 
society. Thus we can agree with Ricoeur that, similarly to texts, human action is an 
open work, the meaning of which is ‘in suspense,’ because it ‘opens up’ new 
references and receives fresh relevance from them, that human deeds are also waiting 
for fresh interpretations that decide their meaning. 41 Put briefly, it can be said that 
insofar as texts, history and tradition recount the past or provide us with ‘archives’ of 
the past, they are not fixed entities; they are open to present praxis.42
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that although tradition needs 
reinterpretation to ensure that it is protected from total degeneration and continues to 
answer to today’s world, changing traditional values or perspectives takes time. As
40 Ricoeur, TA, 155; for an interesting account o f  how Ricoeur’s work succeeds in keeping language, 
history and meaning ‘open’, as it were, see Hans H. Rudnick, “Naive and Sentimental Hermeneutics: 
Keeping Language Open,” in Halm (ed.), The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, vol. 22, 1995, 140-144.
41 Ricoeur, TA, 155; cf. Clark, Paul Ricoeur, 115-119.
42 Ricoeur, TA, 155; a discussion o f  the interplay between innovation and sedimentation may be found 
in Ricoeur, 77V/, 68-69, 77-79, 166-208.
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Ricoeur tells us, while the idea of sedimentation allows for change, the rules of 
narrative modes do not change quickly; in fact, some even resist change.43
This can be clearly seen when we examine Ricoeur’s dialectic of sedimentation and 
innovation in narrative texts. While the meaning of a given text is contained in the 
text (sedimentation), the act of writing the text in the first place was possibly due to 
an innovation on behalf of the writer/author. But this is not to say that the meaning of 
a given text is set in stone, never to be changed in spite of new interpretative methods. 
On the contrary, texts which are classified as being of a particular genre, for example, 
can give rise to new ways of writing or to new genres, which act as a critique of what 
was previously considered to be typical of a genre.
What is important here is that the new genre or new innovation is the product of the 
old one. Hence the force of what Ricoeur calls innovation does not come from 
nowhere; it grows out of an already existing or sedimented genre or tradition. In this 
way, tradition includes the possibility of deviance from the standard way of thinking, 
seeing or interpreting something, while deviations are constituted by what has gone 
before them, i.e., tradition. ‘The variations between these poles gives the productive 
imagination its own historicity and keeps the narrative tradition a living one.’44
If Ricoeur is right, what keeps any tradition alive, be it narrative or otherwise, is the 
interplay between sedimentation and innovation. To ensure that a tradition remains 
living, one has to allow for deviation from the standard genres. Ricoeur’s first 
category of tradition, which he terms traditionality, signifies that ‘the temporal
43 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 25.
44 Ibid.
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distance separating us from that past is not a dead interval but a transmission that is 
generative of meaning. Before being an inert deposit, tradition is an operation that 
can only make sense dialectically through the exchange between the interpreted past 
and the interpreting present.’45 This brings us to Ricoeur’s second category of 
tradition, which he terms ‘traditions’. There is a move from the formal concept of 
tradition (traditionality) to the material contents of a tradition,46 which is necessitated 
by the activity of interpretation.
5.3.2 Ricoeur’s Second Category of Tradition: Traditions
Whereas ‘traditionality’ is a formal concept referring to the historical transmission of 
meaning, the category of ‘traditions’ refers to the contents of a tradition. It is at this 
level that we truly become heirs of our tradition. In the struggle for meaning and 
understanding in our lives, we find ourselves accepting what tradition has to offer 
rather than attempting to create meaning ex nihilo.
Here the consciousness of being exposed to the past becomes supplemented by our 
interpretive response to texts, stories, symbols and truths communicated to us by our 
tradition. And we find ourselves responding to our tradition and grappling with what 
it proposes to us. In this way, we can say that we truly belong to a tradition, because 
we accept to take what it proposes as a basis or a starting point for interpreting our 
lives.47 Moreover, we can agree with Ricoeur that ‘[t]he notion of tradition, taken in
45 Ricoeur, TN III, 221.
46 Cf. Ricoeur, TN I, 68-70; see also Charles E. Regan and David Steward (eds.), The Philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of his Work, Boston: Beacon Press, 1978, 162-166.
47 Ricoeur, TNI, 68-70.
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the sense of traditions, signifies that we are never in a position of being absolute
48innovators, but rather are always first of all in the situation of being heirs.’
Nonetheless, our consciousness of being exposed to the past and its effects must be 
coupled with our interpretative response. We must interpret what our tradition is 
proposing to us. For instance, just as the texts of our tradition question us about who 
we are, so we must question the texts of our past. This is no less the case when we 
attempt to interpret the past: just as the past questions us, so we must question the 
past. The past and its meaning exist in a dialectical tension with the interpreting 
present. Various proposals of truth and meaning are put forward in this category of 
tradition, and the struggle between past and present proceeds in the same way as an 
exegete struggles with a literary text. The text proposes several possible meanings to 
the exegete. In turn, the exegete interrogates the text and proposes several possible 
interpretations. In this sense, text and reader are in a constant state o f being made 
familiar and unfamiliar.49
In brief, it could be said that Ricoeur’s second category of tradition, i.e., traditions, 
conceives of the past in terms of several proposals of meanings. The past proposes 
certain meanings and truths to us, and we propose new possible meanings of what this 
past might mean in the present so that tradition remains alive, responsive and relevant 
in the present. This brings us to the third and final Ricoeurian category of tradition: 
Tradition (with a capital T).
48 Paul Ricoeur, TN III, 221.
49 Ibid., 222.
175
5.3.3 Ricoeur’s Third Category o f Tradition: Tradition (with a capital T)
The confrontation between the past and the present or, to use Ricoeur’s terminology, 
the confrontation between the ‘so-called hermeneutic of traditions and the critique of 
ideologies.. .results from a shift from the consideration of traditions to an apology for 
tradition.’50
This shift is necessitated by the activity of critical interpretation and brings us to 
Ricoeur’s third category of tradition: Tradition (with a capital T). Although tradition 
binds us to things already said in the past and proposes certain truths to us, it must be 
critically interpreted. Critical interpretation allows us to question the truths of 
tradition and revise them if necessary. In this category, therefore, we must interrogate 
and raise suspicions about tradition. Taking a step back from tradition—a movement 
known as distanciation—and critically examining the truths it proposes allows us to 
make an apologia for tradition.
That Ricoeur is proposing a hermeneutical approach to tradition is clear. The 
hermeneutical approach allows us to ‘sift through the dead traditions in which we no 
longer recognize ourselves.’51 Distancing ourselves from tradition, critically 
accessing it, and proposing several possible meanings of tradition in the present 
(traditions) allows us to make a legitimate defence of tradition. Calling into the 
question the received wisdom of the past and engaging the hermeneutics of suspicion 
guarantees the existence of a more authentic and orthodox version of the truth.
50 Ricoeur, TNIII, 222.
51 Ricoeur, TN III, 224; cf. Joseph Dunne, “Beyond Sovereignty and Deconstruction: The Storied Self,” 
in Richard Kearney (ed.), Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action, London: Sage Publications,
1996, 137-158.
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Literary texts may be understood in the same way. The critical interaction between 
the text and the reader allows various possible meanings to emerge (traditions). 
Subsequently, these proposed meanings are submitted to the tribunal of reason and 
suspicion, and are taken as legitimate claims to truth so long as a stronger reason, that 
is, a better argument, has not been established.'
In summary then, Ricoeur’s three categories of tradition, i.e., traditionality, traditions
and Tradition, may be mapped out in the following way:
Traditionality designates a formal style of interconnectedness that assures the 
continuity of the reception of the past. In this respect, it designates the 
reciprocity between effective-history and our being-affected-by-the-past. 
Traditions consist of transmitted contents insofar as they are bearers of 
meaning; they set every received heritage within the order of the symbolic 
and, virtually, within a language-like and textual tradition; in this regard, 
traditions are proposals of meaning. Tradition, as an instance of legitimacy, 
designates the claim to truth (the taking-for-true) offered argumentation within 
the public space of discussion. In the face of criticism that devours itself, the 
truth claim of the contents of traditions merits being taken as a presumption of 
truth, so long as a stronger reason, that is, a better argument, has not been 
established.53
This brings us back to the question posed earlier: Can one adopt a hermeneutical 
approach to tradition without undermining its orthodoxy? According to Ricoeur, the 
answer is yes. Texts and traditions should be understood as the critical dialectic 
between past and present, text and reader. All traditions, be they literary or otherwise, 
demand critique and reinterpretation so that they remain alive and responsive to who 
we are in today’s world.
We must remember, however, that we are not the originators of truth or history; we 
are bom into a context of ‘presumed truth’. Truths and traditions are passed on to us.
52 Ricoeur, TN III, 227; cf. Regan and Stewart (eds.), The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ló lf f .
53 Ricoeur, TN III, 227.
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We become the heirs of our tradition. The same applies to literary texts. In texts we 
find a trace of history which we have not made ourselves but which has been passed 
on to us by successive generations. In this way, any attempt to understand ourselves, 
our narratives, or our tradition must begin by an acknowledgement that meaning is 
derived out of a process of receiving as well as giving. Tradition questions us as 
much as we question tradition.
Hence it can be said that there exists a certain orthodoxy about our past that we have 
not created or written. To prevent our notion of the past from becoming some kind of 
naive nostalgia for the past, as was typical of the Romantic period, the truths and texts 
of our past require critical interpretation so that our understanding of ourselves 
remains a true interpretation of who we are. Praxis is necessary so that the past 
remains alive in the present, and the present is grounded in the past. Without praxis, 
we run the risk of either creating a new tradition or inhibiting the already-existing 
tradition.
Thus praxis and orthodoxy go hand in hand. The fonner conditions the latter, and 
vice versa. Praxis and critical interpretation ‘liberate the still untapped potentialities 
of inherited meaning,’54 and ensure that our understanding of our past and ourselves 
remains authentic and true, This is what Ricoeur terms innovation. In turn, the 
orthodoxy of the past guarantees that our understanding of ourselves today is 
grounded in the history of our tradition and prevents the innovative forces of critique 
and reason from creating a new tradition of its own.
54 Keamey, “Between Tradition and Utopia,” 63.
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In short, criticism of tradition or texts leads to legitimation, and praxis keeps the 
orthodoxy of the past alive in the present and allows us to discriminate between true 
and false interpretations of the past. Moreover, orthodoxy safeguards the received 
wisdom of the past until such times as praxis and critical hermeneutics find a better 
argument. Therefore, praxis and orthodoxy co-exist and mutually condition each 
other so that the texts and the received wisdom of our past stay alive in the present 
and help to further reinforce ‘the community’s consciousness of its identity, its 
narrative identity, as well as the identity of its members.’55
5.4 Ricoeurian Tradition and the Christian Proprium  Debate
Returning to our discussion of the Christian proprium  debate, we can now suggest 
various ways in which Ricoeur’s work can help proponents of the Glaubensethik and 
Autonomy stances to move beyond the tensions regarding the role of tradition and the 
Magisterium in Christian morality. We will begin by relating Ricoeur’s three 
categories of tradition more closely to the Christian tradition and to the search for 
moral truth.
The first category, traditionality, indicates that the search for truth takes places in a 
context of ‘presumed truth’. It makes sense to speak of the Christian tradition in such 
terms, since the Christian community represents a place where moral values are 
transmitted to successive generations. But this first category of tradition also refers to 
the handing on of the ways in which a tradition rehearses its identity. Hence, we can 
speak of stories, rituals and practices of a community being passed on to us from our
55 Ricoeur, TN III, 187; for a recent summary o f  Ricoeur’s views on the necessity o f  an open-ended 
interpretation o f  history and tradition, see Christian Delacroix, “D e quelques usages historiens de P. 
Ricoeur,” in Bertrand Miiller, L 'Histoire entre mémoire et épistemologie: Autour de Paul Ricoeur, 
France: Éditions Payot Lausanne, 2005, 99-123.
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tradition. For Christians, reading and interpreting the story of Jesus, reflecting on the 
symbols of faith, engaging in practices of worship, prayer and the Eucharist, for 
example, are ways of keeping the tradition alive, which they have not invented but 
inherited. The process of ‘handing on’ the already-established rituals and stories 
ensures that the Christian community does not lose its sense of identity and that its 
future is grounded in the past, a past that arises out of the story of Jesus Christ.56
Ricoeur’s second category of tradition, traditions, refers to the actual reception of the 
past. It is within this category that one’s sense of identity is communicated and 
beliefs about one’s tradition are proposed to, and accepted by, us. In terms of the 
Christian tradition, it could be argued that it is within this category that Christians 
gain a better understanding of their faith and of the moral expectations of their 
community. This is not to say that the reception of tradition is an easy task. 
Questions are also asked about the meaning of the Christian narrative and its 
significance for the Christian living in today’s world. The question of legitimacy, 
however, is only introduced after engaging in a hermeneutics of suspicion.
This may be compared to Ricoeur’s third category of tradition: Tradition (with a 
capital T). It involves questioning all that has been inherited and given by one’s 
tradition. It is at this stage, for instance, that Christians might begin to question 
magisterial pronouncements or the validity of certain moral norms. The need for 
change in the tradition may be expressed in this category; issues of social justice, 
inequality and exclusion, for instance, may be discussed and critically analysed.
5b For an interesting discussion on the transmission o f  the biblical texts as perceived by Ricoeur, see 
Louis Fèvre, Penser avec Ricoeur: Introduction à la pensée et à l ’action de Paul Ricoeur, Lyon: 
Chronique Sociale, 2003, 117-120.
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But this is not to say that criticism of one’s tradition undermines it in any way. In 
fact, if Ricoeur is right, questioning one’s tradition leads to a more authentic and 
orthodox tradition. Moreover, since the criticisms raised about one’s tradition are the 
result of having accepted it in the first place (in the two former categories), it is 
unlikely that a new or unorthodox tradition will be created. Questioning a tradition is 
rooted in our horizon of experience and acceptance of that tradition, which ensures 
that tradition’s future remains grounded in its grand narratives, stories and beliefs 
without giving rise to an unconditional acceptance of them. Thus, to use Ricoeur’s 
words, ‘schismatic utopianism’ is avoided.57 This has implications for the 
Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate.
We have seen that proponents of the Glaubensethik view cannot accept the Autonomy 
school’s proposal to use the natural law and reason as the source of Christian morality 
out of a fear that it will undermine tradition and the Magisterium and make reason 
absolute.58 We have also seen that proponents of the ‘stronger form’ of the Faith- 
Ethic view are at one in the belief that the Christian tradition can give specifically 
Christian norms to its members. From the perspective o f the Autonomy school, 
however, the issues are slightly different. Its supporters fear that the Glaubensethik 
school’s position were adopted, it would lead to a ‘ghetto’ mentality within the 
Christian tradition, and make it impossible to engage in inter-religious dialogue.59
57 Ricoeur, TNIII, 215.
58 See MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 43; cf. Philippe Delhaye, “La spécificité de la morale 
chrétienne,” RTL 4 (1973), 314ff. Delhaye argues that Josef Fuchs’ autonomy thesis triggers a denial 
o f  Christ as the giver o f  moral norms and a disrespect for the Magisterium’s authority to teach on moral 
matters.
59 MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 38.
181
The dynamic between the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools may be likened to 
the first two Ricoeurian categories of tradition. The Glaubensethik school wishes to 
emphasise the formal contents of the Christian tradition in terms of specifically 
Christian norms and principles (traditionality), while the Autonomy school is anxious 
to show that the content of morality is discoverable by reason and the natural law, 
informed by the Christian vision and story (traditions). Neither school intends to 
undermine tradition; each appears to be defending two important aspects of the 
Ricoeurian dialectic of tradition.
Thus both schools have it right. The Glaubensethik school is right to assert that the 
Christian tradition gives norms and values to its members. It does. Being a part of a 
tradition means that we are situated in a context of already-established truths to which 
we can refer when making moral choices (traditionality). However, as Ricoeur 
asserts, truth is not mediated to us directly; the discovery of truth is a process , not a 
given. This is another way of saying that truth involves a search. Furthermore, the 
truths of tradition are universal, which means that although they may be mediated in a 
particular context, they are discoverable by other traditions. The Autonomy school 
argues rightly, therefore, that reason and the natural law are the basis upon which 
Christian moral truth is attained. The search for Christian moral truth, then, may be 
understood as a dialectic between what tradition proposes as true and what the natural 
law demands of us in light of our contemporary experience.
It is important to remember, however, that the way in which we reason about our 
tradition is already conditioned by it and is the result of having already accepted it. 
This must change the way in which one views natural law. For it locates the natural
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law at the heart of the Christian tradition and in an acceptance of what the Christian 
tradition proposes as true. In this respect, that natural law is seen as something which 
is already informed by the Christian vision, stories, and practices. It is unlikely, 
therefore, that any natural law approach to Christian morality will undermine 
tradition, or suggest ways of living that go against the central telos of the Church.60
In short, then, Ricoeur’s dialectical approach to tradition indicates that the respective 
stances taken by proponents of the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools vis-à-vis 
tradition may be seen in complementary terms. They are two sides of the same coin. 
Ricoeur’s approach to tradition does not favour one school of thought over the other, 
but seems to provide some necessary clarifications as to what is at stake when we 
claim to be a part of a tradition and take it as our moral starting point. However, as 
long as the Christian proprium  debate remains focused on the search for specifically 
Christian norms and values, the Christian tradition may be deprived of the kind of 
enrichment it might otherwise receive if the search for truth were understood in terms 
of a Ricoeurian dialectic.
5.5 The Need for a Magisterium
Of course, the question still remains as to whether Ricoeur’s interpretation of tradition 
allows for a Magisterium. Although Ricoeur does not discuss the Magisterium in his 
work, we can make some suggestions as to where it might be placed based on what 
has been argued here already. Recall what was said in the previous chapters. A 
Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate asserts that what is specific 
about Christian morality is the particular way in which Christians interpret themselves
60 For an account o f the criticisms made against the Autonomy school regarding a natural law  approach 
to Christian morality, see MacNamara, Faith and Ethics, 54.
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and their moral actions, that is, through the Christian story. However, if the Christian 
story is not protected, it becomes susceptible to misinterpretation. Thus one could say 
that the Magisterium is necessary to protect the Christian story from the kind of 
distortion that arises out of a fundamentalist reading of the biblical texts.
Moreover, in a dialectical approach to tradition one has to acknowledge that we are 
bom into a context of ‘presumed truth’. This means that truth precedes us until such 
times as it no longer answers to the needs of contemporary society. The same may be 
said in terms of the Christian church: there are truths which have already been 
established by the Church concerning our identity and ways of living which are 
faithful to life in a messianic community. These truths, although available to those 
outside the Christian community, need to be protected until such times as a better 
argument is found which demands that they be changed. This suggests that a 
Magisterium is absolutely necessary in a Ricoeurian approach to tradition, as it will 
ensure that the goals of the Christian life are rooted in the Christian heritage, not 
based on a narcissistic desire for self-fulfilment or superiority.
A further way which highlights the necessity of a Magisterium in a Ricoeurian 
approach to the Christian proprium  debate concerns the role of practices in the 
acquisition of virtue. As pointed out in earlier chapters, practices serve to remind the 
faithful of their identity and shape character. They play a vital role in a morality of 
virtue rather than mle.
In its role as protector of the faith, the Magisterium can ensure that the practices of the 
Christian community are not lost but continue to sustain the Christian faithful in the
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ongoing search for truth and understanding. As De Schrijver points out, ‘An 
organized religion cannot survive if it fails to keep alive its ‘common memory’ by 
means of rituals, religious customs, catechetics, liturgical and [though not specific to 
the Christian community] moral preaching, prayers, etc.... Indeed, it is imperative for 
a congregation to engage periodically in the rehearsal of its past salvation history, for 
this rehearsal is of such a nature that it bears upon the ‘basic trust’ looked for in 
religion.’61
None of this, however, is to suggest that magisterial role in a Ricoeurian approach to 
the Christian proprium  debate is confined to the protection of the Christian story, 
already-established truths and Christian practices. For the Ricoeurian understanding 
of tradition makes reference to Habermas’ theory of ‘communication free from 
domination’. This means that the Magisterium is also called to stand before the 
tribunal of critique and reason so that its functioning remains responsive to the needs 
and demands of the Christian community in a secularised society.
Hence it could be argued that a dialectic approach to the magisterial authority, based 
on Ricoeur’s interpretation of tradition, expects the Magisterium to provide well- 
reasoned answers and explanations for issuing this or that set of pastoral or 
theological directives. The advantage of this kind of approach to tradition is that the 
Magisterium is called to engage in open dialogue with the Church and its members. 
For the faithful should know why they are required to accept the magisterial 
pronouncements which pertain to their identity as Christian or their conduct as 
members of the human community. As De Schrijver notes,
61 De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 42.
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If those reasons are suppressed, the suspicion arises that the Magisterium, just 
like other lobbying officials in secular life, seek to conceal their true intentions 
so as to strengthen their ‘traditionally’ untouchable power position. Especially 
those who have been trained in the socio-critical school, Church officials 
cannot escape being put to the test, just like any other power group, to see 
whether or not they are giving their support to some influential political or 
financial group in society.62
A Ricoeurian approach to the Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate, then, does not
exclude the need for a magisterial teaching authority. In fact, it asserts that a
Magisterium is necessary to protect the Christian heritage from misinterpretation and
misuse. Consequently, it seems to satisfy the concerns of the Faith-Ethic ethic school
regarding the need to protect the orthodoxy of the Christian tradition. Indeed,
Ricoeur’s interpretation of tradition seems also to satisfy the concerns of the
Autonomy school, since it asserts not only that all are united in the common search
for truth, but also that one must be critical about one’s tradition in order to avoid
falling into a sectarian and insular Church.
In short, Ricoeur’s interpretation of tradition combines orthodoxy with orthopraxis 
and gives us a broader understanding of tradition and Magisterium. His account of 
tradition allows him to play the role of mediator between the concerns of 
Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools regarding tradition: he can account for the need 
to have and to defend the Christian tradition, and to dialogue with the rest of God’s 
creation about the content of morality, without suggesting that one is more important 
that the other. Ricoeur’s genius lies in his ability to offer us an assiduously balanced 
account of history and tradition, which may be used to discuss and shed new light 
upon the issues arising out of the Christian proprium  debate; orthodoxy is as 
important as orthopraxis; protecting a tradition and its practices is as important as
62 De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 46.
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being critical of them; the role of the reader is as important as the role of text, etc. All 
coexist in a dialectical relationship.
In this way, a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate invites us to 
reconsider some of the divisions between the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools in 
terms of a necessary dialectic, instead of an unnecessary division. Of course, this will 
only be possible if one can agree with Ricoeur’s belief that what is specific about 
Christian morality is that it is considered (not given) through the lens of the Christian 
story. Then we might be able to proceed to understanding tradition in dialectical 
terms. Until such times, however, perhaps all one can do is hope.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE LIMITS OF CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE
It has been argued here that the work of Paul Ricoeur can help to change the way in 
which the question of the distinctiveness of Christian morality question has hitherto 
been interpreted. His work invites us to consider biblical revelation in such a way that 
we are not looking to it merely for moral norms. In so doing, Ricoeur succeeds in 
demonstrating that the Bible represents a space in which believers can interpret 
themselves and develop the kind of character traits necessary for a life of virtue. That 
Ricoeur’s work situates narrative at the heart of Christian morality is clear.
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that narrative has its limitations. The misuse of 
story can lead to sectarianism,1 and to the exclusion of minority groups whose 
individual narratives differ from the dominant narrative of a particular community. In 
fact, it is often said that the traditional understanding of story does not account for all
1 This is true when the Christian narrative becomes preoccupied with itself, becomes tribal, and is 
considered only to be available to a small minority o f  people. In addition, Christian theology becomes 
more concerned with maintaining a fidelity to the Christian narratives than with providing external 
justification for maintaining that fidelity. Cf. Terrence P. Reynolds, “A  Conversation Worth Having,” 
JRE  28/3 (2000), [Academic Search Premier Database], 1-19. (21/06/2004).
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domains of human life, that it is exclusionary,2 and that it overemphasises the role of 
the plot—thus presuming that every story results in the triumph of order over chaos 
and good over evil.3
This chapter will discuss some of the possible objections to, and criticisms of, a 
narrative approach to Christian morality. It will begin by highlighting the limits of 
the narrative structure as a medium through which human beings gain a better 
understanding of themselves and of their identity. Then it will ask whether the 
interpretation of the self through the medium of texts is a solitary or communal 
venture, and whether one can justify using the narrative structure to explain human 
existence.
The chapter will also examine the limitations of using Ricoeur’s identity theory as a 
way of mediating the impasse between the Faith-Ethic and Autonomy schools, as well 
as raising some general concerns about placing virtue ethics at the heart of Christian 
moral living. These concerns will appear in the form of two questions: a) Where does 
the concept of obligation come into a Ricoeurian approach to Christian ethics? and b) 
Does this approach favour a Greek understanding of virtue, in which case it might be 
thought to promote a culture of violence rather than peace? The chapter will conclude
2 There may exist a gap between the story o f  a community and the narrative o f  an individual’s life. It 
must be remembered that it is often difficult to see one’s own story in the larger story o f  one’s tradition 
or community. This is particularly true o f  the role o f  women in the Bible, for instance. In addition, 
there may be times in the course o f  a person’s life, or in some cases a person’s entire life, when he/she 
has practical difficulties identifying with alien situations and characters, i.e., a m otiveless priest and 
Levite, a senseless prejudice against improvident virgins, etc. This is the case because o f  the distance 
which separates the reader from the text itself; the reader may not be in a position to relate to the 
episodes presented to him/her by the text. Likewise, it could be said that stories give us a false sense o f  
security because they sometimes tend to avoid presenting us with a disturbing account o f  life, one 
which bears witness to the ‘m ess’ all around us in which people are trapped in lives o f  hopelessness.
See Richard Lischer, “The Limits o f  Story,” Interpretation 38/1 (1984), [ATLA Religion Database],
3Off. (07/03/02).
3 Lischer, “The Limits o f  Story,” 30.
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by asking two more general questions: a) whether Ricoeur’s emphasis on the role of 
the imagination undermines the truth of the biblical texts; and b) whether using his 
work in the context of Christian ethics encourages a sectarian view of the Christian 
community.
6.1 Narrative and its Limitations
It is easy to assume that every story, whose plot assists in moving the story towards its 
end, has a resolution of one kind or another to which the reader can relate. This is the 
shape which Ricoeur gives to story, both fictional and non-fictional. Nevertheless, 
‘[s]uch a shape does not always reflect the way things are but mercifully—or 
arrogantly—imposes a pattern on the disorder and anarchy of life as it is.’4 While 
Ricoeur believes that the human person only understands his/her own existence 
through the interpretation of signs—personal and cultural— scattered in the world,5 
his theory seems to overlook two important points. First, signs and symbols, whether 
found in narrative or in life itself, are difficult to interpret; and second, not every story 
or life-story can be easily described in terms of a coherent beginning, middle and end.
Richard Lischer argues that many people, especially preachers, have assumed that, 
because of the apparent simplicity involved in storytelling, stories may be easily 
understood.6 Stories, however, come with built-in limitations. The first of these 
limitations has to do with the fact that a story is peculiar to its teller. Added to this is 
the difficulty the listener/reader may experience trying to identify with the principal
4 Lischer, “The Limits o f  Story,” 30.
5 Loretta Dornish, “Symbolic Systems and the Interpretation o f  Scripture: An Introduction to the Work 
o f Paul Ricoeur,” in Semeia: An Experimental Journal for Biblical Criticism 4 (1975), 7.
6 Lischer, “The Limits o f  Story,” 29. Here Lischer points out that any aesthetic object, including an 
‘artless’ story, com es with built-in limitations which make it difficult to understand.
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characters of a particular narrative. It is at this point in the reading process that the 
reader no longer recognises him/herself in the story, as he/she becomes aware that 
there exists a kind of dissonance—often explained using the metaphor of a veil— 
between the story and his/her personal story.7
Indeed, to many, telling stories may seem to be a more honest form of communication 
than other forms of communication, perhaps because it is a more straightforward 
mode of imparting history and wisdom; but we must not lose sight of the fact that the 
quest for authenticity and for self-understanding via texts is a difficult one. Very 
often, what begins as a search for truth about our past and our identity results in a 
thickening of the veil between the reader and the text, between the individual and 
his/her master story.
In addition, as mentioned above, the traditional description of story in terms of a plot, 
which helps the story to move through various episodes towards its end, can lead to 
the presumption that every aspect of an individual’s life may be interpreted and 
explained by story. It seems to suggest that resolution always follows chaos, and that 
any sorrow can be overcome if  a story can be told about it. Although stories can 
assist in the articulation of personal identity, and give us the coherence we need to 
live a balanced life, we must not overlook the fact that there are storyless places in our 
lives. Story can perform a comforting function, and give us a secure sense of who we
7 Cf. Zeiss Stange, “Treading the Narrative W ay Between Myth and Madness: M axine Hong Kong 
Kingston and Contemporary W om en’s Autobiography” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 3/1 
(2001), [ATLA Religion Database], l-5 ff. (18/06/2004).
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are, but sometimes life and narrative have more in common with Samuel Beckett’s 
Theatre of the Absurd than with Ricoeur’s unified self.8
Storyless places exist in our lives, on the face of it, ‘wherever episodic complications 
have stagnated and ceased to develop with any organic connection toward new 
episodes and new complications.’9 When this happens, life is perceived as proceeding 
in an episodic way. But the episodes are not connected, for they either lack the 
coherent unity we have come to expect from life and from stories about life, or 
proceed as a series of individual sketches typical of a cabaret show. 10 Indeed, as 
Lischer points out, an objective thread of identity may persist, but to those caught in 
this kind of life the T  previously known by them has become a stranger. In order to 
make sense of such a life, the individual will have to move away from casting his/her 
life into ‘acts’ and rationalising its plot, and attempt to rediscover the continuity of 
identity throughout the confusion of broken plots.11
If one accepts the idea that the Christian tradition tells us more about who we are than 
what we should do, consideration must be given to the storyless places in the life of 
the Christian believer. Christians often question their faith, their identity as Christians 
and their relationship with God. We lose our way in the search for truth. Sometimes
8 The implication here is that story often resembles parataxis, i.e., placing episodes side by side, rather 
than syntaxis, i.e., tying episodes together to form a cohesive story. It is interesting to note, however, 
that some scholars maintain that, by offering exaggerated accounts o f  broken identity, motion pictures 
can help Christians to construct a responsible, ethical self. Cf. Glenn Whitehouse, “Unimaginable 
Variations: Christian Responsibility in the Cinema o f  Broken Identity,” L T 18/3 (2004), 321-350.
9 Lischer, “The Limits o f  Story,” 31.
10 In the former case life proceeds as if  it were a collection o f  unrelated short stories written by 
different authors. In the latter case, however, life proceeds by a series o f  ‘slices’ or ‘snippets’, even 
though all o f  the snippets are part o f  one show which may have been written by one person.
11 Lischer, “The Limits o f  Story,” 31.
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we lose failh and give up hope of ever finding the truth. On other occasions, we 
succumb to the temptation of evil. We also experience suffering, which can alienate 
us from ourselves and from the Christian story. Therefore, we must not presume that 
our story always gives us a sense of belonging, or that it can be considered as a safe 
place where we can take refuge.
6.2 An Egalitarian Approach to Narrative
Moreover, we must be mindful of some particular difficulties involved in trying to 
attain a coherent understanding of what it means to be a Christian from the texts of the 
biblical canon. The biblical texts are culture-bound, and can be criticised for, among 
other things, their androcentric vision of the world and of the self. It can be difficult, 
therefore, for women to gain the unified sense of self, which Ricoeur claims is 
provided by the interpretation of signs and symbols contained not only in texts but 
also in the wider context of community and culture. If story is the raw material of the 
Christian life, we must ensure that it does not become oppressive, and that it continues 
to operate as an inclusive Gospel, giving life and a sense of belonging to the faithful, 
whether male or female.
Writing about autobiographical narrative, Mary Zeiss Stange contends that men and 
women envision the unified self or ‘me’, who we all strive to become, differently.12 
Zeiss Stange explains that this difference is embedded in sociological realities: 
traditionally women were denied the opportunity to participate in life in the same way 
as their male counterparts. The result of this sociological fact is that, when they 
attempt to interpret and search for the unified self through reading the texts of their
12 Zeiss Stange, “Treading the Narrative Way,” 2.
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tradition, women often find themselves alienated, for they fail to find their gender 
represented in the narrative.
Indeed, in patriarchal society the distinguishing feature between men and women was 
that men were expected to strive to attain their identities, while women had their 
identities imposed upon them.13 The task of becoming oneself was altogether more 
straightforward for men than for women: men strove to become themselves and 
women strove to become what society expected them to become.
An egalitarian approach to narrative is imperative,14 so that both men and women are 
included in the quest for self-understanding through the texts of the biblical canon. If 
the Bible is to be understood as the archive of a unique Christian identity, then we 
must ensure that our interpretation of this identity is representative of both sexes. The 
interpretation of the Christian story should not equate authentic Christian identity with 
subordination. In fact, the model of the Trinity should act as a source of inspiration in 
the quest for equality and integration. Throughout the Gospels, the Son is obedient to 
the Father through the power of the Spirit, yet Father, Son, and Spirit are equal, united 
as one God. By the same token, Christians must learn to mirror the Trinity as they
13 Zeiss Stange, “Treading the Narrative W ay,” 2; for an interesting account o f  how gender affects our 
understanding o f  ourselves, see Susan Frank Parsons, “To Be or N ot to Be: Gender and Ontology,”
7 7 //4 5 /3  (2004), 327-348.
14 See Anne Patrick, “Narrative and the Social Dynamics o f  Virtue,” Concilium 191 (1987), 69-80, esp. 
71-74. According to Patrick, we must strive to attain an egalitarian paradigm o f  narrative, character 
and virtue. Rather than understanding power as control over persons, this paradigm operates with a 
sense o f  power driven by proper relatedness. For a similar discussion on gender and morality, see Brad 
J. Kallenberg, “Positioning MacIntyre within Christian Ethics,” in Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg 
& Mark Thiessen Nation (eds.), Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics 
After MacIntyre, 2nd edn., Notre Dame: University o f  Notr e Dame Press, 1995, 45-81, esp. 49-51. The 
crucial point here is that ‘morality’ becomes immoral when it ignores other voices or opinions; no 
voice should be denied the right to speak.
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seek to attain an authentic understanding of their special identity, for it is the perfect 
example of unity in difference.15
This acceptance of unity in difference can also assist fellow believers when they lose 
their way on the path of the Christian life, for it asserts that, while all are different, 
and may be at different stages in the life of faith, we are all one in Christ. This means 
that even though it is difficult to attain a unified sense of self, and to be confident that 
one has grasped the meaning of Christian identity, we are never alone in the quest for 
authentic identity; we are companions on the journey.
6.3 Reading Narrative: An Embodied Experience
The idea of being companions on the journey is also an important metaphor for 
understanding the process of reading as a socially embodied activity. Another 
possible concern that may arise from the claim that the Bible is identity-constitutive is 
that the reading process will be interpreted as a solitary experience, that is, as an 
activity of the mind and memory, not of the body or of the community. Although 
liturgical celebrations demand that Scripture be read in public, believers often read the 
sacred texts of the Bible alone, which might imply that the interpretation of the self is 
a solitary venture, carried out in isolation from the community. Applied to the 
Christian proprium  debate, this view of reading runs the risk of promoting the false
15 Cf. Scott Bader-Saye, “Listening: Authority and Obedience,” in Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells 
(eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004, 164. 
Bader-Saye suggests that biblical authority should be understood in a Trinitarian way, i.e., by 
respecting difference in unity. In m y view, this understanding o f  the Trinity may also be used to make 
the point that, although different, male and female are one in Christ. (Saint Paul’s letter to the Romans 
(7.1-6) seems to add weight to the idea o f  being one in Christ, for it asserts that Christians are freed 
from the constraints o f  the old law to become one in Christ.) In addition, the equality among the 
persons o f  the Trinity highlights the fact that all persons are the same. By the same token, the male 
understanding o f the unified se lf should not be considered as superior to the female, and vice versa.
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idea that the Ricoeurian self can be whatever we want it to be. It seems also to 
suggest that human beings have absolute self-determination.
According to Jim Fodor, reading need not be understood in this way. For reading 
does not simply involve extracting meaning or content from Scripture by means of a 
process which ignores the role played by the body; it is a bodily activity and is 
therefore social and communal. 16 Reading is more than the movement of one’s eye 
across a page; it is embodied. We are enmeshed in social relations and community 
before we learn to read at all. When we develop the capacity to read and interpret 
texts, especially those of the Bible, we realise that our ability to understand is already 
embodied in the believing community. Hence, the reading process, whether carried 
out alone or in liturgical settings, is unavoidably communal.
Indeed, as Fodor explains, the relationship between text and reader is similar to that of 
yeast and dough: ‘By being read, Scriptures work themselves into the lives of the 
faithful just as yeast is kneaded into dough.’17 This means that the interpretation of 
the self through the Scriptures is less about what the reader expects to be told about 
their identity and more about how we relate to the Scriptures, how we allow ourselves 
to be informed and transformed by them. The biblical texts do not hold meaning
16 Jim Fodor, “Reading the Scriptures: Rehearsing Identity, Practicing Character,” in Hauerwas et al. 
(eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, 2004, 149.
17 Ibid.
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similarly to the way in which bottles hold water. Nor do readers possess the sense of
1 8Scripture in the way a landlord owns property.
Instead, readers relate to the Scriptures in the way a musician relates to a score, or an 
actor to a script, or a cartographer to a map.19 Reading is not a private process but a 
process which is relational to its core. To view the reading process as a purely 
solitary action is to undermine the relational quality of reading itself and to suggest 
that human beings are only physically present in the communities in which they live, 
or that they possess absolute self-determination.
Of course, the possible criticisms of a Ricoeurian interpretation of the 
Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate are not confined to the way in which we read the 
biblical texts. A more fundamental question could be asked: Why should the self, the 
moral life, tradition and the story of the community be understood in terms of 
narrative? While we might agree that our desire to know ourselves over time and to 
describe our past may require a narrative structure, i.e., that we tell stories about 
ourselves and our experience, it could be argued that this does not necessarily imply 
that our identity should be understood in terms of such a structure.
6.4 Why Narrative?
But there are compelling justifications for using the narrative structure as the means 
through which we interpret and come to understand ourselves. The first reason is
18 The interpretation o f  the texts o f  the biblical canon is often complex; it requires us to follow  a 
complex set o f  rule-keeping activities so that we might eventually becom e attuned to its message. It is 
for this reason that it can be said that reading the Scriptures involves a process similar to that o f  a 
musician rehearsing his/her part in an orchestra; it requires hours o f  rehearsing and effort before one 
becomes aware o f  the kinds o f  dispositions and attitudes they seek to encourage and promote.
19 Fodor, “Reading the Scriptures,” 150.
197
probably the most straightforward of all, for it refers to the human ability to 
experience and perceive things in the world. We are limited as human beings, limited 
in terms of what we can experience and understand in life. To cope with our 
limitations, and with the sheer immensity of our past, we need to be selective. This 
requires that we classify our experiences into beginnings and continuations, 
resolutions, plots and sub-plots.
Similarly, we rely on others doing the same in order to understand their narrative
story, as well as the complex nature of our own communities, societies and cultures.
For example, parents tell their children about the day they were bom because their
children cannot remember it. Christian parents tell their children of the story of Christ
because their children cannot yet read, and because the only way to make children
feel a part of a history or an event, which they did not witness, is to tell a story about
it. Or, to put it in Ricoeurian terms, narrative liberates the reader from a major
21obstacle to freedom: temporal distance.
A second reason why the narrative structure is important in the search for self- 
understanding is because narrative increases awareness of what it means to be a 
human being. From a very early age children are told stories about wicked
20 Paul Crowther, “Narrative and Self-Consciousness: A  Basis for Virtue-Ethics,” J V I36/4 (2002), 438.
21 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer, Chicago and 
London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1988, 144. Ricoeur asserts that, by re-enacting the past (i.e., 
telling a story about it), we can identify with what once was. It is important to note that Ricoeur 
borrows this term from Augustine’s reflections on time. For Augustine, the human experience o f  time 
in the face o f  the Eternal Kingdom produces a distentio animi, i.e., a dissonant soul or a soul which 
cannot access or hold on to the past, present or future all at the same time. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “Life in 
Quest o f  Narrative,” in David W ood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, Warwick 
Studies in Philosophy and Literature, London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1991, 22ff. Here Ricoeur 
explains that the narrative structure is the configuration o f  that which endures and remains across that 
which passes away. See also Brian Mahoney, “The A ffective Narrative: A Grammar o f  Praxis,” ITQ  
54 (1988), 50. For a clear explanation o f  Ricoeur’s reliance on Augustine’s work on time, see Karl 
Simms, Paul Ricoeur, London and N ew  York: Routledge, 2003, 80ff.
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stepmothers, wicked witches and selfish stepsisters, etc. They are also told non- 
fictional stories about their own identity or about the experiences of the person who is 
telling the story.
Understanding or following the story requires in part the capacity to achieve what 
Crowder terms ‘emphatic identification with how other individuals perceive and 
feel.’22 Along with learning to understand the stories of others, we gradually begin to 
form our own story from the stories others have told us about our past, our society and 
our culture. The relationship then becomes reciprocal: ‘The narrative of a life 
involves learning from others and then going beyond this, and others learning from us 
and then going beyond that.’23 Hence, narrative is essential to our being relational 
human beings in the world, for it is the firs t means by which we understand what it is 
to be human, to exist, to have a history and an identity.
Indeed, Ricoeur points out that if we did not have narratives, which construct durable 
properties of character to which we can relate, we would have no choice but to 
explain the self as something abstract and impersonal. We would be forced to 
interpret selfhood as a ‘supplementary fact’ of our being.24 There would be no 
continuity between person and life-story, for identity would be described in an 
impersonal manner, as an empty question. An impersonal account of identity, then, is
22 Crowther, “Narrative and Self-Consciousness,” 440.
23 Ibid.
24 Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” in W ood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur, 1991, 193.
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undesirable because it ‘seems to be dependent on a technological dream in which the
■ 25brain has from the start been the substitutable equivalent of the person.’
In addition, if we did not have narratives which we could carry over and transpose 
into the exegesis of ourselves, the dialectic of the self would not take place; and if it 
did, it would be deprived of the kind of humanness we have come to expect from 
stories of ourselves and our past. It is for this very reason that Ricoeur’s 
interpretation of the self is connected to stories we tell and read about ourselves and 
our experiences: the self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by the 
detour of the cultural signs of all sorts, narrative being one of them.26
What narrative interpretation brings to life is its figurai nature of character by which
the self can interpret him/herself and through which the self can gain access to the
past. And even if one were to say, ‘Identity does not matter’, it is still a person who
says this, who pronounces the words. The only difference between someone who
says, ‘I am nothing’ and someone who says, ‘I am X or Y ’ is that the former is
experiencing difficulty articulating who they are. In Ricoeur’s own words,
Is that not the meaning of many dramatic—not to say terrifying— experiences 
in respect of our own identity, that is the necessity to go through the trial of 
this nothingness of permanence-identity, to which nothingness would be the 
equivalent of the null case of the transformations dear to Lévi-Strauss. Many 
conversion narratives bear witness to such dark nights of personal identity. At 
these moments of extreme exposure, the null response, far from declaring the 
question empty, returns to it and preserves it as a question. What cannot be 
effaced is the question itself: who am I?27
25 Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” 197; It is interesting to note that recent publications which discuss the 
role o f  narratives, especially “grand narratives”, are putting forward the idea that even the sciences can 
be understood as modes o f  story-telling. This is true because scientists have to tell stories to convey  
their findings. See Stephen Prickett, Narrative, Religion and Science: Fundamentalism versus Irony,
1700-1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, esp. 1-13.
26 Cf. Domish, “Sym bolic Systems and the Interpretation o f  Scripture,” 7ff.
27 Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” 198.
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Possible criticisms of Ricoeur’s work are not confined solely to his use of the 
narrative structure to explain identity; particular questions arise from the application 
of Ricoeurian theory to the Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate. In chapter five the role 
of the Magisterium was discussed, and it was suggested that the disparity between the 
Autonomy and Glaubensethik approaches does not look so great if we use Ricoeur’s 
categories of tradition. It was also suggested that both schools seem to be defending 
tradition, albeit from different perspectives.
Nevertheless, given that there has been so much disagreement between scholars over 
the specific nature of Christian morality, it is likely that some would reject the 
proposal that the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools can be interpreted in 
complementary terms.
In response to this possible criticism, it is worth mentioning James Keenan’s article, 
“Fundamental Moral Theology at the Beginning of the New Millennium: Looking 
Back, Looking Forward.” Here, Keenan suggests that the insuperable differences and 
exclusions created by the so-called autonomous ethics and an ethics of faith are now 
being transcended. Keenan mentions Kathryn Tanner as an example of the kind of
work now being done in contemporary theological scholarship that seeks to reconcile
28conflicting views in theology, and move away from a contrastive style of thinking. 
Indeed, the work of Eric Gaziaux also bears witness to the desire to reconcile
6.5 Ricoeurian Theory and Contemporary Trends in Theology
28 James F. Keenan, S. J., “Fundamental Moral Theology at the Beginning o f  the N ew  Millennium: 
Looking Back, Looking Forward,” TS 65 (2004), 130.
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contrasting theologies: he attempts to find a compromise between Josef Fuchs’
9Qautonomy position and Philippe Delhaye’s faith-ethic stance.
The Dutch theologian, Frans Vosman is also among those authors cited by Keenan 
who are attempting to minimise divisions between authors regarding the interpretation 
of moral autonomy, and move towards a more inclusive understanding of moral 
action.30 Vosman argues for an understanding of autonomy, especially in the political 
arena, which accommodates a morality of faith and an autonomous morality.31 This 
suggests that the general trend in theology at present is towards a more inclusive style 
of reflection, as opposed to an oppositional style, and to a much more relational way 
of understanding and of talking about theology, God and morality than was earlier the 
case.
In our study of the Christian proprium  debate the use of Ricoeurian theory, especially 
in respect of our understanding tradition and Magisterium, assists in moving the terms 
of discourse towards a more inclusive and less confrontational approach. The 
positions of the Autonomy and Glciubensethik schools were integrated so that a more 
fruitful interpretation of tradition and Magisterium might be provided.
In keeping with the general trend of current theological discussion, then, a Ricoeurian 
approach to the specificity of Christian morality debate seeks to accommodate
29 Éric Gaziaux, Morale de la foi et moral autonome: Confrontation entre P. Delhaye et J. Fuchs, 
Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995, esp. 352ff. Gaziaux suggests that D elhaye’s account o f  
concept o f  autonomy should be understood as being founded in theonomy but accomplished  
anthropologically. This analogy is based on the humanity o f  Christ, i.e., created by God for an earthly 
purpose.
30 Keenan, “Fundamental Moral Theology,” 131.
31 Frans Vosman, “Tussen debat en gebed: D e moraaltheologie in de openbare morele discussie,” 
Tijdschrift voor Theologie 43 (2003), 323-345.
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contrasting views rather than categorise them as opposites. It does not favour the 
position of one school of thought over the other but seeks to find a common ground 
between their respective stances, especially between that of the Autonomy school and 
weaker forms of the Glaubensethik school. In this way, Ricoeur’s work provides us 
with an account of tradition and the Magisterium which is faithful to our Christian 
heritage, and responsive to the needs of the Christian living in secular society. It 
could be said, therefore, that a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate 
seeks to transcend differences, rather than maintain and encourage separation and 
division, to compromise rather than defend, to dialogue rather than argue.
6.6 Paul Ricoeur: Philosopher or Theologian?
Of course, in spite of its advantages, one could also object to examining the Christian 
proprium  debate through the eyes of Paul Ricoeur because he is primarily a 
philosopher, not a theologian. Indeed, since many philosophers seem to be at an 
impasse concerning the problem and origin of values,32 one might argue that 
Ricoeur’s work is more aptly described as an attempt to respond to the atheist critique 
of religion than to the concerns of theologians regarding the specificity of Christian 
morality.
Nonetheless, whether considered in light of philosophy or theology, Ricoeur’s work is
significant. For it responds to some of the most fundamental challenges facing
modem theology and philosophy, that is, the loss of meaning. As Vanhoozer puts it,
Two centuries of biblical and historical criticism have in large part silenced 
the Scriptures, even in the Church. Outside the Church, atheist existentialism 
proclaimed the loss of meaning in the world. Sartre, while acknowledging the
32 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. A Study in Hermeneutics 
and Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 279.
203
mystery of human freedom, declared that bereft of any meaningful context 
(creation), man was a “useless passion”. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy is 
aimed at recovering meaning in texts and the meaningfulness of life, and in 
showing the two tasks are at root one.33
Ricoeur’s attempt to show how texts help us to affirm rather than despise life is no
small contribution to either philosophy or theology. In terms of philosophy, Ricoeur
manages to move the discipline away from the idea that human beings are
autonomous and self-made towards the idea that there is ‘something other.’ His
agenda is to assert that human beings are dependent upon something greater than
themselves. In this way, Ricoeur’s work represents an attempt to make a space for the
sacred in philosophical considerations of the human person.
In terms of theology, and the Christian proprium  debate, Ricoeur successfully 
manages to place the biblical texts at the heart of the Christian search for meaning and 
self-understanding, without turning them into legal codes for living. In this way, he 
encourages us to look at the Bible as an indispensable resource for the whole of the 
Christian life.
Thus while one might be sceptical about any attempt to examine the specificity of 
Christian morality through the eyes of a philosopher, one must also be open to what it 
has to offer. Indeed, given that we all share a common humanity, and that we are all 
in search of meaning, belonging, and truth in our lives, it makes sense that one should 
look to other disciplines in search of new answers to old problems.
33 Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative, 279
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6.7 Moral Rules and a Ricoeurian Approach to the Christian Proprium  Debate
Other questions arising out of a Ricoeurian interpretation of the Christian proprium  
debate concern the role of moral rules. Earlier chapters suggested that Ricoeur’s 
contribution to the debate is similar to all that of others involved in current 
scholarship in virtue ethics and spirituality. Character, self-knowledge and 
relationship are considered more important than the following of moral rules and 
principles.
While it is true to say that a morality of virtue is to be preferred over a morality of 
obedience, this should not mean that moral rules have no place in Christian morality. 
As Stanley Hauerwas argues, ‘Virtues need principles and some kind of 
understanding of obligation, for they are not simply emotions but skills of perception, 
articulation and action.34 The same applies to stories; although stories can educate us 
about the virtues by giving us examples of what virtuous behaviour look like, stories 
need principles. We need a way of testing the validity of moral stories, otherwise we 
risk misinterpreting them or using them to suit our own purpose.
Yet, given that our approach to the Christian proprium  debate has not yet mentioned 
the need for rules in Christian morality or in the interpretation of the Christian story, 
we must ask the following question: Is there a need for moral rules in a Ricoeurian 
interpretation of the Christian proprium  debate?
34 Stanley Hauerwas, with Richard Bondi and David Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further 
Investigations into Christian Ethics, Notre Dame: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1977, 45.
205
Yes. According to Ricoeur, one cannot simply consider the aims or goals of moral 
living without considering the need for rules and principles, for our vision of life may 
be distorted or driven by a desire for self-fulfilment. Indeed, we may misinterpret the 
texts of our tradition and use them in an oppressive rather than loving way. In order 
to avoid presenting a one-sided account of morality, Ricoeur emphasises that all 
visions of the Aristotelian good life, moral stories, aims and intentions must be tested 
against the Golden Rule: ‘Do to others as you would have them do to you’ 
(Lk.6:31).35
This is the case because the Golden Rule emphasises reciprocity at all costs. It invites 
us to consider the ‘other’ in every situation. Although it is quite general in its 
application insofar as it does not state precisely what one should or should not do, its 
value should not be underrated. For Ricoeur, the power of the Golden Rule lies in its 
ability to question whether our intentions, actions or dispositions towards other are 
ones which will promote goodness rather than evil, peace rather than violence. The 
universal demand to ‘love one’s neighbour as oneself, therefore, ensures that we do 
not treat humanity as a means to an end, or impose our will and desires on the will of 
another.36
However, this is not to suggest that Ricoeur is in favour of adopting a situationist 
ethics approach to morality. For he believes that the application of the Golden Rule 
will vary given the circumstances of a particular situation. Indeed, he is clear that
35 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathlen Blarney, Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press,
1992, 170.
36 Christoph Theobald, ‘La règle d’or chez Paul Ricoeur,” RSR 83/1 (1995), 43-59.
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sometimes one will have to test the Golden Rule against the intention or aim, so that 
‘doing the loving’ thing will not become a matter of ‘doing what I want’ or 
interpreting the loving response in a purely subjective manner. Thus Ricoeur argues 
that rules or principles do not always have the final say; it is necessary to refer to the 
‘aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice.’
6.9 The Golden Rule: A Specifically Christian Rule?
Of course, since the Golden Rule appears in the biblical texts, one might argue that it 
is at this point that the Ricoeurian argument regarding specifically Christian norms 
breaks down. We have seen that for Ricoeur texts do not yield any specifically 
Christian norms or principles that cannot be known by means of reason and 
rationality. But his use of the biblical formulation of the Golden Rule as way of 
testing the goals of the virtuous life might give the impression that he interprets the 
Golden Rule as a specifically Christian rule.
In response to such claims, Ricoeur’s offers a very carefully thought out response. He 
argues that the Golden Rule is universal and can be known and understood by anyone, 
regardless of race, religion or culture.38 It is not unique to Christianity. Judaism 
teaches, ‘What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow man.’ Islam teaches, ‘No one 
of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself. ’ 
Even Buddhists, some of whom deny the existence of any God, teach, ‘Hurt not 
others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.’ Thus, some formulation of the
37 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 170.
38 See Peter Kemp, “Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Ricoeur,” in John Wall, W illiam Schweiker, 
and W. David Hall (eds.), Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, N ew  York and London: 
Routledge, 2002, 42.
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Golden Rule or some principle of respect towards others is common to most societies 
and religions.
In spite of its universality, however, Ricoeur maintains that the Golden Rule is 
specific to the narrative traditions within which it appears. This explains why the 
quotations used above are different; different narrative traditions use different 
formulations of the same principle. Thus Ricoeur interprets the specificity of the 
Golden Rule in terms of its narrative context rather than its material content. In this 
way, he avoids suggesting that the biblical Golden Rule may be considered as a 
specifically Christian rule.
6.10 Aristotle or Aquinas? Greek or Christian Virtue?
Another possible objection to using Ricoeur’s work as a way of mediating between 
the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools has to do with his understanding of virtue. 
As pointed out earlier in this study, Ricoeur’s contribution to the Christian proprium  
debate is similar to all that is involved in the current return to virtue ethics advocated 
by Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre.
Similarly to Hauerwas and MacIntyre, Ricoeur believes that stories give coherence to 
our lives and help us to gain the necessary tools for understating the virtues. All three 
are at one in the belief that stories make virtuous actions intelligible by giving us 
paradigmatic examples of what virtuous action looks like. Moreover, all three believe 
that the motivation for seeking what best befits human subjects does not come from 
the following of moral rules but from cultivating an internal desire to do the good.
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The enthusiasm among some over the current return to virtue, however, is matched 
among others by a strong disquiet. While, as Stanley Hauerwas explains, ‘This in 
some cases signals nothing else but battles for turf as the hegemony of liberalism is 
challenged, it is not a false alann. It is quite right to ask what sort of politics matches 
or is entailed by the so-called return to virtue ethics.’39
This concern stems from the fact that most contemporary accounts of virtue ethics 
rely on the Greek understanding of virtue, which is closely associated with war and 
courage in battle (arête). The virtuous man is a warrior who seeks to outshine his 
adversaries.40 The intrinsic reward in this kind of understanding of virtue lies in the 
honour one receives from a fellow soldier and from one’s community. Receiving is 
more important than giving, and being master is preferred over being slave.
Moreover, as MacIntyre explains, in Greek society only the Athenian gentlemen 
could aspire to attain certain virtues: ‘Certain virtues are only available to those of 
great riches and of high social status; there are virtues which are unavailable to the 
poor man, even if he is a free man.’41 Thus the social role one occupied was often a 
prerequisite for possessing certain character traits, which makes the possibility of 
incorporating a Greek understanding of virtue ethics into a Christian context all the 
more questionable.
39 Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations 
with Ancient and Modern Ethics, Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1997, 66.
40 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theoty, London: Duckworth, 1985, 169-174; 
Raymond J. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks, Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002, 62ff; and for an interesting treatment o f  the Greek interpretation o f  
virtue viewed through the lens o f  Christianity, see Rosemary Radford-Reuther, “Courage as a Christian 
Virtue,” CC  (Spring 1983), 8-16.
41 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 170.
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According to Hauerwas and Pinches, however, ‘Greek accounts of the virtues are 
there to be used by Christians, not built upon.’42 ‘To use’ requires that one apply a 
thing within a framework significantly other than the one in which it originally 
appeared, which is precisely what Christianity requires, since it is based on the story 
of Christ, that is, the God of love made flesh. As rooted in the story of Christ, 
Christian virtue cannot but be teleologically ordered to peace, just as Greek virtue 
cannot but be ordered to war.43 Its essence is to direct us towards mutuality, and to 
love as God loves. Considered as a response to the love God has shown to humanity, 
Christian virtues are a response of love and peace.
This call to peace may be found in the Pentateuch, where we find the commandment 
to which Jesus so frequently referred: ‘You will not harbour hatred for your brother. 
You will reprove your fellow country men firmly and thus avoid burdening yourself 
with sin. You will not exact vengeance on, or bear any sort of grudge against, the 
members of your race, but will love your neighbour as yourself (Lev. 19: 17-18). 
Hence, although Christian virtue shares certain characteristics with the Greek 
understanding of possessing an internal desire to do good, it need not be understood in 
terms of self-satisfying aims and objectives; its essence is to direct us towards 
relationship with God and with one another. ‘Characterized as Christian charity, the 
relation this mutuality involves is one in which love produces love, limitlessly, for it 
has its end in God, who is boundless love. In the end, then, Christian virtue is not so 
much an initiated action but a response to a love relation with God in Christ.’44
42 Hauerwas and Pinches, Christians Among the Virtues, 68.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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But can the same be said about Ricoeur’s understanding of the virtues as learned 
through stories? That Aristotle inspires his work is clear. He frequently refers to 
Aristotle’s ‘lessons of poetry’ as a way of explaining how stories teach us something 
about virtue by equating it with happiness.45 Ricoeur’s use of the word phronesis is 
also taken from Aristotle’s work, which shows that the thrust of a Ricoeurian 
interpretation of virtue ethics is an essentially Greek one.
In spite of its Aristotelian roots, however, it must be remembered that Ricoeur 
believes texts are both ‘open’ and ‘closed’ entities: closed to preserve the meaning of 
the text, open to allow the meaning of the text to be critically interpreted.46 In this 
way, the act of reading not only places the text in its original context but 
recontextualises its meaning if the previous interpretation is no longer an acceptable 
one.47
This means that although Ricoeur suggests that reading texts can help to educate us 
about the virtues—because texts provide us with examples of what virtuous behaviour 
looks like—he does not encourage a naive reading of the texts. His work encourages 
us to be critical of what texts suggest to us about virtue. The advantage of such an 
approach is that what is valuable in texts may be built upon and what is oppressive or 
detrimental may be scrutinised and/or recontexualised. In spite of its Aristotelian 
roots, therefore, a Ricoeurian understanding of virtue (as learned through texts) is 
unlikely to promote a culture of war and individualism, since it invites us to
45 Paul Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 22-23.
4b Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blarney and John B.
Thompson, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991, 155.
47 See Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutic Function o f Distanciation,” Philosophy Today 17 (1973), 137,
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constantly question and revise the texts of our tradition so that it continues to answer 
to who we are.
6.11 True Stories
Another possible criticism of a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate
concerns his interpretation of the biblical texts. Ricoeur frequently refers to the
■ ¿10biblical texts as offering possible ways of living. By this he means that texts open 
up possible worlds for the reader, in which the reader can imaginatively ‘try out 
various proposals for living’.49 This is why Ricoeur believes that narrative should be 
considered as an ‘immense laboratory for thought experiments.’50
Indeed, his understanding of biblical metaphor is also based on the assumption that
the power of the biblical texts lies in their ability to engage the reader’s imagination,
and to present him/her with new ways of imagining God and the Kingdom.
Metaphors bring unrelated objects together in order to present readers with a broader
or renewed vision of the world.51 Thus Ricoeur’s point is that the biblical texts refer
to a world which is appropriated imaginatively by the reader.
Fiction [he argues] has the power to ‘remake’ reality and, within the 
framework of narrative fiction in particular, to remake real praxis to the extent 
that the text intentionally aims at a horizon of new reality which we may call a 
world. It is this world of the text which intervenes in the world of action in
48 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest o f  Narrative,” 26.
49 See Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 159.
50 Ibid.
51 See Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred'. Narrative and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer and Mark I. 
Wallace, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995, 8.
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order to give it a new configuration or, as we might say, in order to refigure 
it.52
However, this raises questions about whether Ricoeur intends the biblical texts and 
indeed faith, insofar as it involves a belief in the story of Jesus, to be understood in an 
imaginary or fictive way. Where does the real or the historical come into play? 
Given that the story of Christianity is based on a real event, not an imaginary one, 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of the biblical texts might be criticised because of its lack of 
consideration for the historical reality of the story of Jesus.
Donald MacKinnon summarises the issue in a useful way. He argues that
[w]e are fudging if we allow ourselves to suppose that we do not recongize a 
distinction between the actual and the non-actual, between the eruption of 
Vesuvius and the murder of Caesar on the one side, and the birth of Venus 
from the foam, and the exploits of St. George with his dragon, on the other; 
and it is a matter of crucial importance for Christian belief that the resurrection 
of Jesus belongs with the former, and not with the latter.
Faith for MacKinnon is a new dimension of experience, and what makes this new
experience possible is not imaginary ways of living but real events.54 MacKinnnon
also argues that the possibility of redemption that Jesus procured cannot belong to the
world of ideas; it must belong to reality. For the Christ event was an act of flesh and
blood.
But this sharp dichotomy between history and fiction in Ricoeur’s opinion is as 
misguided as that between the real and the imaginary. For it is Ricoeur’s belief that
52 Paul Ricoeur, “On Interpretation,” in Alan Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy in France Today,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 185; see also Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Philosophical 
Antecedents to Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative,” in W ood (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur, 1991, 49.
53 Donald MacKinnon, Borderlands of Theology, London: Lutterworth Press, 1968, 77.
54 Donald MacKinnon, “Introduction,” Newman’s University Semons, London: SPCK, 1970, 17-18.
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both history and fiction ‘invent’ and ‘discover’. In fact, he argues that it is only by 
imaginatively appropriating real events in history that we can enter into the real 
significance of the event.55 But what does this mean?
In Ricoeur’s view, there is a certain amount of fiction contained in history. Likewise, 
there is a certain amount of history contained in fiction. This means that while history 
is thought to communicate facts to us and to describe events in chronological terms, it 
also includes some Active elements. Consider the historian trying to construct a 
picture of the past from various documents or traces of the events. He/she is 
attempting to write one coherent story from the evidence available. Nevertheless, 
since the evidence is incomplete, the historian must begin to tell stories about the 
event and imagine possible ways of giving the event a coherent form. This means that 
there is a Active experience at play before the writing of history takes place.
If we consider all that is involved in writing works of fiction, we begin to see what 
Ricoeur means when he argues that history is included in fiction. Writing fiction 
means that we are not bound by the constraints of time or logic. Fiction is a work of 
the imagination. Nonetheless, fictional works depend on history and real events in 
order to be credible and coherent. It is not unusual, for instance, to find references to 
time and allusions to real events in fictional novels, which indicate that fiction needs 
history. Otherwise it becomes useless and incomprehensible. Thus one can agree 
with Ricoeur that there is a certain amount of fiction contained in history and vice 
versa.
55 See Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative, 11-12.
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Gerard Loughlin relates Ricoeur’s distinction between history and fiction more
closely to the biblical texts. In fact, Loughlin argues that Ricoeur is correct to assert
that they contain both fictive and historical elements.
The Gospel of Luke repeatedly seeks to locate itself in historical time, in the 
time of ruling successions: “In the days of King Herod of Judea...”; (Luke 
1.5) “Now at this time Caesar Augustus issued a decree for a census...”; 
(Luke 2.1) “In the fifteenth year of Tiberius Caesar’s reign...”. (Luke 3.1). 
Are these examples of referring or of mentioning, of history or of fiction? The 
Gospel of Matthew also seeks historical location, telling us that Jesus was 
bom “during the reign of King Herod”. (Math. 2.1) But it opens with a 
“genealogy of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham”, (Math. 1.1) which 
is not biological, unless we assume Joseph to be the biological father of Jesus, 
but ancestral and apparently mythical. This seems to indicate that the Gospel 
is both history and fiction.56
That the Bible includes certain fictive elements, then, is clear. These fictive elements,
however, do not tend to undermine the historical reality of Jesus. Instead, they serve
to make the person of Jesus more real because they encourage us to ask more
questions, to enter into the story, and to ponder its significance, its wonder. Without
imaginative elements the biblical texts would be lifeless and prosaic. Combined with
the imaginative power of symbols and myths, however, the Bible becomes
intriguing— even mysterious.
But of course it speaks also to the intellect and rational mind. Acknowledging the 
Bible’s power to speak to the intellect as well as to the imagination, then, does not 
serve to undermine or distort the reality of Jesus. Rather, it makes the truth of Jesus 
more credible, since it can account for the fact that Kingdom is the ‘already’ and the
56 Gerard Loughlin, Telling God's Story. Bible, Church and Narrative Theology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 148-149.
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‘not-yet’.57 It is what happened (history) and what is yet to come, which we can only 
imagine (imagination), since only God knows the whole story.
Thus we can conclude that Ricoeur’s insistence upon the imaginative aspects of the 
biblical texts and the faith experience of the Christian community is not intended to 
deny the historical reality of Jesus, but to bring us more deeply into the mystery of 
revelation and God’s eternal promise of salvation.
6.12 Ricoeur and Sectarianism
Perhaps the most important concern arising out of a Ricoeurian approach to the 
Glaubensethik and Autonomy debate is that it may be sectarian. This is not only the 
case because it shares certain characteristics with Stanley Hauerwas’ work on 
Christian ethics and virtue, sometimes said to be sectarian, but also because it 
emphasises the need to belong to an historical community which provides a master 
narrative through which we interpret our lives and our actions. The charge of 
sectarianism is made in as much as this argument seems to imply that there is certain 
politics intended for those of the Church which is separate from the world and from 
non-Christians.
Similarly to MacIntyre and Hauerwas, Ricoeur belongs to a school of thinkers who 
deny the Enlightenment claim that meaning can be mediated to us directly. Instead, 
Ricoeur argues that society cannot be organised without a narrative that gives it
57 See Hans Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, W est Broadway, Eugene: W ipf and Stock Publishers 
1997, 143-144. Frei suggests that the interpretation o f  Christ's identity, and o f  those who seek to 
follow  and understand it, is a dilemma. This is true because the Jesus story is an already and not-yet 
embodied identity. But the advantage o f  such an approach, however, is that readers are prevented from 
formulating prior judgements about the identity o f  Christ. A s has been suggested here, the uncertainty 
o f the Gospels shows that, although it has already been established, the Kingdom has yet to come.
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meaning. Nor can one become virtuous without referring in some way to all that has 
been passed on to us by tradition. Ricoeur resists the impulse to free all peoples from 
the chains their own historical particularity in name of freedom. Absolute freedom, 
therefore, is not an option in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Truth for Ricoeur is not 
something which is found independent of any particular conception of the ‘good life’.
In recent years, however, there has been much debate about the legitimacy of such 
claims. They have been deemed sectarian in the sense indicated above. It is also 
believed that such perspectives make dialogue with Christians difficult, and 
encourage them to withdraw from discussions concerning social justice and the 
politics of the community.
Stanley Hauerwas is in the foreground in this respect.58 Similarly to MacIntyre, 
Hauerwas believes that theology, in its attempt to remain intelligible within modem 
culture, has actually emptied itself of its distinctive theological content, as modem 
intellectual culture is deeply antagonistic to its presuppositions.59 Hauerwas argues 
that those theologians who attempted to recast their moral sensibilities in 
philosophical (i.e., neutral) terms have failed, since such efforts only serve to disguise 
theology as philosophy. Citing the works of James Gustafson, Paul Ramsey and 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Hauerwas maintains that these works are attempts to re-shape 
Christian ethics so that it will become acceptable to the modem, ‘secular’ world.60
58 See Michael J. Quirk, “Beyond Sectarianism?” TT 44/1 (1987), 78-86.
59 See Alasdair MacIntyre, The Religious Significance of Atheism, N ew  York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969; Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character, Notre Dame: University o f  Notre Dame 
Press, 1981, 12ff.
60 For a clear outline o f  Hauerwas’ position, see Quirk, “Beyond Sectarianism?” 80.
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Alternatively, Hauerwas appeals to theologians to stop trying to square their 
distinctively Christian moral viewpoint with that of secular culture, and proclaim it as 
a true alternative.
Thus Hauerwas argues that the Church must not feel pressurised to develop a natural 
law morality, but should develop its internal resources and beliefs about the good to 
provide society with alternatives that are not part of the current social and political 
agenda.61 Of course there is much debate as to what these alternative are, and many 
have criticised Hauerwas for suggesting that the Church can provide answers to all 
political and social issues of contemporary society. For instance, Hauerwas’ 
statement that ‘the church serves the world by giving the world the means to see itself 
truthfully’62 has caused much tension between theologians, for it seems to imply that
63the Church is in some way more truthful than any other institution.
Moreover, for the Church to fulfil the fundamental role of witness to the world, 
Hauerwas explains that ‘a certain kind of people is required to sustain it as an 
institution across time’—people of virtue. For him, this means ‘the virtues necessary 
for remembering and telling the story of a crucified saviour,’ especially patience and 
hope. As he puts it, ‘the church must learn time and time again that its task is not to 
make the world the Kingdom, but to be faithful to the Kingdom by showing to the 
world what it means to be a community of peace. Thus we are required to be patient
61 Stanley Hauerwas, “W ill the Real Sectarian Stand Up?” TT 44/1 (1987), 89.
62 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics, Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1983, 101-2.
63 See Wilson D. Miscamble, “Sectarian Passivism?” T T 44/1 (1987), 71ff.
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and never lose hope.’64 In doing this, Hauerwas believes the Church should be like 
the poor and powerless and to live totally within the control of others.65 He also 
argues that Christian social ethics is not to be written from the point of view of those 
in power, but by those who are subject to such people.
In spite of the strong ecclesial claims in Hauerwas’ work, however, it is difficult to 
see how the Church is to deal with and relate to the world. In this respect, his 
argument remains, as he admits, very abstract.66 We are not given precise details as to 
how the Church that embodies the narrative of God revealed in the stories of Israel 
and Jesus is to conduct itself in society. Is it to ignore social policies that go against 
its central telos? Or should it expect others to adopt its claim to truth because it is 
based on the story of Jesus? Moreover, does belief in the story of Jesus mean that 
Christians are excluded from public discussions on social ethics because their 
language is incomprehensible to non-religious persons?
That Hauerwas’ work is provocative is clear. His attempt to situate the story of Jesus 
Christ at the heart of Christian social ethics is significant. Indeed, it is almost 
impossible not to be moved by his call for us to live out a truly Christian life in a 
divided world and help develop the Kingdom on earth. Nonetheless, his work also 
raises serious questions regarding the possibility of inter-religious dialogue regarding 
issues of social justice and public policy. Is the Church the sole model for 
contemporary society, and can the non-religious person expect to understand the 
values of its teachings by using the natural law?
64 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 103.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 111-115ff.
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Some scholars cannot but label Hauerwas as a sectarian—a label which he rejects —  
because he sees the mission of the Church as one which stands apart from society, or 
which stands ‘against’ culture.68 Others argue that, in claiming that the Christian 
story gives Christian a distinctive viewpoint, Hauerwas excludes the role of Christians 
in secular politics and in the world.69 The fundamental question then is whether one 
can contribute to social and political discourse while remaining faithful to the 
narratives that inform and shape our lives.
In essence, this is what is, in common parlance, thought to be at issue when one 
speaks of sectarianism. According to Michael Quirk, ‘“Sectarianism”, in its usual 
sense, entails the impossibility of any rational dialogue with those outside the “sect”, 
on the grounds that their epistemically and morally central convictions are corrupt and 
diametrically opposed to those of “insiders.” Trying to forge a consensus, then, 
would not only be difficult but possibly dangerous, since arguing a point on ‘their’ 
terms might undermine ‘ours.’70 Hence there are two options available to sectarians: 
a) they can either proclaim their truths and beliefs to the world and risk being ignored, 
or b) they can retreat from public discussion altogether, and limit their audience to 
those who share the same views. Often compared to the theology of Karl Barth, this 
kind of sectarianism interprets the quest for truth as an ‘in-house’ affair; it is,
67 Cf. Hauerwas, “Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up?” 90ff.
68 Miscamble, “Sectarian Passivism?” 73.
69 See Quirk, “Beyond Sectarianism?” 79.
70 Ibid.
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therefore, marginal, exclusive and, perhaps worst of all, lacking in any sort of robust 
rationality.71
Of course our intention here is not to determine whether or not Stanley Hauerwas is a 
sectarian.72 Rather, it is to determine whether a Ricoeurian interpretation of the 
Christian proprium  debate, with all that it shares in common with Hauerwas’s views, 
presents us with a sectarian view of the Church and the claim to truth. The question 
may be put as follows: given his instance on the need to belong a tradition that 
provides narratives and practices which promote virtuous behaviour and assist in the 
quest for self-understanding is Ricoeur’s contribution to the Glaubensethik/Autonomy 
debate sectarian? Put more generally, how can one claim to belong to a tradition (‘of 
presumed truth’) and still engage with the world on issues of justice, equality, 
poverty, etc? It may be useful to begin by asking whether the word ‘sectarian’ 
includes the idea of ‘belonging to’ rather than ‘opposition to’. Wayne Meeks’ 
understanding of the word ‘sect’ is useful in this regard.
6.13 Christianity: A Messianic Sect in Israel
When we use the term ‘sect’, according to Meeks, we must recognise that we are 
using the term in an extended sense.73 Included in our understanding of the 
expression ‘Christian sect’ is the ‘sect of Judaism’. Christianity did not simply 
develop by itself, independent from the cultures and religions that preceded it. The
71 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, “God and the Theologians,” in Against Self-Images of the Age, Notre Dame: 
University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1978, esp. 15-16.
72 For an interesting discussion on Hauerwas and sectarianism, see N igel Biggar, “Is Stanley Hauerwas 
Sectarian?” in Mark Thiessen Nation and Samuel W ells (eds.), Faithfulness and Fortitude: 
Conversations with the Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000, 141- 
160.
73 Wayne Meeks, The Moral World of the First Christians, London: SPCK, 1986, 98.
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Christian movement understood itself in terms of the great traditions in which and 
from which it developed—both negatively and positively.74
Indeed, it was considered ‘sectarian’ because its identity consisted in adopting beliefs, 
practices and patterns of behaviour that were not shared by other groups of Jews. It
• ■ * • 7Swas those beliefs and behaviour patterns that determined who the Christians were. 
Similar to other identifiable sects, such as the Essenes and the Pharisees, members of 
the Jesus movement adopted many practices and beliefs from the already-existing 
traditions, most notably Judaism. Yet, they frequently interpreted and responded to 
the tradition from which they emerged in deviant ways. As Meeks tells us, ‘[the 
Christian sect] drew the boundaries of the sacred community differently and more
76narrowly than did the established leaders in Jerusalem.’
Thus we may speak of a ‘sectarian identity’. Very soon after the death of Jesus, his 
followers took a major step in shaping the Christian community so that its unique 
identity became more obvious. Ritual baptism, for instance, was used to initiate 
members into the sect. The ritual of the Lord’s Supper was also a distinctive practice 
by which Christians defined who they were and worshipped the God of Jesus Christ. 
Reenacting the Last supper represented a way of reminding the Christian sect of their 
identity and of relating it more closely with the identity of one person more than any 
other Jewish sect had ever done before. In this last respect, Christians were 
‘messianic’ in a special sense.
74 Meeks, The Moral World of the First Christians, 98.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 99.
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All of this points to the fact that applying the word sectarian to the Christian 
community need not instantly carry negative connotations. This is the case because 
the term ‘sect’ carries with it the sense of a unique identity. Insofar as Christians 
share in the belief that Jesus is the Son of God, and take revelation as their starting 
point for living, Christianity is a sect.
However, Meeks’ view on Christianity as a ‘sect of Judaism’ is also useful in a 
second way. For it draws attention to the fact that Christianity is not something which 
developed from a vacuum in opposition to the world. Meeks explains that it 
developed from the Judaic tradition, and that many Christians did not see themselves 
as leaving Judaism. This suggests that there lies a certain ecumenism at the heart of 
the Christian identity.77 It exists ‘in relation to’ that which precedes it and that which 
surrounds it.
Hence, contemporary discussions on ‘sectarianism’ would do well to note that 
Christianity is not something which developed over and against the world. Its 
distinctiveness lies in its particular story and in the particular way in which it 
interprets itself in light of the story of Jesus Christ. Asserting its particularity in terms 
of story does not, and should not, immediately suggest that Christians cannot dialogue 
with the rest of the world about the content of morality, issues of social justice,
77 For an interesting discussion o f  Christianity as an ecumenical movement, see Frederick Bird, “Early 
Christianity as an Unorganized Ecumenical Religious M ovem ent,” in Anthony J. Blasi, Jean Dumaime 
and Paul-Andre Turcotte (eds.), Handbook of Early Christianity: Social Science Approaches, Walnut 
Creek, Lanham, NewYork & Oxford: A  Division o f  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002, 225- 
246. Bird offers three reasons as to why Christianity may be considered as ecumenical. The first is 
due to the fact that Christianity was constituted by varied and distinctly different kinds o f  associations, 
between which existed at times various disputes, disagreements, and rivalries. Second, this movement 
from its early stages sought adherents widely, from people shaped by multiple cultural and ethnic 
traditions. And third, Bird maintains that by referring to the early Christian community as an 
‘ecumenical community’, one is acknowledging the many ways in which the members o f  the Christian 
sect expressed their interrelatedness. See esp. 224-225.
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inequality, public policy, and so forth. It has been doing all of these things since it 
began. To quote Meeks: “If therefore we are looking for some ‘pure’ Christian values
• 78and beliefs unmixed with the surrounding culture, we are on a fool’s errand.”
Nor should the belief in a particular story imply that Christians should forget who 
they are when they are called to contribute to dialogue with other religious traditions 
or with the secular world. For if we do not know ourselves, how can we know others 
or expect to find ways of living that will secure the conditions necessary for human 
flourishing?
Having sketched what is meant by sectarianism and related it more closely to the idea 
of a specific identity, we must turn now to the functioning of Ricoeur’s interpretive 
theory in the context of the Glaubensethik!Autonomy debate and determine whether it 
encourages sectarianism as it is understood in common parlance. That is, as 
something which exists over and against the world and which makes it impossible for 
Christians to dialogue with the rest of the world regarding morally significant issues.
6.14 Dialogue with Others as a Critique of Religion
There are several reasons as to why a Ricoeurian approach to the specificity of 
Christian morality debate does not entice us to view Christians as superior to others in 
terms of their moral education or to exclude them lfom contemporary discussions in 
society. Recall what was said in chapter five of our discussion. It was argued that, 
although one may belong to a particular tradition and use its story as a master story, 
our understanding of ourselves and of our tradition (sedimentation) must always be
78 Meeks, The Moral World o f  the First Christians, 97.
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open to critique and revision (innovation). This means that, whether one is Christian 
or not, what constitutes all traditions involves a hermeneutic between that which we 
have inherited and that which we do not yet know.
This explains why the natural law is so important in a Ricoeurian interpretation of 
Christian ethics, since it can provide Christians with the necessary resources to ensure 
that their tradition remains capable of revising itself in light of new experiences or, 
indeed, in light of criticisms made by other religions or atheists. It is clear from 
Ricoeur’s work that he sees value in Christians considering the views of others: these 
views can serve as a critique of religion, thereby inviting Christians to reinterpret their 
views in light of contemporary experience.
According to Ricoeur, interaction between Christians, atheists and non-religious 
persons can help to strip away the masks which religion can create.79 For instance, it 
can encourage Christians not to idolise Christ, or indeed themselves, when faced with 
questions from other traditions or from society in general. Ricoeur also argues that 
when God is no longer understood as an immutable idol, superior to all others, his 
image may be recovered. This renewed image can help to remind Christians that God 
is love, not superiority or dominance. In this way, Christians will be invited to 
reassess their own identities in light of this loving image and be open to the criticisms 
of their tradition which may come out of inter-religious or inter-political discussions.
But this is not to say that Ricoeur is proposing that Christians should only accept
criticism when engaging in such dialogue. When discussing the role of Christians in
79 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, Don Ihde (ed.), Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974, 442.
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creating a new Europe, for example, he is clear that Christians may also criticise other 
traditions in light of what they believe to be true and just. For this will provide the 
necessary external critique needed to ensure that other religious traditions or atheists 
do not create a culture of superiority in society.
In fact, in his writings about the ethos of the European communities Ricoeur makes 
some of his most compelling comments about the role of religion in society and in the 
formation of a just society. It is worth mentioning his central points here because they 
will serve as a model through which we may gain a clearer picture as to how Ricoeur 
views the role of Christians in society. This will also serve us for the purpose of 
showing that his position is not sectarian in any way.
6.15 Christians in Europe and the World
Ricoeur’s interest in constructing an ethos for Europe stems from the unprecedented 
problem of how to get beyond the form of the nation-state, with its particular identity, 
without repeating its well-known structures at a higher lever of ‘supranationalityk 
Put more simply, Ricoeur is interested in examining how the individual identities of 
states can be guaranteed without hindering the common tasks of the larger society, 
that is, Europe. In his view, Europe cannot be fashioned after any one of its nation 
states, for to do so would be to undermine and estrange others from contributing in 
political life.81
80 For an excellent account o f  Ricoeur’s understanding o f  religions in society, see Alain Thomasset, 
Paul Ricoeur: une poétique de la morale, Leuven: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 1996, 600-606.
81 Paul Ricoeur, “Reflections on a N ew  Ethos for Europe,” in Richard K eam ey (éd.), Paul Ricoeur: The 
Hermeneutics of Action, London: Sage Publications, 1996, 3.
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As usual, Ricoeur’s project is not to determine whether national identity is more 
important than integration in the complex European community. Rather, he attempts 
to mediate between these two respective points of view. Both historical difference 
and the right to universality are of equal importance in Ricoeur’s view for the 
construction of a European community, where the particular identities of all are 
protected in the common search for integration and the creation of just institutions.82
Combing ‘identity’ and ‘alterity’, then, are at the heart of the matter. What we most 
desperately need, according to Ricoeur, are models of integration between these two 
poles. His own approach comprises three models: a) the model of translation; b) the 
model of the exchange of memories; and c) the model of forgiveness.
6.15.1 The Model of Translation
Ricoeur’s first model, translation, refers to the need for bilingual translators in Europe 
so that the language of one nation state may be translated into that of the others. The 
need for translation is also indicative of Ricoeur’s position regarding the integration 
of individual identities in a larger community. For he does not suggest that one 
language should be taken as the language of Europe, but highlights the need for 
translation so that the particular identity of all countries, which is expressed in their 
language, is protected.83 Indeed, Ricoeur also argues that, without adequate
82 Paul Ricoeur, “Quel éthos nouveau pour l ’Europe?” in Peter Koslowski (éd.), Imaginer l ’Europe: Le 
marché intérieur européen, tâche culturelle et économique, Paris: Cerf, 1992, 107-116.
83 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a N ew  Ethos for Europe,” 4; for an interesting discussion on the necessity  
o f translation in a pluralistic world, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
London: Duckworth, 1988, esp. 370ff.
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translation, countries will undoubtedly retreat from discussions about Europe out of a
84fear that their own linguistic and cultural tradition will be lost.
But when Ricoeur speaks of the need for translation, he is not simply referring to the 
linguistic task of literally translating one language into another. He is also making 
reference to the cultural, spiritual and moral aspects of a given country or tradition. 
Thus he speaks of the need for cultural bilingualists capable of ‘attending to this 
process of transference to the mental (symbolic) universe of the other culture, having 
taken account of its customs, fundamental beliefs and deepest convictions; in short, 
the totality of its significant features.’85
6.15.2 The Model of the Exchange of Memories
Linked to the idea that there can be no integration between countries without 
translation is Ricoeur’s second model of integration: the exchange of memories. 
Owing to the fact that translation is understood in the broad sense of transferring both 
cultural and linguistic meanings from one language to another, Ricoeur believes it is 
necessary to extend again the idea of translation to include the narrative history, 
customs, rituals, beliefs, norms and values of a particular culture. This means that, in 
the act of translating, one must be sensitive towards the particular story of a given 
culture. Ricoeur counsels that translators must exercise sympathy towards the ‘other 
culture’, even if this is only possible in imaginative terms.86 There is a responsibility, 
therefore, to respect the narratives of other cultures and to be careful not to 
misinterpret or undermine their meaning when translated into another language.
84 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a N ew  Ethos for Europe,” 4.
85 Ricoeur, “Quel ethos nouveau pour l ’Europe?” trans. Mine, 108.
86 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a N ew  Ethos for Europe,” 6.
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Yet this is not to say that Ricoeur believes that translating the story of one tradition 
involves translating illegitimate prejudices or unhealthy biases, for the identity of any 
community, he notes, is not immutable but open to revision. Included in the act of 
translation or in the act of interpreting another tradition is the idea that the stories of 
other communities may be recounted differently. A plural reading is often necessary 
so that countries are protected from presenting an authoritarian or false view of their 
founding events. Take Germany, for instance: there is little agreement among 
German historians regarding the significance of the criminal episodes of World War II 
and, indeed, of the Holocaust. In this case, a plural reading, or translation, of events 
carried out by another tradition can help to guard against the commemoration of an 
immoral event.
Thus being a part of Europe and interacting with other communities can lead to a 
healthy revision of the ‘founding events’ upon which countries build their identities. 
This interaction is, of course, mutual. It is not simply a case of ‘us’ criticising ‘them’. 
There is no threat of unilateral domination in Ricoeur’s understanding of the wider 
community; instead, he proposes a mutual dialectic between countries, which can help 
countries to avoid being blinded about their identity and the significance of certain 
historical events. For Ricoeur, no tradition can survive if it fails to revise its beliefs 
and stories in light of contemporary praxis.87
Nor can any tradition survive if society keeps reminding it of the evil it has committed 
in the past. Events such as the Holocaust, for instance, should be remembered (so that 
they do not recur), but they should not be used as a way of oppressing countries or
87 See Thomasset, Paul Ricoeur, 604.
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keeping them in an inferior position. This brings us to Ricoeur’s third model of 
integration: forgiveness.
6.15.3 The Model of Forgiveness
This model of tradition is connected to the tendency to commemorate and glory in the 
wounds inflicted on one country by another. Ricoeur advises that integration will not 
be possible as long as particular communities continue to commemorate events which 
signify profound suffering for others. If one country has been at the mercy of another 
in history, communication becomes almost impossible. Thus Ricoeur argues that 
forgiveness for the ‘debts of the past’ is absolutely necessary for the creation of a 
peaceful and loving Europe.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should forget the suffering of others. For 
other countries can learn from the narratives of suffering experienced by their 
neighbours and take the necessary corrective steps to ensure that similar events are 
not re-enacted in their community. However, without a move towards forgiveness 
and reconciliation, Ricoeur believes that the communal goals of the European
o o
community will not be achieved.
The model of forgiveness goes beyond the logic of politics and brings us into the 
religious sphere. This is where Ricoeur believes that religions can assist in the 
creation of a peaceful and just society. The emphasis on love of enemies, reciprocity 
and forgiveness, which is central to Christian belief, can provide the necessary 
resources for sustaining a peaceful community.
88 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe,” 12.
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Ricoeur believes that the Christian manner of approaching the problems discussed
89 1 •here would begin with forgiveness as the dominant theme. Nonetheless, Ricoeur
also notes that, in order to be heard, the Christian tradition must abandon the tendency
to dominate or control the political sphere or to take advantage of the invitation to
public life in order to increase its authority. Christians must adopt a model of
fraternity so that a genuine inter-denominational and cross-cultural exchange will be
possible. Thus he writes:
...Christian communities also pay a price for being heard. This price is two 
fold: they must, on the one hand, thoroughly pursue the course of 
relinquishing power.. ..[in favour of] the horizontal relation of wishing to live 
together. [The ecclesia must assert] itself as a place of mutual aid with a view 
to salvation....This leads us to say—and it is the second price to pay [sic] by 
the Christian communities—that the primary context in which the model of 
forgiveness is designed to be put to the test is that o f interdenominational 
exchanges. It is primarily with regard to each other that the Christian 
communities must exercise mutual forgiveness in order to ‘shatter the debt’ 
inherited from a long history of persecution, inquisition, repression, acts of 
violence which were perpetrated by some communities by other or by all of 
the communities against non-Christians and non-believers. The new 
evangelisation of Europe is a project which carries this twofold price.90
That Ricoeur’s vision of Christianity is not sectarian is clear. He interprets the
Christian’s role in society as an important one, but suggests that Christians must be
willing to abandon the quest for superiority and dominance. Failing this will make
genuine dialogue with other communities impossible. From what has been said above
it is also clear that, although Ricoeur is not partisan to the Christian religion, he
presents us with an account of society that respects the particularity of communities in
the ongoing search for integration on inter-religious, inter-denominational and
international levels.
89 Ricoeur, “Quel éthos nouveau pour l ’Europe?” 115.
90 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a N ew  Ethos for Europe,” 13.
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In this respect, his theory of interpretation is useful in the context of the 
Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate, for it can account for the need to dialogue with the 
rest of the world regarding issues of social justice, equality and public policy without 
undermining the specific identity of each community, religious or otherwise. Far for 
presenting us with a sectarian view of the Christian community, then, Rieoeur 
presents us with compelling model that seems to transcend disagreements concerning 
‘alterity’ and ‘identity’. For Christians, this means that they can be present in society 
as Christians and contribute to the human search for justice, equality and love without 
being forced to abandon the narrative that continues to shape their lives.
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CONCLUSION
One of the most difficult things to do with any piece of work is to finish it. As the 
work progresses it raises new question and new perspectives. In this respect, no 
treatment of a given topic is every truly complete. Nonetheless, we must attempt to 
bring together the ideas which have been put forward throughout this study in the 
hope that they will help to show how Paul Ricoeur’s anthropological philosophy can 
contribute to the Christian proprium  debate.
Ricoeur’s insistence on the power of narrative to act as a memory of the past is 
perhaps the most important way in which his work can help proponents of the 
Glaubensethik and Autonomy debate to move beyond the current impasse. For it 
invites us to reconsider the role of the Bible in Christian morality and to place it in 
what is perhaps the most important role of all, that of identity. This means that the 
primary role of the Bible is to answer the question ‘Who am I?’ rather than merely 
‘What am I to do?’
Introducing Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory of interpretation into the Christian 
proprium  debate moves discussions about the role of the Bible in Christian morality 
away from acts, norms and principles, to emphasise the human person and his/her
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need to understand their master story. For Christians, this master story is the story of 
Jesus Christ. The Bible acts a memory for the believing community. Reading the 
biblical stories, in public or in private, is important for the faith community, since it is 
the only way they can access their story—a story which they did not witness but in 
which they believe, in faith.
Moreover, Ricoeur’s work affirms that without some minimal remembrance of one’s 
origins or of the story in which they are entangled, Christians would find it almost 
impossible either to remember or remain faithful to the promises made in the 
Covenant. In this way, Ricoeur’s work affirms that the Bible is an essential resource 
for the Christian community, for its future is based on the promises made in the past. 
And if these promises were not recorded (through narrative), the Christian community 
would lose its direction and its sense of identity.
Of course, none of this is to say that, although it can move the Christian proprium  
debate away from the search for norms and principles, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory 
undermines the role of the Bible in the moral lives of believers. In fact, the opposite 
is the case. It is Ricoeur’s belief that every society needs stories and ethical tales that 
recount episodes of good and evil to which they can relate when making moral 
decisions. His writings invite us to reconsider the value of the ethical stories 
contained in the Bible. We are asked to interpret them as ‘proposals for living’, as 
‘possible ways of behaving in the world’.
Moreover, Ricoeur’s interpretation of ethical narrative helps us to move away from 
the idea that Bible should tell how to live by giving us specific rules and principles.
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Instead, Ricoeur offers us an imaginative alternative. His work suggests that the 
ethical stories contained in the Bible are useful insofar as they give us examples of 
what virtuous behaviour looks like. Following the development of the characters in 
stories allows believers to become familiar with the kind of character traits necessary 
for authentic moral growth and maturity. More importantly, these stories allow us to 
articulate and recognise the virtues, which would be all but incomprehensible without 
stories that explain their meaning.
The similarities between a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  debate and 
current trends in virtue ethics seem to confirm this view. The works of Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas show strong links with a Ricoeurian interpretation 
of the Bible. These scholars are united in the belief that we cannot know what the 
good life requires if it were not gathered together in some way. Although each 
stresses a different function of narrative in the pursuit of goodness, the work of all 
three is marked by the desire to transcend former preoccupation with acts and 
principles. This makes the case for moving the Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate in a 
similar direction all the more promising.
But the advantages of adopting a Ricoeurian interpretation of the Bible do not stop 
here. The move away from the search for norms and principles to emphasise the role 
of the Bible in the formation of character and identity means that Christian ethics is 
offered more resources than before. Virtue ethics not only provide a space where 
biblical scholars and moralists can dialogue, but it opens up the possibility of putting 
morality and spirituality (which includes biblical spirituality) back together.
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Ricoeur’s understanding of revelation as the symbolic disclosure of a loving God who 
invites us to union with him makes it possible to affirm the affective dimensions of 
Christian morality. Rather than submission to an authoritative divine word that 
demands obedience, Ricoeur prefers to speak of the imagination being transformed in 
the living encounter with God through the Scriptures.
When incorporated into the debate about the specific identity of Christian morality, 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of revelation engenders a spirituality of hope and liberation, 
of loving engagement with the world. The events of Sinai are no longer understood as 
legal codes that demand obedience and undermine freedom. Instead, the giving of the 
covenant is affirmed in terms of an invitation to relationship. The believing 
community is, therefore, asked to care for creation in the way that God does, and 
strive for perfection in all subsequent relationships.
Contemporary trends in spirituality emphasise the need for greater alliance between 
morality and spirituality. For the faith community believes that morality is bom out 
of spirituality. For Christians, love of God means love of neighbour. Moral action is 
the outpouring of God’s love. Since a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian proprium  
debate interprets revelation as the invitation to relationship, rather than to obedience, 
it can answer to the contemporary call to acknowledge that Christian morality is 
rooted in Christian spirituality. Although the content of Christian morality may not be 
any different from that of a non-believer, faith in God means that Christians will 
interpret their moral actions in light of their relationship with God. Love gives rise to 
love.
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In spite of its ability to account for the affective aspects of Christian morality, 
however, a Ricoeurian approach to the specificity of Christian morality debate can 
also demonstrate the need for a Magisterium. This is the case because Ricoeur 
believes that we are bom into a context of ‘presumed truth’. We are historical beings 
who exist in a community, a tradition that considers certain things to be true. 
Although Ricoeur’s work suggests that the content of Christian morality is 
discoverable by all, it does not support the idea that human beings are autonomous or 
absolutely free. In Ricoeur’s view, individuals are historical beings who belong to a 
horizon of meaning which existed long before they did.
Yet this is not to say that history is fixed. Nor is it to suggest that the truths of history 
should be considered as absolute truths in every age. This is why Ricoeur chooses to 
consider history and, indeed, truth as a dialectic between ‘sedimentation’ and 
‘innovation’. Thus, for Ricoeur, the search for truth is truly a search. Moral agents 
are called time and time again to question the received wisdom of the past so that it 
continues to answer to the needs of contemporary society and its demands. However, 
since Ricoeur believes that one cannot access the truth without some reference to the 
received wisdom of the past, his work suggests that there is a need to protect this 
wisdom. In this way, it can provide us with a way of affirming the need for a 
Magisterium in the Christian tradition.
The Magisterium can protect the received wisdom of the past until such times as it 
needs to be changed or revised. Moreover, since a Ricoeurian approach to Christian 
morality also suggests that texts should be understood in the same dialectical way, the 
magisterial role may again be affirmed. This time, however, it is placed in the role of
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protector of the primary archive of Christian identity, that is, the Bible. The 
Magisterium, therefore, is called to act as a protector of truth and of the ‘memory’ of 
the Christian community.
It is also called to stand before the faithful and before the court of critical reason. For 
in Ricoeur’s view, no community can survive without the ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’. His work provides us with a model of the Christian tradition which 
includes Habermas’ theory of ‘communication free from domination’. This means 
that the Magisterium is expected to provide well-reasoned answers as to why the 
faithful are expected to accept this of that set of directives. In this way, the 
Magisterium is prevented from falling into a self-interested body that is free from 
critique or adverse to change. This is a compelling model: it can account for the need 
to have leadership in the church without suggesting that the Magisterium is something 
which exists apart from or over and against the experiences and needs of all its 
members.
But perhaps Ricoeur’s most interesting contribution to the Christian proprium  debate 
lies in his ability to provide us with an account of tradition that appears to satisfy the 
concerns of the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools. Indeed, most of Ricoeur’s 
commentators agree that he is extraordinarily considerate to all the alternative 
positions which he interrogates, and these positions have been many.1 As Walter 
James Lowe put it, ‘There is no surer rule for reading Ricoeur than to watch for the 
apparent dichotomies and then look for the argument by which the dichotomies will
1 Don Ihde, “Paul Ricoeur’s Place in the Hermeneutic Tradition,” in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Library o f  Living Philosophers Series, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois:
Open Court, 1995, 64.
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be overcome.’2 Of course it must be said that Ricoeur has not made any direct 
comments about the issues at stake in the Glaubensethik/Autonomy debate, his 
understanding of history and tradition as a dialectic between past and present can 
provide us with a way of transcending the dichotomies between the Autonomy and 
Glaubensethik schools vis-à-vis tradition.
This is the case because, similar to what the Glaubensethik school is trying to achieve, 
Ricoeur believes that tradition mediates truth to us (sedimentation). Nonetheless, 
Ricoeur’s position is almost always a dialectical one. Therefore, he also asserts the 
need for critique in the present (innovation), so that past does not fall into practical 
insignificance. This is what proponents of the autonomy view are trying to achieve 
by asserting the importance of the natural law in the search for moral truth. When we 
use Ricoeur’s model in the context of the debate on the special character of Christian 
morality, then, it shows us that the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools are 
defending two sides of the same coin. In this way, Ricoeur’s work provides us with a 
way of transcending the existing dichotomies between the two schools. It provides us 
with an approach to tradition in which the concerns of both schools are not only 
considered but integrated to give us a broader understanding of the Christian tradition 
and its role in the Christian search for truth and understanding.
Indeed, Ricoeur’s views on the role of individual states in the European community
offer us another useful model which may be incorporated into the Christian proprium
debate. For it provides us with a way of understanding how Christians can dialogue
with the rest of the world about moral matters while remaining faithful to the narrative
2 Walter James Lowe, “The Coherence o f  Paul Ricoeur,” Journal of Religion 61 (1981), 389; see also 
Alain Thomasset’s comments in Paul Ricoeur: une poétique de la morale, Leuven: Presses 
Universitaires de Louvain, 1996, 621.
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that constitutes their specific identity. Ricoeur proposes a mutual dialectic between 
the countries of Europe, where each country is invited to respect and question the 
identities and views of the others. He sees value in countries questioning each other, 
for it prevents any one country from dominating the European community or from 
adopting an unhealthy self-image.
This dialectic may be used in the context of the Christian proprium  debate for it can 
account for both ‘identity’ and ‘difference’. It does not expect individuals to abandon 
their master story when faced with adversity or with the ethical issues of the wider 
community. This means that Christians can be Christians in society. However, 
Ricoeur also asserts the need for criticism so that one community does not try to 
control another. He sees value in inter-religious, secular, and international dialogue. 
The views of ‘another’ or of an ‘outsider’ can help traditions, religious or otherwise, 
to revise or reinterpret their position. For when we are partisans to a given tradition 
we may be blinded by its biases and prejudices.
Thus there is no threat of sectarianism in a Ricoeurian approach to the Christian 
proprium  debate. Nor is there any threat of a loss of identity. Ricoeur invites us to 
understand the whole of the Christian life in terms of a healthy dialectic between who 
we are and what we are expected to do in every age; between the past which shapes us 
and the present which asks us to be critical; between our story and the story of others; 
between love of God and love of neighbour; between Christians and atheists; between 
community and the world; between Glaubensethik and Autonomy.
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In short, Ricoeur is a mediator. He calls us to consider the significance of Scriptures, 
and ourselves, again. His writings invite us to reconsider the long-standing divisions 
between the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools and provides us with an alternative 
way of interpreting and affirming what is specific about Christian morality: Christians 
consciously pursue the goals of morality, as well as their quest for self-understanding, 
through the lens of the faith story.
But this is not to say that the Christ event gives Christians a detailed code for living. 
Instead, as Ricoeur sees it, Jesus came to disclose what is humanly possible. Belief in 
Jesus means that we have more reason to hope rather than to despair, that we can 
affirm life rather than despise it, that we can go on searching in spite of the absurdity 
of life and death. Thus Ricoeur’s philosophy is significant for Christian ethics 
because it approximates in style and in content an account of the theological virtues of 
grace, hope and love.
Grace—Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy helps us to see that, for Christians, the 
meaning of life is a gift, a gift which we have received in freedom. In the beginning 
was the Word. This means that we are not our own makers but invited to participate 
in life in a meaningful and responsible way because it has been given to us by God. 
The Christian story of Resurrection and Salvation opens up the possibility of 
affirming life and of saying ‘yes’ to it in faith and in freedom. This is Ricoeur’s 
‘second Copemican revolution’3: we are not self-constituting but are constituted by 
the world around us, by our story and by the master story of our tradition. The Word
3 This is a term used by K evin J. Vanhoozer to describe how Ricoeur’s philosophy is an attempt to 
overthrow the s e lf  s pretensions to be the source o f  its own existence. See Vanhoozer, Biblical 
Narrative in the Philosophy o f  Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics and Theology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, 127.
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shapes the Christian imagination and opens the hearts o f the faithful so that they can 
receive and participate in the gift of creation.
Hope— Ricoeur’s work also shows us that the Christian story is a source of hope for 
Christians as they engage with the world and attempt to find ways of living that 
promote and sustain all human persons. Biblical metaphors, narratives and poetic 
language nourish the Christian community by displaying visions of possible worlds, 
possible ways of living and of behaving. They help Christians to recognise and 
articulate the virtues, and encourage them to continue searching for truth ‘in spite of 
everything’.
Love—Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy interprets the Christian story and faith in 
terms of an affirmative acceptance to enter into a special relationship with God, where 
love, not obedience, is a cardinal concern. God is not the authority above us but the 
spirit among us. In this way, Ricoeur’s work caters for the fact that, while it does not 
yield any new or rationally defensible norms or values that are beyond the scope of 
reason, faith provides Christians with a sense of belonging, of worth and of 
meaningfulness in the face of the absurdity of life. For Ricoeur the Word invites 
Christians to look at creation in a loving way. But it remains that this Word does not 
concretely demand anything more from Christians than that they use their freedom 
and interpret their specific story in a responsible way as they continue to find ways of 
loving creation as God does.
Nonetheless, it might well be argued that since Ricoeur’s view lead to a rejection of 
the argument that there are specifically Christian norms or values contained in the
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Christian tradition, or in the texts of the canon, that his position comes close to that of 
the Autonomy school, thereby weakening the argument that he may be seen as a 
mediator. There are several points worth noting here, however, that seem to suggest 
otherwise. It will be recalled that the Autonomy position is not merely described in 
terms of a belief that the content of Christian morality is the same for the Christian 
and the non-Christian. Its proponents also stress the importance of a specific 
motivation to do the good. Although, as MacNamara points out, no author has given 
an adequate explanation of the term, and the Glaubensethik school has dismissed it as 
mere decoration, proponents of the Autonomy school continue to emphasise its 
importance.4
Ricoeur, however, does not seem to agree that the texts of the biblical tradition can or 
should be adequately described in terms of their motivational value. This is the case 
because one can also be motivated by secular literature and by stories of injustice told 
to us by the media and by autobiographical narratives.5 Indeed, some Ricoeurian 
scholars have attempted to explain how the cinema can motivate and deepen one’s 
desire and awareness of what it means to be moral or to be a self-conscious being.6 
There is, of course, merit in such studies. However, insofar as the Bible recounts 
what is the most profound event in history (i.e., God made flesh) Ricoeur does not 
seem to agree that emphasising the motivational character of the Bible encompasses 
the richness that the Christian story has to offer. Emphasising its motivational power
4 Vincent MacNamara, Faith and Ethics: Recent Roman Catholicism, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1996, 200.
5 See Paul Ricoeur, “Myth as the Bearer o f  Possible Worlds,” in Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: 
The Owl o f  Minerva, Aldershot/ Ashgate, 2004, 122.
6 See Glenn Whitehouse, “Unimaginable variations: Christian Responsibility in the Cinema o f  Broken 
Identity,” L T 18/3 (2004), 321-350.
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strips the Bible of its ability to shape character, to deepen our understanding of 
ourselves, and to develop good dispositions so that Christians will have the necessary 
moral tools for moral action when they are called to act. This is not something that 
has been discussed by the Autonomy school, which further highlights the fact that 
Ricoeur cannot be categorised as an Autonomist.
Nor can he been classified as a proponent of the Glaubensethik view. Although 
Ricoeur agrees that truth and goodness must be mediated to us through history and 
through the received wisdom of the past, he goes a step further to emphasise the need 
to interrogate our preconceived notions of truth so that they continue to answer to the 
needs of the Christian community. This dialectical model sets Ricoeur’s approach 
apart from the Glaubensethik and Autonomy schools. His work offers the possibility 
of interpreting the Christian tradition and its moral worth in terms of a dialectic 
between that which tradition proposes and that which the moral agent must find out 
for him/herself.
The former point further highlights the fact that Ricoeur’s position lies somewhere in 
between the stances taken by the Autonomy and Glaubensethik schools, for it seems 
to suggest that, although the Christian tradition does not offer Christians any new 
norms or values that are beyond the scope of reason, there may be times when 
Christians are swayed by the summoning voice of the biblical texts. This means that 
Christians may find themselves ‘going the extra mile’, or beyond what is merely 
rational, forgetting themselves and putting the welfare of another first.
244
While these situations will only arise out of an acceptance o f what the biblical 
tradition proposes as the Life of Christ and cannot be predetermined, Ricoeur, like 
many writers of the Autonomy schools and weaker forms of the Glaubensethik view, 
does not rule out the possibility that giving up the self is a specifically religious 
ethical proposal. It is not specifically Christian, but it is certainly an ethical motif that 
runs throughout the history of the faith community and appears to go beyond the 
demands of rationality.7
For Ricoeur, nothing is set in stone. The quest for truth, although carried out with the 
help of tradition and its proposals for living, is ongoing and cannot be easily 
understood or read off from the texts of tradition. It must be open-ended, because the 
nature of the human person and of life itself demands it to be. It must be closed, 
because the fallen nature of man means that we run the risk of adopting a purely 
subjective morality. Truth, then, lies in one’s ability to deal with the ‘in-between’ and 
with the difficult task of critically interpreting tradition and its proposals and of using 
reason in a way that will flesh out what tradition has to offer in terms of how we 
should live.
7 See Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de 
Launay, trans. Kathleen Blarney, N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 152. The conversation 
between Azouvi and de Launay runs as follows: Azouvi and de Launay: ‘What you say about 
“bracketing” the problem o f  the resurrection o f  the flesh, in a glorious body, should have as its primary 
ethical consequence a lack o f  concern about one’s own salvation, but also, more deeply, a lack o f  
concern with salvation as such in the sense o f  an afterlife. W ould you go as far as that?’ Ricoeur:
‘Yes, o f  course. I believe more and more that one has to divest oneself o f  that concern in order to pose 
the problem o f  life until death. Everything that I have tried to say about the se lf and otherness in the 
self, I would continue to defend on the philosophical plane; but, in the religious order, perhaps I would 
ask to give up the self. I have already quoted the word attributed to Jesus and which is undoubtedly 
one o f  the ipsissima verba: “He who would save his life must lose it.” It may very w ell be that, 
philosophically, I must persevere in the defense o f  the se lf in opposition to the reductive claims 
addressed to it. I remain a reflexive philosopher, hence a philosopher o f  the self, o f  the ipse. But the 
shift to the religious question, which in Kantian terms has for its sole theme, unlike morality, 
regeneration— I translate: the restoration or the establishment o f  a capable human being, one capable of 
speaking, o f  acting, o f  being morally, juridically and politically responsible— this shift from the moral 
to the religious presumes a letting go o f  all the answers to the question ‘Who a m i? ’ and implies, 
perhaps, renouncing its insistence as well as its obsession’ (p. 155-156).
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Thus Ricoeur’s work demonstrates that selfhood does not begin with reason or with 
an autonomous self but with an awareness that the subject enters consciousness 
already formed by the symbolic systems within its tradition. This implies that moral 
consciousness and self-understanding are never empty concepts but always already 
interpenetrated by the founding symbols and stories that constitute one’s communal 
heritage. What constitutes the self and the moral consciousness of Christians involves 
the interpretation of the specific symbols of the Christian identity and faith, not those 
of any other tradition.
Christian morality is, therefore, unique. Christians have a specifically Christian 
identity that is formed through the Christian story. If Ricoeur is correct, the journey 
to selfhood commences with the exegesis of the imaginary symbols and stories 
constitutive of one’s tradition in order to equip the subject to become an integrated 
self by means of appropriating these symbols and stories as her own. Thus faith is the 
belief that listening to the summoning voice of the Christian tradition, texts, stories 
and symbols leads to the performance of a life well lived in relation to self and 
others.8
8 Note: There are similarities between this view  and that o f  Joseph Selling. Selling argues that 
‘thinking about acts or simply about intentions is never enough i f  we hope to come to a realistic 
understanding o f  committed discipleship. In order to m ove in that direction, we need to think twice—  
about the attitude that we develop, and the sense o f  proportion we engage in making concrete 
decisions.” Cf. Joseph Selling, “The Renewal o f  Moral Theology,” DL  55/4 (2005), 10.
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GLOSSARY
Ricoeur uses specific terms to translate German expressions. For example, he 
generally renders Deutung as interprétation and Auslegung as explication, even 
though both German expressions are commonly translated as ‘interpretation’ in 
English. Accordingly, most of Ricoeur’s translators have translated these, and 
related terms, as follows:
compréhension ( Verständnis): understanding 
explication {Erklärung): explanation 
explicitation {Auslegung): explication 
interprétation {Deutung): interpretation
Although in most cases I have used an English translation of Ricoeur’s work, 
some of Ricoeur’s terms are quite specific to his anthropological philosophy. 
Hence their meaning may not be immediately obvious to the reader. What 
follows is a brief explanation of some of the Ricoeurian terms used in this thesis. 
It is hoped that it will serve as a guide for the reader.
Distanciation: the effect of being made distant from the producer of the text and 
the cultural conditions under which the author wrote. There are four functions 
of distanciation: 1) the text as a relation of speech and writing; 2) the text as a 
structured work; 3) the text as a projection of a world; 4) the text as mediating 
self-understanding.
Emplotment: the organisation of the various elements of a story into a coherent 
whole.
La langue: grammar. Gram m ar is necessary for the construction of a coherent 
sentence or phrase.
La parole: speech or an act of saying. Ricoeur’s use of this term shows that 
speech is an instance of discourse, i.e., it is more than just a system of signs.
Mimesis: a representation of human reality. Ricoeur uses this term to explain 
how narrative functions as a medium through which aspects of reality may be 
communicated to the reader. There are three kinds of mimesis: mimesis I, 
mimesis II, and mimesis III.
2 4 7
M uthos: plot.
Phronesis: practical wisdom. (Also called prudentia.)
Schismatic utopianism: this occurs whenever our projection of the future is 
disassociated from the past. In other words, it refers to the negation of the past 
in the present and in our utopian ideals concerning the future.
Temporal dissonance: this refers to the distance which separates us from the 
past. According to Ricoeur, this obstacle may be overcome through narratives 
which recount events from the past, for narrative is that which remains over that 
which flows away.
Other terms which are not exclusively Ricoeurian but which merit a brief 
explanation here are:
Orthodoxy: Derived from two Greek words: orthe, meaning right or correct, and 
doxa, meaning opinion or glory, this term refers to that which is representative of 
established or sound doctrine in any given field.
Praxis: Praxis is a notion which has become foundational in many contemporary 
theologies. Political and liberation theologians are accredited with introducing 
the term into modern theology, as they called for a restructuring of theology in 
which praxis would not only be the aim of a theoretical and already-established 
theology, but would also be the foundation of modern theologising. The use of 
the Greek term, praxis, indicates a complex and diverse range of meanings. It 
does not simply mean action or activism in opposition to theory; rather, it refers 
to a dialectic between theory and praxis, i.e., a transposition of traditional 
theological issues or concerns on the relation between faith and reason into a 
contemporary, as distinct from modern, context. In terms of moral theology, it 
perform a significant role, for it encourages human agents to take responsibility 
for their own lives, gives them experiences of what it means to be a ‘person’, and 
not merely passive objects of their histories. A full study of the weaknesses and 
strengths of praxis is beyond the scope of this editorial piece. Cf. The New  
Dictionary o f  Theology, eds. Joseph A. Komonchak, M ary Collins, Dermot A. 
Lane, Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1987, 784-787.
Utilitarianism: Utilitarianism is the extension of philosophy of the Christian 
doctrine of Agape, which has counterparts in the various formulations of the 
Golden Rule. The central idea is that, if we are to love our neighbours as 
ourselves, we are to love all equally. This view runs into difficulty, however, 
when two values of equal importance conflict, or where the good of one person 
conflicts with the good of another. Utilitarianists respond to such conflicts by 
following whatever course of action will lead to the greatest happiness among the 
greatest number of persons. This means that the good of one person may be 
sacrificed if it will make a greater number of people happy. Cf. A Dictionary o f  
Christian Ethics, ed. John M cquarrie, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967, 351-352.
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